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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The constitutionalist debate - over where decision-making authority in society should lie, and how it 
should be exercised - is one which is of fundamental importance not only in academia and 
constitutional theory, but in society generally. Involving issues of morality and political morality, 
particularly acute where rights are concerned, the constitutionalist debate is also one controversial 
beyond academia; the issues involved go to the heart of the current political controversy over 
Conservative plans to replace the UK’s Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights, an approach 
generally viewed negatively within the UK legal academy.1 
The debate is characterised by opposition between two main groups as to how decision-making 
power should be distributed and exercised in society: political constitutionalists and legal 
constitutionalists. In general terms, political constitutionalists argue that controversial issues should 
be resolved by those who are politically accountable, through the political decision-making and 
legislative processes. Members of this school oppose measures which attempt to take rights-issues 
out of the political arena (or at least limit its influence) and into the courtroom; they characterise 
such issues as political disputes through-and-through, which should be left for political resolution by 
electorally accountable bodies.2 Thus, there is a tendency among political constitutionalists to favour 
principles such as Parliamentary sovereignty (the right of the elected legislature to ‘make or unmake 
any law whatever’),3 described by Bellamy as the ‘crux’ of a political constitution,4  and to oppose 
Bills of Rights,  either generally, for the reason that they (according to one commentator) inevitably 
have the effect of transferring ‘too much power…to an unelected judiciary’,5 or particularly those 
that come with a legal strike-down power against legislation deemed incompatible (the specific 
target of Jeremy Waldron’s case against judicial review).6 In contrast, legal constitutionalists turn 
primarily to the legal institutions and processes to resolve issues over rights and their 
implementation. Politics is often characterised as a potentially dangerous arena, which effectively 
                                                          
1
 See, for example, H Fenwick, ‘The Human Rights Act or a British Bill of Rights: creating a down-grading 
recalibration of rights against the counter-terror backdrop?’ [2012] PL 468. 
2
 The classic account of the inescapably political nature of rights-issues comes from JAG Griffith, ‘The Political 
Constitution’ (1979) 42(1) MLR 1. See also his Public Rights and Private Interests (Academy of Legal 
Publications Trivandrum 1981) and The Politics of the Judiciary (5
th
 edn, Fontana 1997). 
3
 AV Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (5
th
 edn, Trollope Press 2009) 38. 
4
 R Bellamy, ‘Legislative Comment: Political constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act’ (2011) 9(1) ICON 86, 
89. 
5
 J Allan, ‘An Unashamed Majoritarian’ (2004) 27 Dalhousie LJ 537, 544. 
6
 See, for example, J Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1346. 
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leaves issues of fundamental importance to the mercy of temporary majorities.7 With this in mind, 
legal constitutionalists tend to favour devices limiting the power of the political institutions, such as 
Bills of Rights, and the institution of judicial rights-review of legislation.8 
The main aim of this thesis is to critically examine the above debate. The examination will take place 
from a particular, sceptical philosophical perspective, one which questions the possibility of 
convincingly defending moral premises in a way which does not merely amount to the questionable 
assertion and question-begging reassertion of a particular individual or group. This claim will be set 
out and defended in detail in Chapter 2 via a pragmatic anti-realist and anti-foundationalist 
approach, drawing on aspects of the sceptical work of the legal theorist Arthur Leff, and the 
pragmatic approach of the philosopher Richard Rorty. For reasons of space, not all (nor even a 
substantial amount) of the legion of philosophical arguments concerning the defence of moral 
premises and claims can be considered. The discussion will therefore be limited to some of the most 
influential approaches, and those which have the most significance for the issues raised here. Thus 
the work of Alan Gewirth in particular will be considered in some detail because of the interest of 
the method relied on, which offers the possibility of defending moral and normative claims, placing 
them beyond question, in a way which avoids the criticisms of other approaches made by the anti-
realist and pragmatic argument put forward here. John Rawls' arguments are considered (in detail in 
Chapter 4) due to his wide-ranging influence and status as, perhaps, the pre-eminent liberal political 
philosopher of modern times. The relevance of the perspective defended here will become clearer 
as the thesis goes on to apply it to issues and arguments within the constitutionalist debate, and a 
large part of Chapter 3 directly responds to arguments that the issues on which this perspective 
takes a stance are in fact irrelevant to that debate and the issues within it. These arguments must be 
given careful consideration given that they effectively question the very purpose of this thesis. In 
particular, the irrelevance argument put forward by Jeremy Waldron will be considered in detail, 
because of the strong influence of his work in the constitutionalist debate. It will be contended, 
however, that Waldron’s argument amounts to an incoherent and self-contradictory implicit attack 
on a particular side of a debate which is claimed to be irrelevant; Waldron himself ends up taking a 
stance on the philosophical issues which it is the whole point of his argument to show are irrelevant 
to the issues within the constitutionalist debate. Here, some more general, and (the author believes) 
original, thoughts regarding the (in)consistency of Waldron’s philosophical stance - in particular on 
                                                          
7
 See, for example, R Dworkin, A Bill of Rights For Britain (Chatto & Windus 1990) esp. 35-6; WJ Waluchow, A 
Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The Living Tree (CUP 2007) esp. 163, 258; TRS Allan, ‘Legislative 
Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism’ (1985) 44(1) CLJ 111, 116. 
8
 For examples see: Dworkin, ibid; C Fabre, ‘The Dignity of Rights’ (2000) 20(2) OJLS 271; ‘A Philosophical 
Argument for a Bill of Rights’ (2000) 30 British Journal of Political Science 77. 
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the realism/anti-realism issue - will also be offered via a close analysis and comparison of his various 
comments (section 3.3.1). Having rejected the argument that the philosophical perspective taken in 
this thesis is irrelevant to key issues within the constitutionalist debate, its relevance and 
consequences will be considered in relation to that debate in the remainder of this work. 
Chapter 3 goes on to consider instrumentalist approaches to the question of the distribution and 
exercise of decision-making authority in a constitution, commonly put forward. In essence this 
approach views the (lack of) justification for an arrangement or distribution of decision-making 
authority in terms of the quality of the substantive outcomes it is likely to reach. It will be argued 
that once the realist assumptions behind this approach, the justification advanced for it, and its 
defences to critics are challenged, it can be seen as misguided. As such, it will be argued that a 
consequence of the perspective taken and defended in this thesis is that instrumentalist approaches 
to the constitutionalist debate are of no assistance. This chapter will finish with a critique of 
Waldron’s direct argument - put forward in the context of his own rejection of instrumentalist 
approaches - against the justification of leaving issues concerning rights and morality to be decided 
by the courts exercising rights-based legislative review. This argument – based on the idea of 
participation as the “right of rights” - will be argued to rest on a moral premise - concerning the 
dignity inherent in the individual and the respect due as a result - that cannot be shown to rest on 
anything more than question-begging assertion and reassertion. 
In Chapter 4, the thesis will consider another popular argument in the constitutionalist debate. 
Arguments from democracy – claiming democratic legitimacy for a particular constitutional setup, 
and criticising opposing constitutional models and their justifications as incompatible with 
democracy and its requirements – put forward by many different sides of the debate will be 
considered in detail. It is for this very reason - the popularity of, and reliance on, democratic 
arguments among constitutional theorists - that this method of argument is considered in such 
detail. The deconstruction of these arguments will reveal the particular conception of “democracy” 
and “democratic legitimacy” relied on. It will be demonstrated that, depending on the particular 
conception one starts from, “democracy” is capable of supporting many different opposing 
constitutionalist models and arguments. In particular, it will be shown that both legal and political 
constitutionalist approaches are capable of “democratic” justification. As a result, it will be argued 
that unless the particular conception of “democracy” relied on can first be set up as superior to 
those relied on by opponents in their own constitutionalist arguments, arguments from 
“democracy” are of little use in the constitutionalist debate, as capable of simultaneously supporting 
many incompatible arrangements. It will be contended that demonstrating such superiority is not 
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possible. Drawing on the “essential contestability” argument of Gallie, underpinned via the 
philosophical perspective taken in this thesis, it will be argued that the conception of “democracy” 
one sees as most justified or “true” depends on the particular values and moral preferences of the 
individual or group engaged in the assessment. It will thus be argued that arguments from 
“democracy”, ultimately amounting to such ungroundable assertions and reassertions of the values 
and moral preferences of particular individuals - convincing to those who agree, but merely begging 
the question against those who hold alternative values – are of little use in the constitutionalist 
debate.  
Following this critical (admittedly negative) discussion of the current constitutionalist debate and the 
key approaches within it, this thesis will, perhaps unsurprisingly, conclude that this debate is 
unsatisfactory. That is, it will contend that the underlying assumptions on which current approaches 
to this debate rely are, from the perspective defended here, misguided and indefensible. Finally, 
some brief comments will be made as to the way forward following this negative argument in 
Chapter 5. The argument of this thesis raises the question of what approach and what arguments 
would be compatible with its perspective; what would a sceptic’s constitution look like, and how 
could it be justified? For reasons of space (this thesis being a (relatively) short one), and scope (its 
immediate aim being to examine the current debate from a philosophically defended perspective), 
these are not questions which can be answered here in any detail. This thesis, therefore, will not 
offer concrete thoughts on what the substantive outcome to the constitutionalist debate should be, 
for example whether a system of political supremacy should be preferred over a system of legal 
constitutionalism, or vice versa. However, having identified the direction to which the argument 
presented here points, the author will proceed to take it, taking the present arguments and 
conclusions as a starting point, and consider the questions raised in detail, by means of a PhD 
programme. 
Questions may be raised regarding the nature and style of the sceptical arguments made here. Given 
that the tone of the argument will be overwhelmingly negative, and destructive, it may be asked 
why the arguments presented here should be taken seriously at all. Are they not themselves subject 
to the very destructive criticisms this thesis makes of others -  for example that the premises on 
which they rely can amount to nothing more than the questionable assertion and question-begging 
reassertion of the author - thus rendering them self-defeating, or just plain unconvincing? Such 
questions go to the very heart of the perspective underlying this thesis, and, as a philosophical 
matter, this criticism is responded to directly when setting out and defending this perspective in 
Chapter 2 (section 2.3.4). In addition to that defence, some explanation for the argumentative 
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strategy used at specific points will be offered here. Regarding the critique of Gewirth's supreme 
moral principle (section 2.4), the argument is not a direct attack on that principle as "wrong" or 
inferior to some alternative; it takes place within Gewirth's dialectical method to show that, on his 
own terms, the principle does not have the justification or status he claims for it. The point is to 
demonstrate that Gewirth does not successfully establish the claim he makes. Similarly, the 
argument against Waldron's irrelevance thesis (Chapter 3) is that, taken on his own terms and 
definitions, Waldron does not prove the point he sets out to establish. Furthermore, the internal 
inconsistencies in his own arguments turn out to undermine his case. Regarding Waldron's "right of 
rights" argument, the point is not that the moral premise on which it relies (the dignity and respect 
inherent in the individual) is "wrong" or defective, but that Waldron fails to establish the 
fundamental status he appears to give it; he fails to show its superiority over alternative premises, or 
that it can withstand questioning. This is also the argument presented against both Rawls' Theory of 
Justice and Political Liberalism arguments (Chapter 4, sections 4.5 and 4.6); that in each case the 
original position does not establish the points he claims it does. Likewise, following the 
deconstruction of democratic arguments in Chapter 4 to reveal the premises relied on, the point is 
that, from the perspective defended here, they cannot be shown as superior to their alternatives, or 
their sceptical denial.  
It may be noticed that underlying these argumentative strategies is a burden of proof issue, which, 
in the interests of clarity will be made explicit. The theories at issue make a claim, either directly, or 
by relying on a particular premise. The arguments offered here merely seek to show that those 
claims turn out to be unsupported; they are vulnerable to questioning and what arguments are 
offered are similarly questionable and thus do not provide support for the claims they seek to 
establish. This negative style of arguing, while likely to be seen as unsatisfactory by some, is, it is 
submitted, consistent with the philosophy which this thesis brings to the constitutionalist debate; a 
philosophy which, it is hoped, the reader will come to see as cogently argued for in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 2 
The Problem of Defending Normative Claims  
An Anti-Realist and Anti-Foundationalist Perspective 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out and defend the philosophical perspective that will lie behind 
the rest of this thesis’ examination of the constitutionalist debate and some key issues and 
arguments within it. In brief, the perspective denies that normative and moral claims can be 
grounded in more than what Leff described as ‘the quicksand of bare reiterated assertion’.1  There 
are no objective constraints on which claims must, or should, be accepted, and which must, or 
should, be rejected by a subject. Moral and normative claims ultimately amount to nothing more 
than the questionable assertion and question-begging reassertion of a particular individual or group. 
In setting out this perspective, the problem of defending normative judgements will first be 
identified as that of defending claims against Leff’s sceptical “sez who?” critique (section 2.2).2 
Having set out the problem, two methods of dealing with it will be considered. First, the possibility 
of establishing which claims correspond best to “reality”, grounding them in “the way things are”, or 
the “intrinsic nature” of notions such as “morality”, “right”, “justice” etc, in an attempt to give them 
objective authority – that is, authority independent of an individual and hence immune from the 
sceptical “sez who?” critique - will be rejected via an anti-realist and anti-foundationalist argument 
(section 2.3). This argument will draw on aspects of the pragmatic work of Richard Rorty, presented 
in contrast to a realist foundationalism holding on to the possibility of escaping belief to reach a 
position from which those beliefs can be independently assessed. A common criticism of anti-realist 
perspectives, the self-refutation critique, will be considered and responded to (section 2.3.4).  
The chapter will then consider the influential dialectical argument of Alan Gewirth as a possible 
means of giving particular normative claims authority, while avoiding making the claims criticised by 
the anti-foundationalist and anti-realist approach supported here (section 2.4). Lengthy 
consideration is given to Gewirth’s argument in particular due to the nature of the method relied on, 
and the possibilities it offers for the task of defending moral and normative propositions. Gewirth 
                                                          
1
 A Leff, ‘Memorandum’ (1977) 29(4) Stanford Law Review 879, 880. 
2
 On the “sez who?” critique and its relevance to moral and normative claims see, as well as the discussion in 
section 2.2 below,  A Leff, ‘Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law’ (1979) 6 Duke LJ 1229 (the classic statement of 
this question, and Leff’s sceptical conclusion). See also SW Calhoun, ‘Grounding Normative Assertions: Arthur 
Leff’s Still Irrefutable, but Incomplete, “Sez Who?” Critique’ (2004-2005) 20(1) Journal of Law and Religion 31. 
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argues that particular normative and moral claims can be set up as authoritative, not because they 
correspond to some kind of fact of the matter grounded in “reality” or “the way things are”, 
independent of the perspective or beliefs of an individual or group (ideas which, as will be argued 
below, are problematic), but because they correspond to the requirements of a supreme moral 
principle derived through logic all agents categorically must accept from within their own 
perspective. The significance of this is that, if successful, Gewirth’s argument will have managed to 
provide a means of grounding normative claims in something more than the questionable assertion 
of an individual or group in a way which avoids the anti-realist criticisms of this chapter. Gewirth’s 
argument will, however, be rejected as unsuccessful on its own terms in that it fails to rely only on 
necessary entailment from one judgement to the next, as his dialectically necessary method 
requires. It will thus be concluded that Gewirth fails to show that his supreme principle of morality is 
anything more than optional, with the result that its implications and use as a means of adjudicating 
between competing normative and moral claims remain questionable. 
This chapter will therefore consider and reject two possible sources of authority for normative 
claims; correspondence to “objective reality”, and correspondence to a principle derived through 
subjectively unavoidable logic. From this, it will be concluded that neither approach resolves the 
problem of giving particular normative or moral claims authority over other competing claims, 
leaving such claims open to question. 
 
2.2. The Problem of Grounding Normative Assertions 
The problem of grounding a normative assertion is the problem of defending a proposition such as 
‘”It is right to do X”’ or “X ought to be”.3  That this is actually a problem to be considered becomes 
clear if one imagines simply turning the claims around so that they now state their opposites. That is, 
they now read “’it is not right to do X” and “it is not the case that X ought to be”. The ‘familiar 
problem’ to be considered is whether it is possible to ‘get a noncircular justification’ of any of these 
normative stances.4 On what basis, if any, can the denial of a normative claim be convincingly 
dismissed in a way that prevents the conduct or state of affairs that claim is said to justify being 
rejected? On what basis can a normative proposition be established as superior to alternatives, in a 
non-circular and non-question-begging fashion? As Leff colourfully puts the issue, what answer can 
be given to a sceptic making the ‘formal intellectual equivalent of what is known in barrooms and 
                                                          
3
 Leff, ‘Memorandum’ (fn1) 880. 
4
 R Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (Penguin Books 1999) 10. 
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schoolyards as "the grand sez who"’5 – a ‘universal taunt by which a skeptic may challenge the 
standing/competency of the speaker to make authoritative moral assessments’6 - such that a 
particular claim can be placed ‘beyond question’, and can provide a stable basis from which to 
proceed in structuring society and guiding the conduct within it?7 Taking some examples from the 
discussion of arguments in the constitutionalist debate to follow in later chapters, what is there to 
stop one simply denying the premise that everyone should be treated with ‘equal concern and 
respect’,8 such that there is no reason to prefer Dworkin’s communal conception of “democracy”, 
which advocates placing substantive restraints on the power of elected majorities to ensure that this 
principle is respected (see Chapter 4, sections 4.3 and 4.4.2)? Alternatively, what is there to stop 
one rejecting Dworkin’s particular interpretation of “equality”, requiring ‘treatment as an equal’,9 in 
favour of a less demanding conception of equal opportunity, such as Waldron’s favoured ‘political 
equality’,10 or vice versa (see Chapter 4, section 4.4.2)? What can be said to those who disagree with 
Waldron’s underlying premise that individuals are moral agents with dignity that ought to be 
respected (Chapter 3, section 3.5)? 
 
Unless such questions can be answered, giving particular normative claims authority over their 
sceptical denial or alternative propositions, those claims, along with the arguments and conclusions 
relying on them, will remain open to question.  Leff’s conclusion is that ‘no one...has come up with a 
satisfactory solution’, leaving what he describes as the ‘bare, black void’ or ‘hollow core of our 
society – the total absence of any defensible moral position on, under, or about anything.’11 The 
question to be considered in the remainder of this chapter is whether a satisfactory solution can be 
found to the problem of grounding normative assertions - defending them against the sceptical “sez 
who?” challenge -  allowing Leff’s sceptical conclusion to be avoided. With this question in mind, two 
potential solutions will now be considered; a realist foundationalist approach (section 2.3), and 
Gewirth’s dialectical necessity argument (section 2.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Leff, ‘Unspeakable Ethics’ (fn2) 1230. 
6
 Calhoun (fn2) 32. 
7
 Leff, ‘Unspeakable Ethics’ (fn2) 1230. 
8
 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1978) 273. 
9
 ibid. 
10
 J Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1346, 1361. 
11
 A Leff, ‘Law and Technology: On Shoring up a Void’ (1976) 8 Ottawa LR 536, 538. 
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2.3. Rejecting Realist Foundationalism 
Generally, foundationalist theories attempt to ‘ground our thinking [and] inquiry...in something 
firmer’ than mere belief or ‘partisan...assumptions.’12 This ground can then serve as a basis outside 
individuals’ competing beliefs and preferred descriptions from which we can examine them and 
‘discuss their adequacy.’13 For the realist foundationalist, concepts such as “morality”, “justice”, 
“right”, “wrong”, are taken to have a ‘real essence’, or an ‘intrinsic nature’, which can be found and 
clarified through inquiry and reflection.14 These essences are seen as independent standards to 
which beliefs and assertions are attempting to be adequate, meaning that they can be assessed on 
how successful they are in that attempt.15 The idea is that notions such as “morality”, “truth”, and 
“right” are ‘the proper names of objects – goals or standards’ which can be reached and are to be 
pursued through inquiry.16 They are notions it is possible to know more about in the ‘hope of better 
obeying such norms.’17 The intrinsic nature of these objects can then serve as a constraint on what 
normative claims are acceptable; competing beliefs can be independently assessed and adjudicated 
on the basis of how well they correspond to the content and demands of these objects. 
 
2.3.1. Consequences of Realist Foundationalism for Normative Disagreement 
This view of inquiry as a means of getting to the intrinsic nature of “Morality”, “Justice” or 
“Rightness” etc, allows the realist to offer the possibility that particular normative assertions are 
‘closer to the way things are in themselves’.18  They are closer to the intrinsic and core nature of (for 
example) Morality and more in line with its Demands – than others.19 Thus, in response to the 
sceptical questioning of a normative claim in the way discussed above, either turning a claim such as 
“it is right to do X” into the negative “it is not the case that it is right to do X”, or else putting forward 
a different idea of what “X” is, the realist can offer the reply “it is right to do X” because “it is Right 
to do X”. The capitalisation of the standard being discussed emphasises the idea that it is 
nominalised; it is being referred to as an object, with a discoverable content, independent of what 
                                                          
12
 U Schulenberg, ‘Wanting Lovers Rather Than Knowers – Richard Rorty’s Neopragmatism’ (2003) 48(4) 
Amerikastudien/American Studies 577, 584. 
13
 ibid. 
14
 R Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (CUP 1989) 74. 
15
 R Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Harvester Press 1982) xxxvii. 
16
 ibid, xiv. 
17
 ibid, xv. 
18
 R Rorty, Truth and Progress (CUP 1998) 1. 
19
 ibid. 
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one chooses to believe about it or how one chooses to describe it, and the realist response claims 
that a particular assertion can be established as more in line with that content.20 
In grounding the authority of a normative proposition in its correspondence to the intrinsic nature 
and demands of particular notions, this process can claim “objective authority” independent of the 
beliefs or particular perspective of an individual; authority is grounded in the nature of the object 
rather than a subject via their individual perspective and values. If an assertion can be grounded in 
the object itself in this way, Leff’s sceptical “sez who?” critique (see above, section 2.2)  can be 
avoided, for the authority is shown to come from correspondence to what is, rather than what is 
said to be by an individual. The claimed-authority, being something beyond an individual and their 
assertions or claims, something independent which those assertions can be said to be adequate to 
or not, makes the relevant issue not who says, but what is. Thus, the consequence of the realist 
approach, if successful, would be to ground a normative assertion in something more than a bare 
reiteration of that assertion, and render the sceptical “sez who?” response irrelevant. The problem 
of grounding a normative assertion in a non-circular, non-question-begging fashion, and the problem 
of authoritatively dismissing competing assertions, will have been resolved. The aim of inquiry would 
then be to work out the content and demands of particular notions and their implications for 
specific disagreements. 
 
2.3.2. Arguing for an Anti-Realist Anti-Foundationalism 
In contrast, the anti-foundationalist approach supported here, drawing on aspects of the work of 
Rorty, holds that we ‘cannot confirm, correct, or reject our beliefs by claiming that there 
is...something which is independent’ of those beliefs.21 Whereas the approach set out in the 
previous section holds on to the idea that there is something beyond beliefs and descriptions 
reachable through inquiry, such as an “intrinsic nature” of particular notions, to which those beliefs 
and descriptions can be seen as adequate or inadequate, the approach supported here drops the 
idea that ‘there is anything like that’.22 As Rorty puts it, ‘nothing has an intrinsic nature’ to which 
beliefs can be said to be either adequate or inadequate.23 When the idea that notions such as 
“Morality”, “Justice” or “Rightness”, have an essence independent of what one chooses to believe 
about them, or how one chooses to describe and apply them, is discarded, then so is the idea that 
                                                          
20
 ibid, 4. 
21
 Schulenberg (fn12) 579. 
22
 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (fn15) xxxvii. 
23
 Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (fn4) 63. 
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they can be used as ground independent of our beliefs and propositions which can be appealed to in 
order to resolve disputes over which beliefs and propositions should be accepted and acted upon.   
The argument for this approach begins by pointing out that notions such as “rightness” (along with 
the terms “right” and “wrong”), and “morality” (along with “moral” and “immoral”) are terms of the 
human language. The consequence is that only if we imagine the world as either ‘itself a person or as 
created by a person’ who spoke this language can any sense be made of the idea that any notion 
‘has an “intrinsic nature”’ which can act as a constraint on how we choose to apply it when 
describing the world and the situations that arise within it.24 The problem is that, as Rorty puts it, 
‘[t]he world does not speak. Only we do.’25 Languages are ‘human creations’, so that while the 
‘world is out there...descriptions of the world are not’.26 The point is that the world does not have a 
preferred description of itself because descriptions require language and language requires a 
speaker.27 However, unless the world ‘has a preferred description of itself’,28 the only descriptions 
and applications of the notions within them we have are those preferred and applied by particular 
individuals or groups. This takes one back to the problem being discussed in this chapter; that of 
establishing particular normative and moral claims as superior to their alternatives, or their sceptical 
denial, in a non-circular and non-question-begging fashion, such that they can withstand the “sez 
who?” critique (section 2.2). 
If the world does not offer a preferred description of itself, and does not itself have meaning, then 
the question that needs to be considered is whether there are nonetheless any constraints on the 
content of these descriptions and on how different individuals or groups choose to apply them in 
evaluating states of affairs.  Holding that there are such constraints would be to hold that, despite 
being the creations of language, the content and application of the notions used to phrase particular 
claims are not entirely free and optional. This possibility is briefly suggested by Upton who questions 
Rorty’s idea that ‘all descriptions are totally optional and freely created.’29 For the realist 
metaphysician, such constraint comes from “reality” or “the way things are”. In contrast to the 
Rortian anti-foundationalist, the ‘metaphysician [does] not believe that anything can be made to 
look good or bad by being redescribed’, or, if they do, ‘they deplore this fact and cling to the idea 
that reality will help us resist such seductions.’30 The realist, in the sense criticised here, thus rejects 
the idea that our evaluations and descriptions are entirely optional; “reality”, or “the way things 
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are”, can serve as a constraint on the acceptability of such evaluations and descriptions. The goal of 
inquiry would then be to gain an understanding of these constraints, thereby gaining an 
understanding of which normative and moral claims are acceptable and which are not as either 
more or less in line with those constraints. As an example, Platts writes that moral claims, ‘like any 
other factual belief’, present claims ‘about the world which can be assessed...as true or false’.31 
Crucially, these qualities of claims are objective and determined by the world itself - to use Platts’ 
words, they are ‘the result of the (independent) world’32 and ‘possible objects of human 
knowledge’.33 Thus, far from optional, Platts clearly sees the acceptability of moral claims as 
something constrained by a power not ourselves - the independent world they are taken to be 
about, as this is taken to determine their “truth or falsity”, knowledge of which will assist us in the 
task of distinguishing acceptable and unacceptable claims.  
With this idea of an independent “reality” which can serve as a constraint come the distinctions 
between appearance/reality and more accurate/less accurate representations. As Rorty points out, 
it is these distinctions which offer the possibility that particular claims can be rejected as inferior to 
others in a way which does not simply beg the question against those claims and views. Claims could 
be rejected as inferior on the basis that they are ‘descriptions of what only appears to be going on’ –
less accurate descriptions of the “reality” - whereas others can be given authority on the basis that 
they ‘are descriptions of what is really going on’ – more accurate descriptions of the world.34  
Particular views and claims would be set up as authoritative through being presented as more 
accurate representations of a “reality” beyond, and independent of, those views and propositions,  
thereby ending the ‘potentially infinite regress of propositions-brought-forward-in-defense-of-other-
propositions.’35 An example of reliance on these ideas of appearance and reality and of claims as 
assessable representations of “reality” or “the world” in the context of morality and normativity can 
again be found in Platts. After making the realist statement quoted above that moral claims are 
rendered true or false by the world and that these qualities are possible objects of “knowledge”, 
Platts seems to make a suggestion as to how this knowledge can be acquired. According to Platts, we 
‘detect moral aspects’ of the world and situations within it ‘in the same way we detect (nearly all) 
other aspects: by looking and seeing.’36 He then suggests that by paying ‘careful attention to the 
world, we can improve our moral beliefs about the world, make them more approximately true.’37 
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The idea seems to be that moral aspects are something independent that can be identified or 
discovered in the world (as suggested by “detect”), and that if we look carefully enough at this world 
our claims about those qualities will become more accurate - more in line with the world itself - and 
so more approximately “true”. Claims are thus taken as attempts to describe – to represent - the 
moral aspects of an independent world we can “see”, and “looking” carefully at these aspects as the 
key to getting these descriptions more approximately right, which in turn is taken as the key to 
improving our claims. Congruence with the world and its moral aspects, attainable through careful 
examination of that world, serves as an independent constraint on the acceptability of moral claims.  
However, this idea of a “reality” beyond particular claims and beliefs, which they are seen as 
attempts to represent, and the distinctions between appearance/reality and more accurate/less 
accurate descriptions that come with this idea, is another which the anti-realist aspect of the 
perspective put forward here discards. If this idea of an independent “reality” - as Platts put it, 
“independent world” - is set aside, then so is the possibility that it can serve to constrain the content 
and application of descriptions and evaluations, or as ground to appeal to in the event of 
disagreement. The argument for discarding the idea of a “reality” which claims are taken as attempts 
to represent or correspond to is the pragmatic one that holding onto such an idea is pointless.  It is 
pointless in that the ‘attempt to get behind appearance’ and our preferred descriptions to a 
“reality”, or “way things are”, independent of how one describes them, is, as Rorty puts it, 
‘hopeless’.38 The problem is that ‘there is nothing to be known about anything save what is stated in 
sentences describing it.’39  There is ‘no way to think about either the world or our purposes’ except 
through language and description,40 because it is ‘only in language that we can mean something by 
something.’41 The result is that “reality” is always ‘reality under some or another description’;42 there 
is no way of distinguishing between one or another description and the “reality” supposedly being 
described, ‘no way to divide’ the “reality”, or an object within it, ‘in itself from our ways of talking 
about’ it.43 There is no way of getting beyond descriptions to compare them with something 
independent - something which is not just another description, such as Platts’ “moral aspects” of an 
“independent world” - because giving that independent thing any meaning, which it must have if it is 
to serve as something which can be compared with or approximated so that it can offer any 
meaningful constraint on the acceptability of particular descriptions, immediately taints it with more 
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language and description. Thus, as Rorty argues, “reality” is never ‘unmediated by a linguistic 
description’; by our linguistic description.44 So while Platts suggests that we can detect moral aspects 
of the world simply by “looking” and “seeing”, and that paying careful attention while doing so will 
improve the accuracy of our moral beliefs, the problem raised here is that one cannot be so sure 
that what one is “detecting” or “seeing” is anything more than the meaning we give to “the world”. 
Platts’ valued process of “paying careful attention to the world” cannot be shown to amount to 
anything more than paying attention to our own preferred descriptions. We cannot get beyond such 
descriptions to assess how well they are approximating something like Platts’ independent world, 
because to give that world a meaning, allowing a particular claim about it to be compared and the 
accuracy of that claim assessed accordingly, as pointed out directly above, is to immediately taint 
that “independent” world with another description, in which case it is no longer independent but is, 
from the start, rendered and conceptualised by the individual. 
The consequence is that “reality”, or “the world”, conceived of as “the way things are” independent 
of how one describes them, becomes the name ‘of something unknowable’.45 Inquiry into the 
constraints of “reality” on the acceptability of our claims - inquiry into which beliefs and descriptions 
correspond best to “the way things are” - can then be seen as inquiry into the unknowable. It is the 
‘impossible attempt’ to step outside of our preferred descriptions and compare them with 
‘something absolute’, something which is more than just another such description.46 The 
pragmatist’s point here is that treating as a goal of inquiry and constraint something which is 
unknowable means that there is no way of establishing when the goal has been reached, or 
recognising when the constraint is being violated, and that this renders the exercise pointless. The 
idea of “reality” or “the world” as a source of constraint on the acceptability of competing 
descriptions and as a goal of inquiry, along with the distinctions between more and less accurate 
representations which rely on this idea, is thus set aside on the pragmatic basis that it fuels and 
encourages such a pointless exercise.  
 
2.3.3. Consequences of Anti-Realist Anti-Foundationalism for Normative Disagreement 
The perspective defended so far has argued against holding onto the ideas of “intrinsic natures” 
independent of human descriptions, and an independent “reality” which can serve as a constraint on 
the acceptability of these descriptions. Rejecting the ideas of an independent “way things are”, or 
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“intrinsic natures”, leaves ‘[t]ruth, right reason, rationality, validity, and the like’, conceived of as 
having objective qualities or contents - qualities independent of what a particular individual or group 
claims about them - as ‘myths’.47 As a result, all that remains are the competing claims and beliefs 
and the individuals or groups who make them and consider them to be justified from their own 
perspectives. This leaves the “sez who?” critique unanswered as ultimately no one can be said to be 
‘in touch with a power not [him or] herself’48 when making and defending their claims.  In the 
absence of independent foundations in which beliefs can be grounded and on the basis of which 
competing beliefs and claims can be adjudicated, the problem of choosing between competing 
normative and moral claims in a way which does not merely amount to the circular, question-
begging ‘reiterated assertion’ of those optional claims, the beliefs on which they are based, or the 
mere fact of one’s questionable preference for those claims and beliefs, remains.49 
 
2.3.4. The Self-Refutation Criticism 
A common criticism of anti-realist perspectives is that they are incoherent and self-refuting. The 
argument is that, in rejecting realist approaches and the possibility of grounding claims in anything 
more than questionable belief and assertions, such as correspondence to “intrinsic natures”, “the 
way things are”, or “facts of the matter”, the anti-realist is caught in a ‘self-refuting attempt to both 
have and deny an “absolute perspective”’.50 The anti-realist’s arguments are seen as ultimately 
amounting to the claim that, as Putnam puts it, ‘from a God’s-Eye View there is no God’s-Eye view’.51 
The anti-realist is seen as claiming that ‘metaphysical realism is wrong’, it is really the case that 
nothing is the case, meaning that anti-realism is right, and hence should be accepted instead.52 This, 
critics point out, amounts to an incoherent claim to have discovered that there is, in fact, nothing to 
discover, that the “reality” is that there really is no “reality”, and that their theory is thus superior to 
the realism it rejects ‘in virtue of the way things really are.’53 In short, as Rorty puts it, the criticism is 
that the anti-realist is inconsistently ‘claiming to know what they themselves claim cannot be 
known’.54 
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However, while making such inconsistent claims would indeed, as Tasioulas is keen to point out in 
response to Rorty, leave the anti-realist ‘floundering in incoherence’,55 allowing their arguments to 
be dismissed on their own terms, it is argued that the anti-realist perspective supported above, 
taken on its own pragmatic terms, does not make those claims. As Rorty points out in response to 
self-refutation critiques, the pragmatic anti-realist perspective supported here does not seek to 
make the problematic claim that it ‘corresponds to the way things really are’.56 In fact, such a claim 
relies on ideas this perspective ‘wants to get rid of’; the idea that anything has an “intrinsic nature”, 
the idea of an objective “reality” or “way things really are”, to be pursued through inquiry, and of an 
“absolute perspective” of any kind.57 After dropping altogether the ideas of “reality”, 
“representation” and “correspondence”, the contradictory claims which anti-realists are accused of 
making, made in these discarded terms, simply cannot be made. 
The reasons for setting aside these ideas were set out above (section 2.3.2). To reiterate, the 
argument was that holding onto such ideas is unpragmatic in that the unavoidability of linguistic 
description makes distinguishing between objective “reality”, an “intrinsic nature”, or “fact of the 
matter”, and our own preferred descriptions of those “objects” problematic; one cannot tell 
whether one is getting closer to these goals or just another preferred description.  The pragmatist 
sees little point in holding as a goal of inquiry, or a constraint, standards which one cannot be sure 
are actually being reached, or satisfied.  In arguing for their claims on this pragmatic basis, the 
Rortian anti-realist is not making the claims critics such as Putnam accuse them of making – that 
realism is ‘wrong’ and that rejecting the ideas of “reality” and correspondence to the “way things 
are” will ‘make us better off...in the sense of having fewer false beliefs’.58 Formulating the argument 
in this way misses the very point the pragmatist is making, which is that such claims should be 
avoided for the reason that it is ‘pointless’ to try and establish whether a belief “really is” true or 
false in the sense of representing something beyond those beliefs ‘accurately’,59 because they see no 
way of being sure, no way of demonstrating, whether one “really is” representing something beyond 
another belief – no  way of breaking out of our language and beliefs to test them against ‘something 
known without their aid’.60 In arguing on this basis against the very ideas of an independent 
“reality”, “way things are”, or “absolute perspective”, the pragmatic anti-realist is not making any 
claims about the nature and content of those notions, let alone the self-refuting ones they are 
accused of making. Thus, it is argued that the self-refutation criticism not only attacks the pragmatic 
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anti-realist for making claims they do not actually make, but which they cannot make given that the 
very wording of the criticised-claims uses ideas it is the whole point of this anti-realism to oppose. In 
attacking claims the pragmatic anti-realist perspective supported here does not, and more 
fundamentally cannot, make, the self-refutation critique becomes irrelevant, and therefore 
unproblematic, to the position taken here. The perspective taken so far, along with the 
consequences for attempting to defend a moral or normative claim set out in the previous section, 
thus remain untouched by this criticism. 
That the pragmatic anti-realist is not claiming to be describing the “way things really are” - to have 
on their side the authority of a power independent of themselves and their claims, such as 
“objective reality” or “fact of the matter” - may seem to some to have the result that their argument 
loses almost all force. It may seem that the pragmatist is effectively saying that it is only their view 
that all moral and normative views remain questionable. Yet if it is only their view, what reason do 
we have to accept it over the alternative it rejects? If the response to the self-refutation criticism is 
that the pragmatist is not purporting to have discovered the independent truth or reality of the lack 
of a discoverable independent “truth” or “reality”, then the only alternative, it might be suggested, 
seems to be that they are claiming to have merely ‘invented’ this fact.61 The idea is that if the 
pragmatist has not found a lack of objective reality then they must have fabricated that situation 
themselves, via their own minds and optional descriptions, in which case, as Rorty himself 
recognises, this seems to beg the question ‘Why should anybody take our [the pragmatist’s] 
invention seriously?’62 
The response to this potential criticism offered here is of a similar nature to that just offered in 
response to the self-refutation criticism. The point that if the pragmatist is not claiming to have 
“discovered” the truth of their perspective – to have found it in a power not themselves - then they 
must problematically be claiming to have “invented” or “made” it itself relies on the distinctions the 
pragmatist rejects. If one drops, as the pragmatist does, the idea that a perspective and the claims 
within it should be seen as trying to “represent” something outside itself, or beyond another such 
perspective, then one must also drop the idea that it can make sense to say that the pragmatist is 
merely inventing.63 Accusing the pragmatist of “only inventing” implies that something more can be 
done – it is to say something like “the pragmatist has only fabricated the lack of an objective truth or 
reality whereas ideally they should have discovered it”. But only someone holding on to the idea that 
there is something independent capable of being “represented” can meaningfully speak of 
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“discovery” as something to be aimed for, and its not being achieved or even being purported to be 
achieved, as something to be lamented. What this shows is that the criticism that the pragmatist has 
merely “made” or “invented” the lack of “reality” or “objectivity” that forms the content of their 
perspective, and that this means their views should somehow be taken less seriously than others’, 
can only be made in realist terms, and so can only be a realist one. As a realist criticism, it is not one 
the pragmatist can answer except to say that it should not be made; it is a criticism that it makes no 
sense to make for it expresses disappointment at not reaching a standard the pragmatist saw no 
hope of reaching in the first place, nor purported to reach, and uses concepts the pragmatist sees no 
point in holding onto in order to criticise their position rejecting those very concepts. If this response 
is further questioned, all the pragmatist can do is reiterate the arguments made for the rejection of 
realism and the distinctions and concepts within it in the first place – arguments such as those 
offered in section 2.3.2. These arguments give the reasons the pragmatic anti-realist position should 
be taken seriously.  If they are found to be unpersuasive, it is indeed the case that the pragmatist 
cannot show that, after all, their views really do have the authority this realist-style criticism seems 
to want – correspondence to some “fact of the matter”. But that, of course, is the very point the 
pragmatic anti-realist is making. 
 
2.4. Gewirth’s Categorically Obligatory Moral Principle as a Means of Authoritatively Resolving 
Normative Disagreement 
Gewirth claims for his ‘Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC)’64 the status of a ‘supreme moral 
principle’, conformity with which is ‘categorically obligatory’ and which can ‘stand unchallenged as 
the criterion of moral rightness’.65 This supreme moral principle and its requirements, claimed to 
have ‘determinate contents that do not admit of variability’ according to the preferences or 
inclinations of an individual, can then be used to distinguish between principles and judgements 
which are morally right, and those which are morally wrong.66 Thus, Gewirth’s PGC claims to offer a 
means of deciding between competing normative assertions in a ‘conclusive’ and unquestionable 
way;67 ‘all...principles must conform to the PGC if they are to be morally right’.68 
The key to the authority claimed for the PGC, and the judgements derived from it, is the dialectically 
necessary method used by Gewirth. Generally, dialectical methods seek to examine the logical 
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implications of ‘assumptions, opinions, statements, or claims made by protagonists or 
interlocutors.’69 Gewirth’s ‘dialectically necessary method’ starts from ‘statements or judgments that 
are necessarily attributable to every agent’ – agents cannot avoid accepting them – ‘because they 
derive from the generic features that constitute the necessary structure of action.’70 Having 
ascertained the initial judgements which agents implicitly and unavoidably accept through the ‘fact 
of engaging in action’,71 Gewirth states that his method ‘operates to trace what judgements and 
claims every agent logically must make’ from within their own standpoint.72 It is through ‘confining 
the argument to rational necessities’ relying on nothing but deduction, logic, and necessary 
entailment from one judgement to the next, which all agents must accept ‘on pain of self-
contradiction’, that Gewirth claims his PGC is established as ‘categorically obligatory’.73 
Of particular interest here is that Gewirth also presents this dialectically necessary method as a 
means of grounding normative judgements in a conclusive and authoritative way while avoiding 
‘certain difficulties that confront naturalistic approaches to ethics’.74 Particularly, he presents his 
method as avoiding what he describes as ‘the problem of the independent variable’ – the problem of 
whether there exist any ‘objective independent variables that serve to determine the correctness or 
rightness of moral judgements’.75 As Gewirth’s claim is only that particular beliefs and judgements 
cannot be avoided or denied ‘from within the standpoint of the agent’,76  the question of the 
adequacy of those beliefs to something independent, outside this standpoint, does not arise. Thus, 
by remaining within the perspective of the agent, Gewirth’s argument can avoid presupposing 
‘metaphysically suspect objective values’,77 or a ‘normative structure of reality’,78 to which 
propositions can be claimed to correspond in the way presupposed by the realist approach criticised 
above (section 2.3).  
If successful, Gewirth’s dialectically necessary argument, seeking to ground his principle in 
subjectively unavoidable logic, can therefore be seen as a solution to the problem of grounding 
normative assertions to give them authority over their sceptical denial or competing assertions set 
out above (section 2.2), in a way which avoids anti-realist and anti-foundationalist criticisms of the 
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idea of ‘objectively right or correct’ principles existing independently of particular beliefs according 
to which those beliefs can be assessed.79 Put basically, the response to the sceptical questioning of a 
normative claim – Leff’s ‘”grand sez who”’80 – would be “you say”; any disagreement being self-
contradictory. 
The question which must now be considered is whether Gewirth successfully shows that his PGC 
must be accepted by all agents on pain of self-contradiction, thereby giving it this authority of a 
principle unchallengeable from the subjective perspective of all agents. The key to this question is 
whether Gewirth shows that this principle is derived through nothing but logical and necessary 
entailment from one ‘necessary belief[]’81 to the next. It will be argued that he does not. After 
setting out Gewirth’s general argument for the PGC, it will be contended that it fails to fulfil the 
requirements of the dialectically necessary method in that at least one of the judgements in the 
series of steps leading to his principle is not the logically necessary entailment of the previous. As a 
result, it will be argued that Gewirth does not show that his PGC has the authority of a supreme 
moral principle which all agents cannot but accept. Therefore, it will be concluded, it cannot serve as 
a means of deciding between competing normative assertions in a non-question begging way. The 
problem of giving particular normative or moral claims authority over their sceptical denial or over 
competing claims thus remains unresolved by Gewirth. 
 
2.4.1. The Argument For Gewirth’s Supreme Moral Principle 
Gewirth’s overarching argument for the PGC is that ‘action has...a normative structure’, meaning 
that the very fact of engaging in action (as all agents unavoidably do), ‘commits the agent to accept 
certain normative judgments on pain of self-contradiction.’82 It is from these unavoidable 
judgements that Gewirth’s supreme moral principle is derived. Gewirth then attempts to ‘prove this 
doctrine’ that action has a normative structure in ‘three main steps’, with each step claiming to 
necessarily follow from the previous.83 
The first step claims that, by engaging in action (defined as the ‘voluntary pursuit of purposes’), the 
agent ‘implicitly makes evaluative judgments about the goodness of his purposes’, and therefore 
about the ‘goodness of the freedom and well-being’ which are the ‘necessary conditions’ of acting to 
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achieve them.84 The second step claims that these evaluative judgements about the ‘necessary 
goodness’ of the conditions of purposive action logically entail a further ‘deontic judgment’.85 Here, 
the agent ‘claims that he has rights’ to the conditions of ‘freedom and well-being’86 so that others, in 
the view of the agent, ‘ought at least to refrain from interfering’ with these conditions of action.87 
The consequence of this deontic judgement is that the agent sees the goods which form the 
necessary conditions of purposive action as ‘goods to which he is entitled – which are due him.’88 
The final step is to show that every agent claims these entitlements ‘for the sufficient reason that he 
is a prospective agent’ with purposes he wants to fulfil.89 The consequence of this observation is that 
the agent must accept that, if he is (as he claims to be according to the previous steps) entitled to 
the necessary conditions of action and non-interference with those conditions from others for the 
sole reason that he has purposes he wants to fulfil, then all other prospective purposive agents are 
similarly entitled.90 The agent’s claimed-entitlement is universalised so that he must accept that ‘all 
prospective purposive agents’ have the rights to freedom and well-being he claims for himself.91 The 
result is that the agent must acknowledge the rights both of themselves and others to freedom and 
well-being, and therefore cannot act, support any action, or advocate any principle or norm, in a way 
which interferes with the freedom and well-being of others or themselves. This is the ‘Principle of 
Generic Consistency’, which Gewirth has claimed to show is unavoidable in that to ‘deny or violate’ 
this principle is to ‘contradict’ oneself.92 
Having summarised the broad steps in Gewirth’s overall argument for the PGC, they will now be 
considered in more detail in order to assess whether he delivers on his promise of ‘confining the 
argument to rational necessities’ and the tracing of necessary entailments.93 As Lomasky notes, a 
consequence of the nature of the dialectically necessary method - tracing a series of logically 
necessary entailments to demonstrate a supposedly unavoidable progression to the PGC - is that 
‘the PGC is no stronger than the weakest step leading to it’.94 This is because each step is reliant on 
the success of the previous; if one step can be rejected as not strictly entailed by the previous, then 
the steps claimed to necessarily follow on from it can also be rejected as not obligatory. Thus, if one 
step in the series can be rejected, the unavoidable progression towards the PGC will stop, and 
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Gewirth’s supreme moral principle will be left without the authority he claims for it – the authority 
of a categorically obligatory principle. Acceptance of the principle, along with the solutions it offers 
for normative and moral disagreement will, in the end, be questionable and optional. 
It is argued here that this is the case; at least one step in Gewirth’s series can be rejected as not 
logically necessitated by the previous, thereby stopping the obligatory progression towards the PGC. 
Specifically, it is argued that the deontic judgement forming the second step in Gewirth’s argument 
(see the summary of Gewirth’s overarching argument, above, pp23-24), where the agent makes the 
right-claim that he is entitled to the goods of freedom and well-being which form the conditions of 
purposive action, is not necessarily entailed by the evaluative judgement established in the first step 
concerning the ‘necessary goodness’ of these conditions.95 
 
2.4.2. Establishing Step Two of the Progression Towards the PGC - Gewirth’s Argument That the 
Rights-Claim is Unavoidable 
As noted above, the second step of the purportedly unavoidable progression towards the PGC is that 
the agent must claim that he has rights to the freedom and well-being that form the necessary 
conditions of purposive action, and which, according to step one of the progression, the agent 
regards as necessary goods.  The argument for the necessity of the rights-claim for all purposive 
agents is that ‘if any agent denies that he has the generic rights, then he is caught in a 
contradiction.’96 Gewirth summarises the reasoning behind this claim in four steps - starting with the 
agent’s denial that they have the generic rights and ending with the problematic self-contradiction 
of the agent. This reasoning seeking to show the obligatory nature of the rights-claim is summarised 
by Gewirth as follows: 
‘Denying (1) “I have rights to freedom and well-being”’ would, ‘[b]ecause of the equivalence 
between the generic rights and strict “oughts”...entail the denial of (2) “All other persons 
ought at least to refrain from interfering with my freedom and well-being.”’97 Denying this 
positive statement would require accepting its negative equivalent ‘(3)”It is not the case that 
all other persons ought at least to refrain from interfering with my freedom and well-
being’”, and this would contradict ‘(4) “My freedom and well-being are necessary goods.”’98 
‘[A]nother way’ of putting this point, according to Gewirth, is that an agent accepting (3) (“It 
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is not the case that all other persons ought at least to refrain from interfering with my 
freedom and well-being”), again, as is ‘entailed’ by the ‘denial of (1)’ (“I have rights to 
freedom and well-being”), would mean accepting the equivalent statement that ‘it is 
permissible that other persons interfere with or remove his freedom and well-being.’99 But 
accepting this idea would mean that the agent ‘regards his freedom and well-being with 
indifference or at least as dispensable’ which would mean accepting ‘(5) “It is not the case 
that my freedom and well-being are necessary goods.”’100 
In both wordings, the argument is that denying the rights-claim would entail the denial of the 
agent’s previous judgement that his freedom and well-being are necessary goods. As this judgement, 
according to the first step of Gewirth’s overarching argument for the PGC, is accepted through the 
fact of engaging in action, the denial of the rights-claim inevitably catches the agent in a self-
contradiction. With its denial being dismissible as contradictory, the rights-claim becomes rationally 
unavoidable; it must be accepted. 
As Gewirth recognises, this argument for the necessity of the rights-claim ‘depends on the 
point...that such a right-claim is correlative with and logically equivalent to a strict “ought”-
judgment’ that others ought to refrain from interfering with their freedom and well-being.101 This is 
because, in the reasoning set out directly above, it is the consequence that denying the right-claim in 
(1) also denies  the “ought”-judgement in (2) which leads to the acceptance of (3) (“It is not the case 
that others ought to refrain from interfering”) which, in turn, unacceptably contradicts (4), or, in the 
alternative wording, leads to (5). So the first issue is whether (1) is in fact logically equivalent to (2).  
It is argued that this equivalence is troubling. (1) and (2) are only equivalent if the notion of “ought” 
in (2) is given a particularly strong interpretation so that it includes the concept of entitlement or 
due, and this conception of “ought” does not necessarily follow from the evaluative judgement 
carried over from the first step in Gewirth’s overall argument for the PGC - that freedom and well-
being are necessary goods.  
2.4.2.1. Equivocating the Right-Claim and the Ought-Judgement 
As Gewirth points out, the concept of ‘a right involves the concept of something due’ to the right-
holder, ‘something to which he is entitled.’102 Therefore, as Gewirth also recognises, if the “ought” in 
the judgement (2) - that others ought to refrain from interfering with the agent’s freedom and well-
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being - is to be ‘logically correlative’ to the “right” in statement (1) - that the agent has a right to 
freedom and well-being - it must be taken in a sense which also ‘includes this concept of an 
entitlement or something due’.103 The “ought”-judgement in (2) will only hold as equivalent to the 
rights-judgement in (1) if the agent making ‘the “ought”-judgment regards it as setting for other 
persons duties that they owe to him’, that is, they regard it as stating something ‘to which he is 
entitled.’104 Otherwise, the right-claim would contain an element of entitlement and duty that is not 
present in the “ought”-judgement, and the meaning of the two statements would differ. They would 
then not be equivalent, with the consequence that denying the right-claim would not entail denying 
the “ought”-claim and would therefore not entail the self-contradiction that Gewirth argues results 
from denying that “ought”-claim. 
Furthermore, in order for Gewirth to stay within his dialectically necessary method, this particular 
conception of “ought” must be entailed and necessitated by the agent’s judgements in the previous 
steps of his argument up to this point. The only previous step at this point in Gewirth’s overarching 
argument for the PGC is the one stating that ‘every agent implicitly makes evaluative 
judgments...about the necessary goodness of the freedom and well-being that are necessary 
conditions of his acting to achieve his purposes’.105 Thus it is from this step that the required 
conception of “ought” must follow. So the crucial issue now becomes whether this conception of 
“ought” – regarded by the agent as expressing an entitlement and setting duties owed by others – is 
entailed by the agent’s judgement that his freedom and well-being are necessary goods. In order to 
consider this issue, precisely what that first judgement involves must first be considered.  
What is involved in the judgement carried over from the previous step of Gewirth’s argument, 
where the ‘agent regards as necessary goods the freedom and well-being that constitute the generic 
features of his successful action’,106 can be clarified by looking at the argument Gewirth puts forward 
to show that it must be made by agents. The argument starts by pointing out that action is 
inherently purposive in that ‘the agent tries by his action to bring about’ some result or 
consequence.107 The intended result can be the action ‘for its own sake’, for the ‘sake of some 
consequence’ he or she intends to achieve by it, ‘or both’.108 Whatever the intended result, the 
agent ‘regards this goal as worth aiming at or pursuing’.109 That the agent regards the purpose of 
their action in this way is implied by the very fact of their acting in order to achieve it; if they did not 
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regard their purpose, either the action itself, or the consequences of that action, as worth pursuing 
they ‘would not unforcedly choose to move from...nonaction to action’.110 In regarding their 
purposes as something worth pursuing, the agent is regarding them as things which ‘seem to him to 
be good’ so that ‘”I do X for purpose E”’ entails the judgement ‘”E is good”’.111 Precisely what this 
means is made explicit by Gewirth; ‘“good” has the common illocutionary force of expressing a 
favorable positive evaluation of the objects or purposes to which it is attributed.’112 In this evaluative 
sense, to hold that something is “good” is to ‘value or prize’ it and to say that it is good is to ‘give 
expression to these attitudes.’113 In other words, to make the judgement that something is “good” is 
to regard a ‘particular event or state of affairs as desirable’.114 
The argument then goes on to extend this ‘positive evaluation’ of the purposes of action to the 
‘necessary preconditions’ of engaging in that action, summarised as freedom and well-being.115 
Without these preconditions of action the agent ‘would not be able to act for any purpose’ at all,116 
and ‘since the agent regards his purposes as good’ they must also regard these conditions as ‘at least 
instrumentally good’ in enabling them to act for those purposes, even if those purposes amount to 
nothing more than the performance of the actions themselves.117 The result of extending the agent’s 
positive evaluation of their purposes to the necessary conditions of action is that these conditions 
are similarly valued. The sense of “good” as set out by Gewirth in relation to the agent’s regarding of 
their purposes as “good” is extended to the conditions of achieving those purposes. Thus, what 
Gewirth has established, on his own terms, is that the agent must regard their freedom and well-
being, like their purposive actions, as something to be ‘value[d] or prize[d]’; something to be 
desired.118 It is from this evaluative judgement that the judgement that others “ought” to refrain 
from interfering with the agent’s freedom and well-being is derived. 
However, as McMahon points out, the only sense of “ought” that can be ‘directly derived’ from an 
evaluative judgement is one with a similarly evaluative nature; one which, like the previous 
evaluative judgement, regards a state of affairs as valuable.119 In this sense, the claim that others 
“ought” to refrain from acting in ways harmful to the conditions of action is taken to express the 
view that others refraining from interference is something to be valued or prized; a state of affairs 
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the agent regards as ‘desirable’.120  The agent necessarily desires or prizes a situation ‘that others 
not interfere with his freedom and well-being’, because he or she necessarily prizes and values his or 
her having those conditions of action, but this says nothing of the obligations of others to do so.121 
Regarding a state of affairs as valuable or something to be prized as in their necessary interests does 
not establish that anyone else has any obligation to act in that way, or that they owe it to the agent 
to act in that way.122 As a result, on this evaluative sense of “ought”, logically derived from the 
evaluative judgement of the agent that their freedom and well-being are necessary “goods” in that 
they both express the notion of valuing or prizing a particular state of affairs, the “ought”-judgement 
does not contain the notion of entitlement or due. As it does not contain the notion of entitlement 
or due, as Gewirth recognised it must if it is to be correlative to the right-claim (see above, p27), the 
“ought”-judgement of (2) is not logically equivalent to the right-claim of (1) in Gewirth’s argument 
for the necessity of the right-claim set out above (pp25-26).123 
The consequence of rejecting this equivalence is that denying (1) – the rights-claim that Gewirth 
seeks to show is unavoidable – does not contradict accepting (4) – the claim that freedom and well-
being are necessary goods. This is because, if (1) and (2) are not equivalent, then denying (1) does 
not also deny (2) and so does not require accepting the equivalent (3) – it is not the case that others 
ought to refrain from interfering with the agent’s freedom and well-being – and it was accepting (3) 
which Gewirth claimed contradicted (4).  Denying that one is entitled to, or is due, freedom and well-
being and their maintenance says nothing necessarily of whether one thinks it is desirable or 
valuable to remain free from interference, which, it has been argued here, is the logically entailed 
interpretation of (2) following on from the similarly evaluative judgement in the previous step. 
Denying the rights-claim thus leads to no contradiction, meaning that, according to Gewirth's 
method it is not necessary for the agent to accept. 
 
2.4.2.2. Gewirth’s Response 
Gewirth has, however, in a later article,124 offered a response to this criticism – that the sense of 
“ought” entailed by the evaluative judgement that freedom and well-being are necessary goods is 
one of a similarly evaluative nature, expressing a necessary desire for, or valuing of, the non-
interference of others, but which need not say anything of their obligations or what they owe the 
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agent. Gewirth responds that the above argument’s ‘construal’ of the judgement “my freedom and 
well-being are necessary goods” as ‘containing or authorizing only the “ought” of evaluation is 
mistaken.’125 It is mistaken because on this construal the agent’s statement that freedom and well-
being are necessary goods ‘would simply report the existence of these qualities as “desirable”’ but 
would not provide any ‘practical advocacy or conative commitment on his part to ensuring his 
continued possession of them.’126 According to Gewirth, the statement of the necessary goodness of 
freedom and well-being is more than just a statement of their desirability; ‘on the contrary’, it is 
‘equivalent to the “must”-statement..."I must have freedom and well-being”’, and this “must”-
statement is ‘regarded by him [the agent] as prescriptive for the conduct of other persons.’127 The 
reason offered by Gewirth for the claim that the agent regards this “must”-statement as prescriptive 
for the conduct of others is that ‘in holding he must have freedom and well-being, the agent 
implicitly demands of other persons that they at least not interfere’ with them.128 ‘Hence’, Gewirth 
concludes, ‘he regards both [the statement of the necessary goodness of freedom and well-being] 
and [the statement that he “must” have freedom and well-being] as action-guiding for others 
because of this prescriptive component.’129 Thus, contrary to the argument presented here, the 
move from the necessary good judgement to the ‘prescriptive “ought”-judgment’ does not involve 
an ‘equivocation’ because the necessary good judgement and ‘its equivalent “must”-
judgment...already implicitly incorporate prescriptive advocacy concerning the conduct of other 
persons.’130 If successful, this response would show that the above argument denying the necessity 
of the rights-claim rests on a misguided premise; that the judgement of necessary goodness carried 
over from step one is of a merely evaluative nature saying nothing of the obligations of others. The 
necessary progression towards the PGC could then proceed in line with the authority claimed for 
that moral principle. This response must therefore be carefully considered. 
For ease of analysis, Gewirth’s response just set out will be broken down into the following parts. 
First, that the statement of the necessary goodness of freedom and well-being is equivalent to the 
statement “I must have freedom and well-being”.  Second, that this “must”-statement is seen by the 
agent as prescriptive for the conduct of others because it contains an implicit demand that others do 
not interfere with his freedom and well-being, and third, therefore, the statement of necessary 
goodness is seen by the agent as action-guiding for others rather than merely evaluative. Each part 
must hold if Gewirth is to successfully show that the statement of necessary goodness is not merely 
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evaluative but also prescriptive in the sense of expressing what one considers entitled to or due 
from others. With this in mind, each part of Gewirth’s response will now be assessed. 
 
i) The statement of necessary goodness is equivalent to “I must have freedom and well-
being” 
Gewirth argues that the “must”-judgement follows from the statement of necessary goodness 
‘because of two interrelated aspects of the “must”’ in this judgement.’131 Firstly, ‘it reflects the 
factual relation of means-end necessity that the having of freedom and well-being bears to all 
successful action.’132 The statements that freedom and well-being are necessary for purposive action 
and that one must have freedom and well-being to be successful in purposive action can indeed be 
seen as equivalent in that they both express the same idea – that freedom and well-being are 
required, or are essential, for purposive action. Thus this first part of the argument for their 
equivalence is acceptable when the “must” is taken as merely expressive of this observation that 
there is an essential connection between the conditions of action and action.  
The second part of the argument for the logical equivalence of the necessary goodness and “must”-
judgements is that this “must” ‘reflects the practical prescriptiveness of the agent’s conative attitude 
toward his purpose-fulfillment so that he advocates or endorses his having freedom and well-
being.’133  It can be accepted that the agent must logically proceed to “endorse” his having freedom 
and well-being from the previous judgement that they are necessary goods. This is because 
otherwise, without such endorsement, the agent would be regarding as neutral the conditions of his 
action which he did not regard as neutral in the previous judgement; he regards his freedom and 
well-being as “good” on the basis that he unavoidably regards the purposes he acts for as “good”, 
and they are required if the agent is to be able to act towards these valued purposes. On this basis it 
is accepted that the “must"-statement is meant by the agent as more than a neutral expression of 
the factual connection between their having freedom and well-being and their engaging in purposive 
action. It must be taken in a way so as to actually support their having these conditions of action if 
what the agent says is to be coherent and of any meaning. However, this does not say anything 
about the nature of the entailed endorsement.  
So while Gewirth may have shown that the necessary goodness and “must”-judgements can be seen 
as  equivalent, in that they both express the factual connection between the conditions of action and 
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action, and that the agent must (to remain coherent) take this statement as expressing his or her 
support for his or her having these conditions of action, he has yet to show that the “must”-
judgement has to be seen as prescribing for the conduct of others and has to be seen as expressing 
the idea that the agent regards others as obligated to behave in a particular way where his or her 
freedom and well-being are concerned. The argument for that claim will now be considered. 
 
ii) The “must”-statement is seen by the agent as prescriptive for others  
As noted above in the discussion of Gewirth’s response to the criticism presented so far, the 
argument for the claim that the agent sees the “must”-statement as prescriptive for others is that, in 
‘holding that he must have freedom and well-being, the agent implicitly demands of other persons 
that they at least not interfere with his having’ freedom and well-being.134 The key question at this 
point is therefore whether the “must”-statement does in fact include an implicit demand prescribing 
for the conduct of others. Returning to Reason and Morality, Gewirth sets out four ‘necessary and 
sufficient conditions of some person’s addressing’ such an obligation to others.135 The first is that ‘he 
sets forth a practical requirement for their conduct that he endorses’.136 The second is that ‘he has a 
reason on which he grounds this requirement’, the third is that ‘he holds that this requirement and 
reason justify in some way preventing or dissuading the persons addressed from violating the 
requirement’, and finally ‘he holds that fulfillment of the requirement is due to himself’.137 Being 
described as both “necessary and sufficient”, it is clear that Gewirth considers that each condition 
must be satisfied if the agent is to be seen as making a demand prescribing for the conduct of 
others. However, it is argued that at least two of these conditions are problematic.  
Regarding the first necessary condition, that the agent ‘sets forth a practical requirement’ for the 
conduct of others,138 Regis Jr argues that ‘it is not clear’ that it is ‘fulfilled’.139 The reason is that while 
it is ‘probable that a rational agent will be aware that freedom and well-being are necessary for his 
action and he will therefore want them to be unabridged’, it does not necessarily follow that he or 
she will ‘on that account require...of others that they do not abridge them.’140 Wants and demands 
are two distinct notions; one can want without thereby setting forth a requirement or demand of 
others. There is ‘no contradiction’ in the idea of an agent ‘acting for some end’ while also ‘refraining 
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from setting forth requirements to others’, so that they are not logically compelled to lay down such 
requirements of others.141 Of course, an agent is free to set forth such requirements, ‘free to 
demand’, and some ‘may well do so’, but that is not the same as being logically compelled to 
‘demand that others respect his freedom and well-being.’142 As a result, it is not clear that the agent 
must set forth a practical requirement of others, and it is therefore not clear that they must mean 
the “must”-statement in a way which incorporates this prescriptive demand. 
In defence of Gewirth, Beyleveld offers a reply to this argument. Replying to Regis Jr, Beyleveld 
points out that ‘as a means to its actions for purposes, it is not a case of [an agent] probably wanting 
its freedom and well-being’, rather, the agent ‘categorically...must want its freedom and well-being, 
and hence, must demand noninterference.’143 Beyleveld presumably considers this emphasis on the 
idea that the agent must (as opposed to probably will) want freedom and well-being a reply to Regis 
Jr because of Regis Jr’s initial phrasing of his objection as ‘although it is probable that a rational 
agent will be aware that freedom and well-being are necessary...and he will therefore want them’, 
this does not logically compel him to set forth requirements for others.144 However, it is submitted 
that Beyleveld, in focussing on the word “probable”, misses the point of the criticism. The argument 
was not that the agent merely probably wants freedom and well-being, and therefore it is not the 
case that they must make the demand of others. The “probably” was attached to the agent being 
aware that freedom and well-being are necessary, and the argument went on to suggest that even if 
the agent is aware of this necessity and so will (as they must once they are aware of their necessity) 
want them, it is not the case that ‘he will on that account’ (that he undeniably wants them) make a 
demand addressed to others.145 The point of the criticism as presented by Regis Jr and supported 
above is that wants do not logically or necessarily entail the issuing of requirements or demands 
addressed to others. While a demand may well entail a want (arguably because making a demand is 
a purposive action and in acting for a purpose an agent implicitly regards it as “good”), a want does 
not entail a demand, and so while an agent recognising the necessity of freedom and well-being as a 
means to action will necessarily want freedom and well-being, they are not thereby caught in a 
contradiction if they do not demand of others that those others assist them in maintaining these 
conditions of action. That the necessity of the wants may only be probably recognised is irrelevant to 
this point; the inescapable nature of a want does not say anything of the sufficient connection 
between a want and a demand addressed to others. Once this is recognised, it can be seen that 
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Beyleveld’s response, emphasising the necessity of wanting freedom and well-being, does not 
address this point. This is because it amounts to repeating the claim that because the agent ‘must 
want’ freedom and well-being it ‘must demand’ noninterference from others,146 and that is the claim 
Regis Jr was criticising in the first place. In not addressing the point of the criticism made here, 
Beyleveld’s response to Regis Jr can be rejected as unproblematic for the conclusion that Gewirth’s 
first necessary condition of making a prescriptive demand of others – that the agent sets forth a 
practical requirement for their conduct – is not established. 
It is further argued that Gewirth’s fourth necessary condition of setting out an obligation for others – 
that the agent holds that ‘fulfilment of the requirement’ set forth to others ‘is due to himself’147 - is 
problematic. Gewirth’s argument for this condition being established is remarkably weak. After 
stating that the agent’s reason for issuing a requirement of others is that freedom and well-being are 
‘necessary for all his pursuits of his purposes’ (thereby arguing for the second condition of an agent’s 
considering that others have obligations towards them), and that this is also ‘what justifies for him 
preventing any violations’ (arguing for the third), the argument for the last condition is not set out so 
explicitly. As Regis Jr points out, what one finds is a repetition of this condition ‘in different 
words’.148 Gewirth states that the agent claims he has a right (an entitlement, a duty owed by 
others) to noninterference ‘because the agent holds that other persons owe him this strict duty of at 
least noninterference.’149 This is not an argument, but merely a reassertion of the condition sought 
to be established; that the agent regards noninterference as due from others. As Regis Jr points out, 
‘without a reason why the agent must make this claim’ that others owe them noninterference, other 
than that they simply must make this claim (which is not a reason but a repetition of the claim a 
reason is needed to justify), Gewirth simply ‘exceeds what he has evidence to show’.150 
 
iii) Therefore, the statement of necessary goodness is seen by the agent as action-guiding 
for others rather than merely evaluative 
Having rejected two of the conditions Gewirth puts forward as necessary and sufficient for the claim 
that an agent necessarily makes a prescriptive demand of others that they refrain from interference 
with the agent’s freedom and well-being, that claim is rejected as unsupported on Gewirth’s own 
terms. Having rejected that an agent necessarily makes such a demand of others, prescribing for 
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their conduct and requiring that they refrain from acting in a way which interferes with the agent’s 
freedom and well-being, Gewirth’s argument that the agent’s “must”-judgement (that they must 
have freedom and well-being) must be seen by the agent as putting forward such a demand is also 
rejected. Having rejected that the “must”-judgement implicitly contains a prescriptive demand 
addressed to others regarding their conduct, the argument that, on the basis that the necessary 
goodness judgement and the “must”-judgement are logically equivalent, the necessary goodness 
judgement also already contains a prescriptive element for the conduct of others is also rejected. 
Finally, having rejected the argument that the necessary goodness judgement carried over from step 
one of the overall argument for the PGC (see the summary above, pp23-24) necessarily contains a 
prescriptive element prescribing for the conduct of others, Gewirth’s response that the argument 
that the necessary goodness judgement ‘contains or authorizes only the “ought” of evaluation is 
mistaken’151 on this basis is rejected. 
It is therefore argued that the criticism presented here of the second rights-claiming step of 
Gewirth’s argument for the PGC holds. The argument for this right-claim relies on a prescriptive 
conception of the word “ought” which is not the necessary entailment of the evaluative premise 
carried over from the previous step that freedom and well-being are necessary goods. The logical 
entailment of this evaluative judgement would be for the agent to hold, via a similarly evaluative use 
of the word “ought”, that it is necessarily desirable or valuable that others refrain from interfering 
with the freedom and well-being that form the necessary conditions of purposive action, which they 
necessarily want to achieve.152 It is therefore argued that Gewirth establishes, at most, that it is 
necessary for the agent to want others to act in a particular way, not that it is necessary that they 
see such conduct as something which they are owed and which they demand as an entitlement. 
Gewirth has shown that the agent must endorse or advocate their having freedom and well-being in 
order to remain consistent with the judgement that they are necessary goods, but this falls short of 
showing that the agent must regard noninterference from others as something which they are due 
or entitled to. Because a right-claim is defined by Gewirth as a claim to such an entitlement (see 
above, section 2.4.2.1, p27) the argument presented here has the consequence that the right-claim 
is not a logically necessary entailment of the previous step in the argument for the PGC. It is 
therefore concluded that the agent is not compelled to make the claim that ‘he has rights to 
freedom and well-being’ which forms the second step in the progression towards the PGC.153 
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2.4.3. Consequences of Rejecting the Rights-Claiming Step for the Argument for the PGC 
As noted above (section 2.4.1, pp24-25), because of the nature of  Gewirth’s method, claiming to 
trace a progression of necessary judgements from the perspective of the agent to reach the PGC, the 
rejection of the necessity of one step is fatal to the argument that the PGC must be accepted as 
categorically obligatory. If one step is not necessary, then neither are the steps claimed to follow 
from it, and the unavoidable progression towards the PGC stops. This can be more clearly seen 
through considering the particular consequences of rejecting the necessity of the rights-claim in step 
two of Gewirth’s argument for the judgement claimed to follow from it in step three. 
The third and final step of the argument for the PGC which follows on from the right-claiming step is 
that the agent ‘must claim these rights for the sufficient reason that he is a prospective agent’ with 
purposes he necessarily wants to fulfil,154 and that the agent is ‘entitled to adduce only’ this 
description as his sufficient reason.155 Furthermore, because of the ‘logical principle of 
universalizability’, showing that an agent would be caught in a contradiction if they hold that they 
have rights for the sole sufficient reason that they are purposive agents while denying that others 
who also satisfy this condition also have those rights,156 the agent must ‘admit that all prospective 
purposive agents have these rights’ which he claimed for himself.157 It is from this third step that the 
PGC – the principle demanding that agents ‘[a]ct in accordance with the generic rights of [their] 
recipients as a well as of [themselves]’ – is derived.158 
However, if the rights-claim of step two is rejected as not obligatory to accept on pain of self-
contradiction, as it was argued above that it can be, then the third step of universalising this right-
claim cannot follow, and the PGC derived from it also does not follow, as a matter of obligation. 
Rather, as the second stage of Gewirth’s argument shows nothing more than that one is logically 
required to regard freedom and well-being and noninterference from others allowing them to enjoy 
these goods as valuable, generalising this judgement ‘merely forces’ the agent to ‘grant that other 
agents have sufficient reason (from their points of view) to regard as desirable [the present agent’s] 
promoting their freedom and well-being.’159  It does not force the agent to grant that others are 
entitled to or due such necessary goods and therefore to the noninterference of others with these 
goods. As the agent does not necessarily claim such entitlements for themselves, there is no 
unavoidable contradiction in denying such entitlements to others, or acting in a way which is 
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incompatible with those entitlements. Gewirth’s supreme moral principle is therefore not, as he 
claims, necessary to accept on pain of self-contradiction.  
 
2.4.4. Consequences for Using the PGC to Ground Normative Claims 
The aim of Gewirth’s argument was to give the PGC the authority of a ‘supreme moral principle’ 
which can ‘stand unchallenged as the criterion of moral rightness’.160 As the unchallengeable 
criterion of moral rightness, the idea was that the PGC could be used to resolve normative 
disagreement in an unchallengeable way; principles and judgements incompatible with the supreme 
moral principle and its requirements would have to be rejected by the agent putting them forward 
to avoid contradicting this principle they cannot deny, and thereby contradicting themselves. The 
unchallengeable authority of the PGC depended on showing that ‘the steps leading to its justification 
cannot rationally be evaded.’161 However, it has been argued that at least one of those judgements, 
the deontic right-claiming statement of step two, is not logically necessary, and therefore can be 
rationally evaded.  
As a result, the dialectically necessary method does not provide Gewirth’s PGC with the authority he 
claims for it – the authority of a categorically obligatory principle which must be accepted from the 
perspective of all agents on pain of self-contradiction. The principle has not been shown to be 
anything more than optional. If the principle is not obligatory to accept from the perspective of all 
purposive agents, then neither are its implications. The PGC therefore fails to provide an 
authoritative means of overcoming the questioning of particular normative claims, or of adjudicating 
between competing claims. The problem of grounding normative or moral claims in something more 
than the mere question-begging assertion and reassertion of a particular individual or group 
therefore remains unsolved.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has raised and considered the problem of defending moral and normative claims 
against their sceptical denial or competing alternatives. Unless this problem can be convincingly 
resolved, meaning particular claims and principles could be placed beyond question, arguments 
relying on such claims as their fundamental premises, including those in the constitutionalist debate, 
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would also remain open to question. For example, as will be seen in Chapter 4, in the event of 
disagreement, a particular conception of “democracy” would remain indefensible in a way which 
does not, when taken back its underlying normative or moral premises, simply beg the question and 
rest on the mere questionable assertion and reassertion of a particular individual or group. With this 
problem in mind, two means of establishing particular claims as superior to their alternatives, in a 
way which avoids resting on question-begging assertion and reassertion, were considered. 
Firstly, a realist foundationalist approach offering the possibility of establishing which claims 
correspond best to the “intrinsic nature” of (for example) “morality”, “rightness”, “justice”, or 
“objective reality”, thereby giving particular claims objective authority independent of the 
perspective of an individual or group, was considered but rejected. It was rejected via an anti-realist 
and anti-foundationalist approach arguing against the possibility of escaping beliefs in order to 
independently assess them and their accuracy. This argument drew on aspects of the pragmatic 
work of Rorty. It was argued that this pragmatic argument avoids the popular self-refutation attack 
on anti-realist approaches, for once this pragmatic argument is taken seriously on its own terms it 
becomes clear that the self-refuting claims anti-realist approaches are criticised for making both are 
not, and cannot, be made by the approach supported here, relying as they do on the very concepts 
the pragmatic anti-realist drops. Having rejected the realist approach of escaping our preferred 
beliefs, descriptions and claims to assess their adequacy to something independent, it was argued 
that all one is left with are the competing beliefs and claims themselves, supported by some 
individuals or groups, and rejected by others. There is no independent or neutral ground to appeal 
to allowing some claims to be set up as superior to others, and this takes one back to the problem 
identified at the beginning of this chapter; that of defending a normative or moral claim against their 
denial, or against other competing claims, in a way which does not merely beg the question. 
The chapter then went on to consider the influential argument of Gewirth. His dialectically necessary 
method sought to show that particular claims were obligatory for all purposive agents from their 
own subjective perspectives, thereby moving around the criticism of anti-realist and anti-
foundationalist approaches of the idea of escaping that perspective to reach independent ground. 
Gewirth’s claim was that his PGC, requiring all purposive agents to act in accordance with the 
generic rights to freedom and well-being of themselves and others, could be set up as the supreme 
and undeniable principle of morality.  As a supreme and unavoidable moral principle, Gewirth’s PGC 
potentially offered a means of adjudicating between competing claims in a way which does not 
amount to the questionable assertion of a particular individual or group, nor presuppose the realist 
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concepts and ideas rejected here. All beliefs, principles and actions would have to be in line with the 
requirements of this moral principle which all agents cannot question from their own points of view. 
However, it was argued that Gewirth fails to show that his PGC has the obligatory nature claimed for 
it. This is because the second step in the series of purportedly obligatory judgements leading to the 
PGC - the crucial rights-claiming judgement - was not the necessary entailment of the previous 
judgement. Because of the nature of the dialectically necessary method, rejecting one stage as not 
logically entailed by the previous has the result of stopping the purportedly unavoidable progression 
towards Gewirth’s PGC and leaving that principle as optional; it does not have the nature of an 
unavoidable supreme moral principle that Gewirth claims for it. If Gewirth’s principle is 
questionable, then so are its implications, and it therefore cannot serve as a convincing means of 
deciding between competing normative and moral claims in a non-question-begging way. The 
problem of defending particular claims against others therefore remains unresolved by Gewirth. 
It is therefore concluded that neither realist approaches, nor Gewirth’s supreme moral principle, can 
provide a satisfactory solution to the problem considered here of defending a particular normative 
or moral claim against their sceptical denial, or competing claims. It is suggested that this provides 
support for Leff’s sceptical conclusion of the ‘absence of any defensible moral position on, under, or 
about anything.’162 In the following chapters, the consequences of this sceptical conclusion of the 
lack of the ability to place normative and moral positions beyond the mere questionable assertion of 
an individual or group for the constitutionalist debate and the arguments within it will be considered 
in detail.  
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Chapter 3 
Waldron and the (Ir)relevance of (Anti)Realism  and (Non)Objectivity  
 
3.1. Introduction 
Having set out and defended the sceptical claim that there exists no convincingly defendable moral 
position via a pragmatic anti-realist and anti-foundationalist philosophical approach (Chapter 2), the 
thesis will now go on to explore some of the consequences of this claim for the constitutionalist 
debate. In doing so, the irrelevance argument of Jeremy Waldron must first be addressed. According 
to Waldron, ‘the truth or falsity of moral realism’, and, therefore, the “truth or falsity” of anti-
realism,1 ‘makes no difference to the justification’, or lack of justification, of the judicial review of 
legislation enacted by the elected branches on rights grounds.2  Put the other way around, shifting 
the focus from the legal branches to the political, Waldron’s irrelevance argument is that the 
realist/anti-realist issue makes no difference to the (lack of) justification for leaving issues 
concerning rights and morality to be determined by the elected political branches, and remain 
legally unquestioned by the judicial branches.  
By “moral realism”, Waldron means the ‘claim that some moral judgements are objectively true, 
while others are objectively false’, and by “anti-realism”, the denial of this claim.3 Thus, according to 
Waldron, anti-realists ‘deny that there are moral facts which determine the truth or falsity of the 
judgements people make’; with no means of showing such judgements to be correct or incorrect, 
there are ‘only moral judgements and the people who make them’.4 On these definitions, it is clear 
that the perspective defended above in Chapter 2 falls under Waldron’s “anti-realist” category given 
that it argued against the idea that there exist any independent constraints on which moral claims 
and judgements must, or should, be accepted, and which must, or should, be rejected. Part of the 
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argument for that position was a rejection of the idea that there exist any moral facts, realities, 
intrinsic natures, or what Waldron describes as ‘real properties’,5 which particular moral judgements 
and predicates could be said to represent or correspond to more or less accurately. The result is that 
moral claims amount to nothing more than the questionable assertions and reassertions of 
particular individuals or groups; there are only assertions, question-begging reassertions, and the 
people who make them. 
As the philosophical perspective taken in this thesis falls under Waldron’s description of “anti-
realism”, and rejects what Waldron describes as “realism”, it falls under his irrelevance argument. As 
a result, if Waldron’s irrelevance claim can be made out, then the philosophical perspective taken 
and defended in this thesis would be shown to be irrelevant to key issues in the constitutionalist 
debate, and arguably, therefore, irrelevant to that debate itself. The perspective defended here 
would have nothing, or at best very little, worthwhile to say about the legal/political constitutionalist 
debate being explored. For that reason, Waldron’s irrelevance case must be carefully examined and 
tested before proceeding any further. It will, however, be argued that Waldron’s arguments fail to 
demonstrate his claim that the realist/anti-realist debate is irrelevant to the constitutionalist debate 
and the issues within it. 
To show this, a standard of irrelevance – a benchmark according to which Waldron’s arguments can 
be tested – will first be set out and justified (section 3.2). Waldron’s specific arguments relied on to 
establish the irrelevance of the realist/anti-realist issue will then be evaluated according to this 
standard (section 3.3). In doing so, it will be argued that Waldron’s arguments contravene the 
standards that an argument of irrelevance must satisfy in order to successfully prove its point. This is 
because those arguments, it will be argued, in effect amount to an implicit attack on realist claims 
and theories; they attack realism ‘under the guise’ of showing it to be irrelevant whether convincing 
or not.6 The result is that, rather than showing the realist/anti-realist issue to be irrelevant, Waldron 
himself becomes entangled in that debate and the issues within it. Moreover, it will be argued that 
because Waldron’s arguments take sides in the philosophical debate he claims is irrelevant in the 
very course of attempting to show that debate to be irrelevant, they turn out to be self-
contradictory and incoherent. Ultimately, therefore, it will be concluded that Waldron’s irrelevance 
arguments do not prove their point, are incoherent and so cannot prove their point, and should be 
dismissed on these grounds. Following this argument, there will be some discussion of the tensions 
and, it could be argued, contradictions, Waldron’s comments on the realist/anti-realist debate give 
rise to (section 3.3.1). This is a problem highlighted by, and forming an interesting background to, 
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the criticism of Waldron’s irrelevance argument offered here. Reading Waldron’s irrelevance 
arguments alongside his other comments in the writings where those arguments are found, and 
others, and drawing out the philosophical suggestions of those comments, gives rise to a 
problematically inconsistent picture of where Waldron stands on the realist/anti-realist issue.  
Having set out the negative case against Waldron’s irrelevance argument, the consequences of the 
anti-realist perspective will be considered in relation to a key issue of concern for Waldron, and one 
at the heart of the constitutionalist debate – decision-making authority in a constitution, particularly 
concerning rights. Specifically, Waldron’s criticisms of instrumental approaches to constitutionalism 
and authority – approaches holding that the (lack of) justification for a particular constitutional 
arrangement or distribution of decision-making authority depends on the quality of the substantive 
outcomes it is likely to reach - will be discussed, along with responses to these criticisms (section 
3.4). Waldron’s conclusion that instrumental approaches to the constitutionalist debate are 
misguided will be supported, but, contrary to Waldron, this will be explicitly via the anti-realist 
perspective taken in this thesis. It will be argued that the responses to Waldron’s anti-
instrumentalist case, while arguable if one accepts their realist assumptions (which Waldron, as will 
be suggested, at times seems to do, and those responding to his arguments on authority take him as 
doing), lose their force if these assumptions are rejected. Once an anti-realist stance is taken, the 
instrumentalist approach (and its defence) becomes fundamentally misguided. Finally, one of 
Waldron’s more positive contributions to the constitutionalist debate – his direct argument in favour 
of leaving decision-making over rights and the moral issues involved to elected representatives and 
against the institution of judicial rights-review, based on the idea that participation is the “right of 
rights”– will be considered. It will, however, be rejected as relying on, when taken to its fundamental 
premise, moral claims which (according to the perspective defended in the previous chapter) are 
incapable of convincing, non-question-begging defence against their sceptical denial, or against 
competing claims. 
 
3.2. The Standard of Irrelevance 
Testing Waldron’s argument that ‘the truth or falsity of moral realism’ makes no difference to the 
(lack of) justification of judicial rights-review of legislation7 requires a standard according to which it 
can be assessed. The standard suggested by Smith in discussing Waldron’s irrelevance, or ‘no-
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difference thesis’,8 will be supported and adopted here. Generally speaking, an argument for the 
irrelevance of a particular debate and the issues involved cannot involve taking sides on such issues, 
either explicitly, or implicitly. Otherwise, the argument would become involved in the very debate 
the irrelevance theorist claims can be avoided. The argument would therefore contradict the very 
point it tries to support in the course of attempting to support that point, rendering the argument 
paradoxical and simply incoherent. Thus, using this logic, Waldron cannot show that the realist/anti-
realist issue is irrelevant to the constitutionalist issue ‘by taking sides in [that] meta-ethical debate’, 
either explicitly or implicitly.9 This standard of “not taking sides” must be operationalised to be of 
any use in assessing Waldron’s irrelevance argument. In order to avoid taking sides in the 
realist/anti-realist debate, Waldron ‘cannot deny any meta-ethical claim’ argued for by either 
realists, or anti-realists, for again, to do so would be to become ‘embroiled in the very debate [he] 
claims to be irrelevant’.10 
Putting this standard of irrelevance into practice in relation to realism will involve ‘distinguishing 
claims about, say, how to identify objective moral beliefs’ – how to establish moral truths –  ‘from 
claims about the relevance’ of those truths to the (lack of) justification of judicial rights-review.11 
Furthermore, putting this “not taking sides” standard of irrelevance into practice will also require 
distinguishing claims about the ability to identify objective moral beliefs and establish moral truths 
from claims about the relevance of this ability to the (lack of) justification of judicial rights-review. 
This is because claims about how to identify accurate moral beliefs, or objectively assess the 
accuracy of moral claims, presuppose the ability to do so, and more fundamentally the possibility of 
doing so. Otherwise the realist would incoherently be claiming to provide a means of doing what 
they do not accept they can do, or can be done at all.  A realist claim about how to identify moral 
truths or objectively superior moral beliefs therefore inherently involves a positive claim about the 
ability and possibility of doing this. Turning this around, in relation to anti-realism, evaluating 
Waldron’s irrelevance argument will require distinguishing claims about the lack of ability of 
establishing moral truths, from claims about the effect of that on the justification (or otherwise) of 
judicial rights-review. For the purposes of his irrelevance argument, Waldron is ‘free to challenge the 
claim that [realism or anti-realism] makes a difference to’ the justification (or lack of justification) of 
judicial rights-review of legislation, but ‘not the claim that objective moral truths can [according to 
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the realist, or cannot, according to the anti-realist] be discovered in a certain way [or indeed in any 
way]’.12 
Smith suggests that the above distinctions are ‘likely to become blurred at certain points’.13 This 
would clearly raise problems. If one has difficulty identifying what claims are and are not acceptable, 
one will have difficulty establishing whether the irrelevance thesis successfully proves its point. To 
overcome this problem, Smith suggests another test for use in those cases where the distinction 
between a philosophical claim, and a claim about the relevance of such claims, is unclear. In those 
cases, ‘one must decide...whether the no-difference theorist can challenge the claim in question 
without begging the question.’14 Again, to be of any use, what it means to “beg the question” in this 
context must be clarified. This can be done by asking ‘whether the claim in question can be accepted 
by all sides to the meta-ethical debate’ – by realists and anti-realists alike.15 If it can, this ‘suggests 
that [the claim in question] is not sufficiently central to any meta-ethical position to be immune to 
challenge’ without questioning that position itself.16 Conversely, it can be added, if it cannot, then 
this would suggest that the claim in question is one at issue in the philosophical debate Waldron is 
claiming to be irrelevant, and would therefore beg the question, and as suggested above would be 
self-contradictory and paradoxical, to rely on in the context of his irrelevance argument. 
Having set out and operationalised the standards that will be used to test Waldron’s claim that the 
realist/anti-realist issue makes no difference to the justification or lack of justification of judicial 
rights-review, Waldron’s specific arguments seeking to show the irrelevance of the realist/anti-
realist issue to the legal/political constitutionalist issue will now be set out and evaluated, both on 
their own terms and, where necessary, by applying the above standards and tests. 
 
3.3. Waldron’s Arguments for the Irrelevance of the Realist/Anti-Realist Issue 
Waldron is, in his own words, ‘known as a fanatical opponent of strong judicial review’,17 and, as 
Kavanagh notes, one of the most ‘persistent and influential opponents’ of such review in favour of 
leaving decisions over rights to the electorally accountable representatives of citizens.18 It is 
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therefore perhaps hardly surprising that Waldron argues for his claim of the irrelevance of realism 
and anti-realism to the constitutionalist issue on the basis that ‘the truth of moral realism – if it were 
true – would make no difference’ to his conclusion that the ‘practice of judicial review of popular 
legislation’ on rights grounds cannot be justified.19 Specifically, in ‘The Irrelevance of Moral 
Objectivity’,20 Waldron argues for the irrelevance of the realist/anti-realist issue on the grounds that 
it makes no difference to his argument that judicial decision-making regarding the controversial 
moral issues involved in rights protection is ‘arbitrary’.21 Waldron’s point here is that ‘moral 
decision-making in law is likely to be as arbitrary...for a moral realist as it is for any opponent of 
moral objectivity’, and that, therefore, the issue makes no difference, and thus is irrelevant, to the 
issue of the (lack of) justification for judicial review of legislation on rights grounds.22 
Waldron’s main concern with judicial decision-making in rights cases, where ‘a judge sometimes has 
to assert his view of what is [morally] right over the view taken by a legislature or electorate’, is with 
‘explaining the democratic legitimacy of this.’23 The problems with such arguments from 
“democratic legitimacy”, relying as they do on the heavily contested concept of “democracy”, will be 
discussed in Chapter 4.  It is argued there that “democracy” is ultimately a useless concept for the 
constitutionalist debate unless the contestation over what it actually involves, or rather should 
involve, can first be addressed. It will be argued that such disagreement is irresolvable due to its 
value-laden nature, along with the inability of showing any side of these value, moral and normative 
disputes to be correct, or at least superior to others - a claim made relying on the anti-realist and 
anti-foundationalist perspective defended earlier. For now, however, Waldron seems to offer an 
argument as to the arbitrariness of judicial decision-making on rights-issues that avoids making use 
of this contested concept, and as such may not be subject to the criticisms made of “democratic” 
arguments in that chapter. If it is subject to those criticisms, however, then that could be a further 
argument against Waldron’s case that the realist/anti-realist issue is irrelevant, given that those 
criticisms are made from an anti-realist perspective. Earlier in the chapter of Law and Disagreement 
where Waldron makes his argument for the irrelevance of the realist/anti-realist issue on the 
grounds that it makes no difference to the arbitrariness or otherwise of judicial decision-making, 
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Waldron writes of ‘political legitimacy’.24 The issue is that judges determining issues of ‘social 
principle and social value’, lacks ‘authority’ over the determinations of those issues by elected 
legislators.25 Waldron’s point is that this is likely to be so regardless of whether moral realism is 
correct or not. Furthermore, because the argument below will be that Waldron’s irrelevance 
arguments amount to an attack on realism, and can therefore be dismissed as incoherent and not 
proving their point, whether Waldron’s arguments concerning the arbitrary nature of judicial rights 
review are themselves convincing is not at issue at this stage. Whether Waldron’s premise that 
judicial review is “arbitrary” or “democratically” questionable is convincing or not, his arguments 
that moral realism would not change that, it is argued, are in either case problematic.  That premise, 
is (to adopt a Waldronian phrase) “irrelevant” to the argument against Waldron in this section. 
Returning to Waldron’s irrelevance case, to support his point that judicial decision-making over 
issues of rights remains “arbitrary” regardless of whether one takes a realist or anti-realist approach, 
Waldron recasts the situation of judges determining rights-issues and imposing them on society in 
preference to the determinations which have been, or could have been, made by elected legislators 
in (what he describes as) realist terms. For Waldron, ‘if moral realism is true’ then it would be 
accurate to say that ‘what the judge is imposing on his [or her] fellow citizens...is a belief of his [or 
hers] about the moral facts’, rather than their ‘subjective preference[s]’, as he suggests it would be 
described by the anti-realist.26 However, Waldron argues, if realism were the case then the decisions 
of ‘legislators and voters’ could equally be cast in this realist language to the effect that their 
decisions and judgements reflect ‘their beliefs about the moral facts’.27 Thus, the judges’ ‘beliefs 
about the moral facts’ would be imposed in preference to those of electorally accountable 
legislators, and by extension, the general population.28 But, and this is Waldron’s key point, ‘in the 
absence of any account of how one could tell which of two conflicting beliefs about the moral facts is 
more accurate’ – which is to say, to use the language of realism discussed in the previous chapter of 
this thesis, which represents the “moral truth” or “moral reality” more accurately – the ‘imposition 
of...a few people’s beliefs over those of the population at large still seems arbitrary.’29 
This argument for the irrelevance of the realist/anti-realist issue rests on the premise that there is 
“an absence of any account” of how to distinguish accurate (or more accurate) moral beliefs from 
inaccurate (or less accurate) ones. Waldron is saying that without such an account, judicial decision-
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making still seems “arbitrary”. However, even taking Waldron’s argument on its own terms and 
assuming that judicial decision-making on rights and moral issues is actually “arbitrary” in the first 
place (so that it could properly be said to “still be” arbitrary even on a realist approach), it is argued 
here that this premise of the irrelevance argument is problematic. It is problematic for slightly 
different reasons depending on what interpretation is given to the claim that there is an “absence of 
any account” of how to distinguish between more and less accurate moral beliefs.  If Waldron’s 
claim here is that there is an absence of any account among moral realists of how more and less 
accurate beliefs can be distinguished, then it is argued that it is both empirically questionable - such 
accounts (whether convincing or not) are provided – and contradictory to other comments made by 
Waldron - he himself refers to such accounts. If Waldron’s point is, rather than there being an 
absence of any account at all of how to tell the difference between more and less accurate moral 
beliefs, that whatever accounts are offered turn out to be unconvincing or unpersuasive, then his 
argument begs the question against realist theorists. That is, the argument becomes an attack on 
realist theories and claims - in effect an anti-realist argument – thereby contradicting Waldron’s case 
that the realist/anti-realist issue is irrelevant in the very course of trying to establish that case. These 
problems will now be set out in more detail, along with a discussion of the particular interpretation 
of Waldron’s premise that leads to each problem and the evidence supporting these interpretations. 
 
a) The Claim That There is an “Absence of Any Account” of How to Distinguish Accurate From 
Inaccurate Moral Claims is Empirically Questionable and Self-Contradictory 
The idea that there is “an absence of any account” of how to distinguish accurate (or more accurate) 
from inaccurate (or less accurate) moral beliefs, which forms the key premise of Waldron’s 
irrelevance argument set out above, is empirically questionable and contradictory to other 
comments made by Waldron if it is read as claiming that there is an absence of any such account. On 
this interpretation the claim simply reports that no realist offers any means for establishing the 
accuracy of beliefs regarding the moral facts they claim those beliefs seek to, and more 
fundamentally can, represent.  There is some evidence to suggest that this is what Waldron means 
by the premise of his irrelevance argument. For example, he writes earlier that, ‘though they 
[realists] insist that there is some fact of the matter, they offer nothing which would help distinguish 
a mere arbitrary opinion from a well-grounded belief.’30 The emphasised words suggest that the 
criticism Waldron makes of realists is that they put forward no test at all for the accuracy of moral 
                                                          
30
 ibid, 180 [emphasis added]. 
48 
 
beliefs in representing the moral facts; that they offer no epistemology which can be used to 
establish what the moral truth of the matter is, or even how to get closer to that truth.  
However, as Smith points out, realists and objectivists ‘do indeed offer ways of determining which 
moral beliefs are objectively true’, or at least more accurate than other moral beliefs.31 In fact, 
Waldron himself mentions such accounts when he recognises that, for example, the realist ‘natural 
lawyer...will claim that the development of the natural law tradition represents progress towards 
the truth, and that it indicates the epistemic strategies’ that should be encouraged to ‘continue 
down this path’ towards such truth.32 Similarly, Waldron himself notes that, for example, a realist 
utilitarian ‘will claim that the development of utilitarian ethics’, along with the development of a 
utilitarian epistemology, represents ‘progress towards the truth.’33 These examples of theories 
offering epistemologies for purportedly reaching, or progressing towards (if their proponent also 
happens to be a realist) the moral truth or fact of the matter given by Waldron himself demonstrate 
that the claim that there is an absence of any account of how to distinguish which beliefs represent 
the moral facts accurately, or at least progress towards such representation, simply cannot be 
maintained. These theories do offer epistemologies, which, if characterized in the realist language, 
do purport to represent a means of progressing towards moral truth or more accurate 
representations of such truth. Therefore, on this first possible interpretation of Waldron’s key 
argument that there is ‘an absence of any account’ of how to distinguish accurate moral beliefs from 
inaccurate ones,34 which he relies on to demonstrate that judicial decision-making would still be 
unacceptably “arbitrary” even if realism were accepted, that argument is problematic and 
unconvincing. Such a claim cannot be maintained in light of what realists do say,35 and is 
contradicted by Waldron’s referring to claims that a particular theory provides a means of reliably 
progressing towards moral truths. Insofar as this interpretation does accurately reflect Waldron’s 
argument for the continued arbitrariness of judicial decision-making over issues of rights in the 
event of realism, and therefore the irrelevance of the realist/anti-realist issue, it is argued that it can 
be quickly rejected on these grounds. 
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b) The Claim That There is an “Absence of Any Account” of How to Distinguish Accurate From 
Inaccurate Moral Beliefs Incoherently Begs the Question Against Realism  
However, the above interpretation is not the only way in which Waldron’s premise of the “absence 
of any account” of how to distinguish accurate (or more accurate) from inaccurate (or less accurate) 
moral beliefs could be read. Indeed, the very fact that Waldron himself appears to mention such 
accounts may itself point against the first interpretation as the one actually intended, assuming he 
would not intend to so clearly contradict himself. As Smith suggests, it could also be taken to mean 
that there is an absence of any ‘successful’, convincing, ‘plausible’, and therefore useful, account of 
how to determine the accuracy of moral beliefs, rather than that there is an absence of any account 
at all.36 
There is also some evidence to suggest that this second interpretation is the way Waldron meant his 
claim. To rework an example from the discussion of the first possible interpretation above, Waldron 
writes that ‘though they [realists] insist that there is some fact of the matter, they offer nothing 
which would help distinguish a mere arbitrary opinion from a well-grounded belief.’37 The words 
emphasised here suggest that the criticism Waldron makes of realists is that, while they may offer 
some purported means of distinguishing mere arbitrary opinions from well-justified beliefs about 
the moral facts, the means they do offer are, it turns out, unhelpful for that purpose; they cannot 
deliver on their promises of providing a means of deciding between competing beliefs about the 
moral facts. As another example, Waldron immediately follows his consideration of the possibility 
that a realist utilitarian ‘will claim that the development of utilitarian ethics...is progress towards the 
truth’, in that the ‘basic propositions of his theory are true’, with the objection that ‘there is nothing 
he can say to support these claims.’38 The words emphasised here suggest that Waldron’s problem 
with realist theorists is that they cannot back up their claims to epistemological authority; their 
claims to have a theory which provides a sound means of accurately, or more accurately, 
representing moral truth which can then be used to decide between competing moral beliefs. This 
objection seems to be made explicit by Waldron when he writes that ‘moral realists...are quite 
unable to demonstrate the truth of their judgements or show how they correspond to moral reality’ 
and that they should therefore qualify their substantive moral claims with the rider that it is ‘”only 
[their] opinion”’.39 Similarly, Waldron goes on to write that no beliefs about the moral facts ‘can be 
certified as superior or naturally prevalent on any credentials other than that some people find them 
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congenial.’40 Whether or not a claim delivers on its promises, can be supported, or is adequately 
demonstrated, is an evaluative judgement, as opposed to the empirical one of whether a claim is 
made at all. Waldron’s criticism of realist theories, on this interpretation, therefore differs from the 
first interpretation offered above in that it involves an assessment of whatever claims realists do 
make; whether they can convincingly make those claims, and whether they are capable of support, 
rather than whether or not they actually make those claims in the first place.  
However, while this evaluative interpretation of Waldron’s key claim of the “absence of any 
account” of how to distinguish more and less accurate beliefs about moral truth avoids the criticisms 
of the first interpretation discussed above - that it simply cannot be maintained in light of what 
some realists do say, and in light of other statements made by Waldron himself on this matter - it is 
argued that it is nonetheless problematic. If this interpretation is how Waldron intended his claim 
then it is argued that it can be dismissed as ‘question-begging’ in the context of an irrelevance 
argument.41 It is question-begging in that it ‘focuses on’, as Tasioulas notes, ‘what on anyone’s view 
must be a serious defect’ in the realist position; the ‘putative absence of a reliable’ and convincing 
means of identifying moral truths.42 Claiming that there is a fundamental defect in realism – that its 
claims cannot be supported or demonstrated – seems ‘indistinguishable from an attack’ on realist 
theories, and even the very idea of realism itself.43 
That this argument (on this interpretation) is question-begging against realism becomes even clearer 
by applying the more specific test for question-begging set out above;  whether the claims involved 
can be accepted by both sides to the philosophical debate (see section 3.2). It is argued that 
Waldron’s claims on this interpretation are not acceptable to both sides. Those realists putting 
forward their favoured epistemological theory, and, as Waldron himself notes, which they regard as 
facilitating ‘progress towards the truth’ and relying on ‘basic propositions’ which are ‘true’, would 
surely not accept Waldron’s point that there is ‘nothing [they] can say to support these claims’.44 If 
such realists thought their claims were not supported, and more fundamentally, could not be 
supported, then surely they would not advance them at all. However, as Waldron has just noted, 
they do make claims to epistemological superiority and do claim to provide a means of progressing 
towards moral truths. Indeed, as Waldron has noted previously regarding the very nature of putting 
forward an argument, ‘everyone thinks her [or his] own current position is correct; otherwise she [or 
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he] would not be putting it forward’ at all.45 Thus, on this logic (which, again, is Waldron’s own), it is 
argued that to the realists who also advance an epistemology, whether they be (to use Waldron’s 
examples) ‘utilitarians’, ‘Christian fundamentalists’,46 ‘deontologist[s]’47 or whatever, Waldron’s 
argument that their claims cannot be supported or certified, or are unconvincing, is likely to be 
unacceptable. This further demonstrates that Waldron’s argument, on this interpretation, begs the 
question against realism, and as such takes sides in the realist/anti-realist debate in the course of 
arguing for its irrelevance.  
The problem is that to support the claim that the realist/anti-realist issue is irrelevant with an 
argument that amounts to an attack on realism is, as Smith puts it, ‘to take part in the meta-ethical 
debate, not to show that it is irrelevant.’48 Furthermore, as was argued above while setting out the 
standard an irrelevance argument must meet in order to be convincing (section 3.2), to take sides 
(explicitly or otherwise) in the debate one claims to be irrelevant in the very process of supporting 
the claim that it is actually irrelevant is self-contradictory and incoherent. Therefore, on this second 
interpretation of Waldron’s argument for the irrelevance of the realist/anti-realist issue to the 
constitutionalist issue, which it was just argued does take sides in the realist/anti-realist debate 
(against realism and realist claims) that argument can be rejected as incoherent. 
Putting the arguments in this section together, whichever of the above interpretations of Waldron’s 
argument that realism makes no difference to the “arbitrariness” of judicial decision-making on 
rights-issues is taken, and even assuming such judicial decision-making is actually “arbitrary” to start 
with, that argument does not, and furthermore cannot, support Waldron’s case that the realist/anti-
realist issue is irrelevant. It is either empirically questionable and hostile to realism in a way which is 
self-contradictory, in denying that any realist puts forward a means of distinguishing more accurate 
from less accurate moral beliefs while also mentioning examples of realist epistemologies put 
forward precisely for this purpose (the first interpretation), or it is hostile to realism in a way which 
is both question-begging and self-contradictory in the context of an irrelevance argument, as itself 
taking sides in the debate it supposedly demonstrates is irrelevant and can be avoided (the second 
interpretation). Either way, the consequence is that Waldron’s irrelevance argument is wholly 
unconvincing. 
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3.3.1. A Tale of Two Waldrons? 
The argument of this chapter so far has been that Waldron’s case for the irrelevance of the 
realist/anti-realist issue to key issues at stake in the constitutionalist debate amounts to an implicit 
attack on realism itself, and as such does not, and cannot due to its self-contradictory nature, prove 
its point. That Waldron’s arguments are hostile to realism is, it might be suggested, unsurprising 
given what he has previously written regarding realism and anti-realism.  In an article on the issue of 
moral truth, rights, and judicial review (prior to the publication of Law and Disagreement),49 
Waldron expressly states that one of the views he holds is ‘anti-realism’,50 before proceeding to 
point to sceptics such as Hume and Hare as providing the ‘accounts of moral judgement [he] find[s] 
most convincing.’51 In this article Waldron talks of anti-realists in the first-person; one ‘of the views 
that I hold [is] anti-realism’,52 ‘we...discover that there is simply no room for realist conceptions like 
moral truth and moral objectivity, and we put those ideas quietly and untendentiously aside.’53 The 
use of the first-person here suggests that Waldron, at this stage, identifies himself as an anti-realist. 
Waldron himself seems to find moral realism unconvincing and Waldron himself puts realist 
concepts like “moral truth” and “moral objectivity” to one side. Even more strongly, Waldron openly 
claims that ‘the realist is making some wretchedly misbegotten category-mistake in assimilating 
moral judgments to judgments about matters of fact.’54 Reading this article, putting his first-person 
alignment with anti-realism, anti-realists, and anti-realist ideas together with his apparently open 
rejection of realist concepts and ideas, one gets the impression that Waldron is a trenchant anti-
realist. This alignment with anti-realism, may, it could be suggested, fuel Waldron’s implicit attack on 
realism which it was argued above his irrelevance argument amounts to. 
However, in the chapter of Law and Disagreement where the irrelevance arguments discussed and 
rejected above are found (Chapter 8), Waldron seems to want to distance himself from the anti-
realist position and the ideas within it. In that chapter, one finds statements like; ‘of the various 
views about justice and rights that compete in our society, surely some are more acceptable than 
others’, and that ‘[s]urely...some of them are true and others false.’55 That Waldron wants to 
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distance himself from anti-realism is further suggested by the use of, contrary to the quotes from 
the previous article just noted, the third-person when mentioning anti-realists. For example, when 
defining anti-realism he writes that ‘[t]hey [anti-realists] deny that there are moral facts which 
determine the truth or falsity of the judgements people make’, ‘[t]hey say: there are only moral 
judgements and the people who make them’,56 and, in a quote otherwise strikingly similar to that 
found in the previous article, that ‘they [no longer “we”]...discover that there is no room for any 
realist notion of moral truth and moral objectivity, and they [no longer “we”] put those ideas quietly 
aside.’57 
The absence of the explicit attacks on realism from his previous article on moral truth and judicial 
review referred to above, and the shift from the first-person to the third-person in statements 
regarding anti-realists and their claims which are otherwise identical, could suggest a number of 
things. Firstly, it could represent the full flowering of Waldron’s irrelevance case. Because Waldron’s 
argument is that the realist/anti-realist debate is irrelevant and of no consequence to the 
constitutionalist issues, he may see his own stance in that debate as irrelevant. Indeed, if his 
irrelevance case is to be convincing, according to the standard set out above (section 3.2), he should 
see his own stance in the philosophical debate as irrelevant. Seeing his own philosophical views as 
irrelevant, Waldron may simply see no need to mention them in a chapter which has the purpose of 
showing the irrelevance of the philosophical debate to the constitutionalist issue. Those views would 
not (again, as they should not) add anything to this argument. 
Secondly, the shift could signal a change in Waldron’s stance so that, by the time of Law and 
Disagreement, he is no longer convinced that realism is ill-founded, or makes some “wretchedly 
misbegotten mistake”, and no longer sees anti-realism as more convincing. Simply put, Waldron 
could have changed his mind regarding his philosophical stance. Some commentators do seem to 
take it as read that Waldron is (now at least), ultimately, a realist, and thinks that there are such 
things as moral facts regarding moral rights and wrongs, and accepts realist concepts like “moral 
truth” and “moral objectivity”. For example, in the course of discussing Waldron’s critique of 
instrumentalist conceptions of authority and arguing that the constitutional design which is ‘most 
likely to yield morally right decisions, or is likely to yield the most morally right decisions, is most 
justified’, Kavanagh points out that while some would regard the very idea of a “morally right” 
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decision dubious, Waldron does not.58 Kavanagh’s assumption that ‘there is such a thing as a morally 
right and wrong decision’ regarding issues of rights is, she states, ‘not in contention with Waldron.’59 
To support this point that Waldron accepts, and is even ‘keen to stress’, the realist idea of moral 
rights and wrongs ‘independently of what people believe’, Kavanagh points to the statement made 
by Waldron that ‘”rape is wrong even in societies where it is a common practice”.’60 Here, Kavanagh 
takes Waldron not only as accepting that there are moral rights and wrongs, but as regarding this 
particular statement as an example of a moral truth. Waldron appears to assume that he knows this 
particular moral truth, and that those who deny it (even whole societies) are wrong to think 
otherwise.61 How Waldron’s apparent assumption of the existence of moral truths and the apparent 
assumption that he himself knows such a moral truth (the rape example) is reconcilable with his 
other comments discussed above – particularly that, while some realists claim to have found the 
truth, or a means of accessing it, there is nothing they can say to support these claims (see section 
3.3, p49) - is another problem pointing to the inconsistency in Waldron’s various comments 
involving the realist/anti-realist issue. To reconcile the idea that one cannot support a claim to know, 
or to know how to access, a moral truth with Waldron’s suggestion that the rape example is a moral 
truth so that those who disagree with him are wrong, that latter suggestion must be regarded by 
Waldron as unsupportable. But if it is regarded by Waldron as incapable of support – that there is 
nothing he could say to demonstrate the truth of his claim – how can he consistently say that those 
who disagree (even whole societies) are - not merely that he thinks they are - wrong? Without such 
a rider, his own claim, then, seems to be caught by the criticism he makes of realists for the 
purposes of his irrelevance argument. That said, the important point to take from the discussion at 
this stage is that there is evidence to suggest that Waldron has in his later writings taken a realist 
stance, using realist concepts, making claims which can only make coherent sense to a realist, and 
that other commentators have noticed this. They take the idea that Waldron is a realist and accepts 
moral objectivity to be straightforward and uncontroversial. These commentators, and the further 
evidence they point to, could therefore support the idea that Waldron has shifted to a realist 
philosophical stance. 
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If this “change of mind” explanation is taken, however, one should be aware that this would not be 
the first time Waldron would appear to have “changed his mind”. From an article published several 
years before ‘Moral Truth and Judicial Review’ (the article where, as above, Waldron openly aligns 
himself with anti-realism), one finds statements that seem to align Waldron with the realist case, 
and which are cast in the realist terminology, using realist concepts, rejected by Waldron in the later 
article. While criticising Freeman’s instrumental defense of judicial review,62 Waldron considers what 
he sees as the likely situation of disagreement over rights where ‘a number of citizens think a piece 
of legislation respects and even advances fundamental rights’ while others ‘believe that it 
unjustifiably encroaches on rights’.63 In such a situation, he states that ‘no doubt from a God’s-eye 
point of view, one of these positions is ultimately true and the other false’.64 The idea of a “God’s-eye 
point of view”, and the idea that judgements concerning rights can “no doubt” be “true” and others 
“false” are, as discussed at length in the previous chapter, typically realist ones. Furthermore, they 
are typically realist ones according to Waldron’s own definitions of “realism” and “anti-realism”. 
Recall that in ‘Moral Truth and Judicial Review’, Waldron states that ‘we [anti-realists] discover that 
there is simply no room for realist conceptions like moral truth and moral objectivity, and we put 
those ideas quietly and untendentiously aside,’65 and in ‘The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity’ that 
‘they [anti-realists]...discover that there is no room for any realist notion of moral truth and moral 
objectivity.’66 In these descriptions of the position of anti-realists, Waldron sees “moral truth” and 
“moral objectivity” as “realist notions”. If “moral truth” is a realist notion, and if the issue of rights is 
(as Waldron characterises it) a moral one,67 then the idea that one position in the moral 
disagreement over rights citizens are likely to come across is “true”, and others “false”, is clearly a 
realist idea, according to Waldron’s characterisation of that term. This statement from an earlier 
article of Waldron’s is therefore incompatible with his later statements that ‘we’ (first person, and 
therefore including Waldron) ‘put those ideas [moral truth and moral objectivity] quietly and 
untendentiously aside.’68 The earlier Waldron accepts (with “no doubt” - which is far from “putting 
aside”) the very realist notions the later Waldron rejects as an anti-realist. So if Waldron has 
changed his mind at all, he seems to have done so several times; from realism to anti-realism, and 
back again.   
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Thirdly, the motive behind Waldron’s move away from an explicit anti-realist position could be a 
tactical one to strengthen his irrelevance case. Again, as was argued above, an irrelevance case 
cannot rely on a particular stance (or hostility to a particular stance) in the debate which it is the 
whole point of the case to show is irrelevant. If the irrelevance case does rely on taking sides in the 
debate in the course of arguing that the debate is actually irrelevant it would be paradoxical, 
contradictory, and simply incoherent. With this in mind, Waldron may have consciously decided to 
distance himself from the anti-realist position to avoid encouraging the kinds of criticisms made in 
this chapter – that his arguments do take sides in the realist/anti-realist debate, and should 
therefore be rejected as an unconvincing irrelevance case. 
Whichever (if any) of these suggested explanations are behind what seem to be incompatible 
statements concerning the realist/anti-realist debate made by Waldron at various times, the above 
argument that Waldron’s case against the relevance of the realist/anti-realist debate is problematic 
as begging the question against realism remains. Whichever is most likely to be the case is therefore 
not a crucial issue for the argument of this chapter. Moreover, this thesis is not in a position to 
confidently state which is in fact the case (ultimately only Waldron himself can know his own 
position(s) and reasoning with confidence). But what this thesis is in a position to suggest, following 
the argument so far, is that if Waldron does not consider himself to be an anti-realist, then his 
realist-hostile irrelevance arguments are inconsistent with that. If Waldron is an anti-realist, then 
perhaps he should justify this stance openly rather than deny its relevance with what are, in effect, 
anti-realist arguments. Rather than putting realist concepts and ideas, to use Waldron’s words, 
‘quietly...aside’,69 they should be put noisily to one side, through direct arguments so that his implicit 
hostility to realism is openly justified and supported.  Of course, Waldron would no longer be able to 
characterise his arguments as an “irrelevance” case, but, according to the argument of this chapter 
so far, that characterisation is misleading in any case. Waldron could then, perhaps, proceed to work 
out the links between his anti-judicial review stance, specifically his views on the “arbitrary” nature 
of judicial decision-making over rights, and his philosophical stance, no longer regarding (without 
cogent justification according to the above argument) those two issues as irrelevant to one another. 
From the perspective of an anti-realist concerned with the constitutionalist debate, this would be a 
welcome move in developing an anti-realist take on constitutionalist issues.  
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3.4. The Relevance of the Realist/Anti-Realist Issue to Instrumentalist Approaches to the 
Constitutionalist Debate 
Having rejected Waldron’s argument that the realist/anti-realist issue is irrelevant to the issues 
involved in the constitutionalist debate, its relevance will be considered in relation to the key issue 
of authority. The question theories of authority seek to address is that of who, by what processes, 
and under what principles and constraints (if any), is to be given the power to decide which answers 
to questions of rights, morality and justice are to be enforced in society, and what is the justification 
for that power?  As Waldron puts it, the issue of authority in constitutional theory is that of ‘[w]ho is 
to have the power to make social decisions, or by what processes’ are those decisions to be made, 
over questions of rights and the practical and moral issues involved?70 In this section, the 
instrumentalist approach to constitutionalism and authority often put forward will be examined. In 
doing so, Waldron’s criticisms of this approach will be considered, along with responses by 
advocates of instrumentalism. It will be argued that the responses to Waldron’s criticisms, while 
arguable if one accepts their realist and objectivist underpinnings, are unconvincing if one rejects 
these underlying philosophical assumptions. That is, they are unconvincing if one takes an anti-
realist stance such as that offered and argued for in Chapter 2. Furthermore, it will be argued that 
the very idea of the instrumentalist approach becomes fundamentally misguided if one takes such a 
stance. Thus, Waldron’s conclusion dismissing instrumentalist approaches to constitutionalism and 
authority will be supported, but, unlike Waldron, this conclusion will be reached explicitly as a 
consequence of the anti-realist stance taken in the philosophical debate by this thesis – a stance 
which Waldron, as has already been argued, has failed to show is irrelevant to the constitutionalist 
debate. In short, the relevance of the realist/anti-realist issue here is that Waldron’s criticisms of 
instrumentalism become more convincing if given an anti-realist underpinning, but less convincing if 
that approach’s realist assumptions remain unchallenged. 
 
3.4.1. The Instrumentalist Approach and its Justification 
The instrumentalist approach to the constitutionalist debate and the key question of authority 
within it is, as Kavanagh puts it, that ‘the justification of political authority must ultimately rest on its 
instrumental value to “good government”’.71 In the context of rights and the issues of morality 
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involved, Kavanagh adopts an instrumentalist approach to argue that the institution and 
constitutional design ‘that is most likely to yield morally right decisions, or is likely to yield the most 
morally right decisions, is most justified.’72 The (lack of) justification of constitutional review (or its 
absence) thus ‘hinges crucially on its conduciveness to producing good outcomes for human rights’73 
– on its conduciveness to ‘enhancing the protection of human rights’ in society.74 As Kavanagh notes, 
this instrumentalist approach is ‘supported by many political theorists’.75 For example, for Rawls, the 
‘fundamental criterion for judging any procedure is the justice of its likely results’.76 Similarly, 
Dworkin argues that the ‘best institutional structure is the one best calculated to produce the best 
answers’,77 and Raz claims that a ‘natural way to proceed’ regarding the issue of rights in society is 
‘to assume that the enforcement of fundamental rights should be entrusted to whichever political 
procedure is...most likely to enforce them well.’78 
The justification for adopting an instrumental condition of authority of ‘delivering sound political 
decisions’,79 or, as Kavanagh also puts it, decisions ‘in accordance with right reason’,80 stems partly 
from the moral nature of political decision-making and partly from the importance of the decisions 
at stake for society. Regarding the moral nature of political decision-making, Kavanagh states that 
‘[s]ome political decisions involve a choice between states of affairs or actions which are morally 
right or wrong, better or worse, independently of what people prefer.’81 Kavanagh names these 
decisions involving choices between what is independently “right” or “better”, and what is 
independently “wrong” or “worse” in a moral sense, ‘political decisions with a moral content’.82 
Since some political decisions have this “moral content”, ‘and can be judged good or bad, better or 
worse’, Kavanagh argues, ‘it seems clear that a good governmental decision-procedure must be 
acceptable from a moral point of view.’83 To be “acceptable from a moral point of view”, the 
argument goes, a decision-making procedure or institution must be ‘likely, by and large, to produce 
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morally right decisions’.84  Regarding the importance of the decisions at stake, Kavanagh also argues 
that the ‘moral quality of political decisions is sufficiently important to establish the instrumentalist 
condition’ of good government.85 The nature of many decisions is such that they ‘inevitably affect 
the moral quality of our lives and institutions’.86  Thus, an institution can only have the ‘authority to 
make those decisions if they can generally make them well.’87 By making a decision “well”, Kavanagh 
means, as with “acceptable from a moral point of view”, and as with decisions leading to “good 
government”, reaching a ‘morally correct’ outcome.88 Thus it is on these grounds that Kavanagh 
concludes that a decision-making procedure and institution is ‘acceptable only insofar as it is 
designed to reach morally correct decisions’; if it is not likely to reach such decisions, it ‘cannot be 
justified and should not be adopted.’89 
 
3.4.2. Waldron - Rejecting the Instrumentalist Approach in Practice 
In the course of discussing instrumentalist responses to ‘the problem of disagreement and authority’ 
over rights, in a section of Law and Disagreement entitled ‘The Trouble With Rights-
Instrumentalism’, Waldron begins by praising the idea behind such approaches.90 Waldron stresses 
that he ‘do[es] not want to deny that this [the instrumentalist approach] is an honourable 
approach’.91 It is “honourable” for the reason that it takes the possibility of reaching the ‘wrong 
answer’ to questions of rights ‘very seriously’.92 Reaching ‘wrong answers...on matters of principle’ 
(by which Waldron means matters concerning the ‘content and distribution of individuals’ rights’)93 
will mean that rights are ‘violated’.94 Thus, according to Waldron, the instrumentalist approach is 
admirable in seeking to avoid such harm altogether, or ‘at least to minimize it’.95 Praising the goal of 
seeking to avoid the harm of reaching “wrong decisions” in relation to rights accords with the 
justification for instrumentalism noted above; that the nature of the issues involved in decisions 
over rights are such that they have the potential to greatly affect our lives and that the moral quality 
of these decisions is therefore of great importance. Waldron puts a similar point more explicitly in a 
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later article when we writes that ‘[b]ecause rights are important, it is likewise important that we get 
them right’ and we must therefore ‘take outcome-related’ justifications put forward in the 
constitutionalist debate ‘very seriously indeed.’96 Thus, with this praising of the goal of 
instrumentalist approaches, Waldron seems to accept the justifications for the instrumentalist 
condition given by those advocating such an approach set out in the previous section.  However, 
while initially praising the instrumentalist approach in theory, and accepting much of the ground on 
which it is justified by those putting it forward, Waldron goes on to object to its use in practice on 
several grounds. 
 
3.4.2.1. Direct Instrumentalism as Question-Begging 
The first is that the instrumentalist approach ‘seems to face the difficulty that it presupposes our 
possession of the truth in designing an authoritative procedure whose point it is to settle that very 
issue.’97 Waldron gives the example of two competing views on the right to socio-economic 
assistance.  According to Waldron,  someone holding that individuals do have such a right and that it 
‘imposes limits on property rights’, will ‘probably respond differently’ to the task of designing a set 
of procedures ‘most likely to yield the truth about rights’ than someone who believes the opposite.98 
Waldron further suggests that such substantive disagreements over rights ‘explain most of the 
differences’ in proposals for constitutional-design even ‘among rights-instrumentalists.’99 Following 
these points, Waldron concludes that ‘there seems, then, something question-begging with using 
rights-instrumentalism’ to design political procedures ‘among people who disagree’ on issues of 
rights and their implementation.100 This first argument against an instrumentalist approach can be 
divided into two claims. The first is that it ‘presupposes our possession of the truth’ about rights and 
the moral issues involved.101 The second is that the ‘point’ of an ‘authoritative procedure...is to 
settle that very issue’ and it is therefore ‘question-begging’ to adopt the instrumentalist approach in 
the context of disagreement.102 Both claims will now be assessed in detail, along with responses of 
criticised instrumentalists, in order to consider how convincing Waldron’s dismissal of 
instrumentalism is (without an anti-realist underpinning). 
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a) Claim 1 – The Instrumentalist Approach “Presupposes Our Possession of the Truth About 
Rights” 
 
Putting the instrumentalist approach into practice and assessing which decision-making institution 
and process is more likely to reach the “morally correct” or “best” decisions regarding rights is often 
presented as an empirical task. For example, Alexander states that ‘the question of who is better in 
the long run in protecting the rights we possess...is an empirical one, to be settled by the way the 
world is’,’103 while Kavanagh suggests that the ‘justification for judicial review must depend 
ultimately on empirical assumptions about the likelihood that courts will succeed’ in adequately 
protecting rights.104 The word “empirical” suggests an approach which bases ‘conclusions on 
observation’ or ‘experience’.105 Applied in the present context, the reference to an “empirical” 
approach thus suggests that the question of which institution is more likely to enhance rights 
protection and reach “morally correct” outcomes is one which can be answered from past 
experience. The records of various institutions are to be compared and an inference drawn as to 
which is more likely to reach the “correct results” from an inspection of which has more often 
reached the “correct results”.106 This approach seems to be what Kavanagh has in mind when she 
writes that the ‘judicial record in upholding rights matters a great deal’ when assessing the 
justification for constitutional review.107 
 
This method of putting the instrumentalist approach into practice does indeed require a standard of 
what the “morally correct result” is, or what it means to successfully “uphold rights”, regarding the 
decisions found in the past record of whichever institution is being assessed. Without such a 
standard it can be asked how one would know whether or not that institution has, in fact, reached 
the correct or best outcome in the decisions made. Given that this empirical approach relies on an 
assessment of how often competing institutions have or have not reached the desired results in the 
past as a basis for predicting how likely they are to reach the desired results in the future, not being 
able to identify which decisions are to count for or against each institution would be fatal to this 
approach.  It is therefore argued that, insofar as instrumentalists rely on this empirical approach to 
make claims about which institution is more likely to reach the morally correct results on issues of 
rights, the first claim of Waldron’s argument against rights-instrumentalism – that it presupposes 
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our possession of the truth about rights – can be accepted. Without a substantive standard of moral 
truth or superiority to use as a benchmark in assessing the past record of competing institutions, this 
empirical approach is practically unworkable. 
 
b) Claim 2 – The Point of an Authoritative Decision-Making Procedure is to “Settle That Very 
Issue”, Rendering the Instrumental Approach “Question-Begging” 
The second claim which can be drawn from Waldron’s first argument against the use of 
instrumentalist approaches – those which argue that decision-making authority should be given to 
the institution and procedure most likely to reach the “morally correct” or “superior” outcomes - in 
practice is that the point of an authoritative decision-making procedure in society ‘is to settle that 
very issue’, so that this approach is ‘question-begging’.108 In order to assess this part of Waldron’s 
argument, precisely what is meant by “that very issue” which Waldron sees the point of a decision-
making procedure in society as being to resolve must first be clarified. This claim that the purpose of 
an authoritative decision-making procedure is to “settle that very issue” immediately follows the 
first claim of Waldron’s argument; that instrumentalism “presupposes our possession of the truth”. 
Thus, the issue that Waldron sees the point of a decision-making authority as being “to settle” 
seems to be “the truth” and our possession of it about rights. However, this could be taken in a 
number of ways. It could suggest that the point of an authoritative procedure is to “decide what the 
truth is” (and who possesses it) in relation to rights and the moral issues involved, or it could be 
taken to mean that the point of an authoritative procedure is to “settle what (or whose) version of 
the truth is to be taken and enforced in society”. 
Reading this claim alongside some of Waldron’s earlier comments regarding truth and political 
procedures in this chapter of Law and Disagreement (Chapter 11), it seems clear that Waldron 
intended his claim to be interpreted in the second way just offered. Waldron writes that ‘the 
political process cannot affect...the truth about that issue [of what rights we have or ought to 
have]’.109 This assertion regards the “truth” of the matter about rights, and the political process of 
making and enforcing decisions about rights, as separate; the truth is not dependent on the 
outcome of the political process. If “the truth” and the outcomes of the political process are 
separate, it would not make sense to claim that the point of a political procedure is to determine 
what the truth is, because that would treat “the truth” as dependent on the political decision-making 
process. Furthermore, Waldron follows this comment with the claim that, because people disagree 
and ‘hold different views about rights and since we need to settle upon and enforce a common view 
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about this’, there is a need to set up an authority in society.110 The words emphasised here suggest 
that we need to enforce a common view on rights in a society in which people disagree and that 
therefore there is also a need for an authoritative institution to make the decision as to what that 
view should be. The purpose of an authority is to fulfil this need to enforce a common view on 
rights, and the ‘need for us to act in concert’ and ‘co-ordinate our behaviour’ in the face of 
disagreement.111 This is in line with the second interpretation offered of Waldron’s argument above 
– that the “point” of an authoritative procedure is to settle the issue of what (or whose) version of 
“the truth” about rights is to be enforced in society in preference to competing views, rather than to 
determine what the truth is. Thus, on this interpretation, Waldron’s first argument against 
instrumentalism is that it is question-begging to take and use a standard to guide the choice, design 
and justification of an institution whose very purpose it is to decide what standard should be taken 
and enforced in society; the outcome it is the point of an authority to choose is supposed from the 
start.  
However, for the instrumentalist who holds that there are objectively right and wrong answers to 
issues of disagreement, this argument can be rejected as misguided in that it does not attach 
sufficient importance to the dangers of getting matters wrong (and therefore to the importance of 
getting matters right) when describing the purpose of a procedure. For example, while 
acknowledging Waldron’s point that there is widespread disagreement in society on issues of rights 
and morality, Fabre argues that, ‘if one allows for the possibility that someone may be wrong’ and 
others right on these issues, then ‘why not argue that in so far as he [or she] is wrong’, their views 
on these issues ‘should not prevail?’112 On the same logic, why not hold that insofar as someone is 
right on these issues, their views should prevail over those whose are wrong? One can agree with 
Waldron (as Fabre does) that there is a need to settle on a particular view to be enforced in society, 
but while ‘[a]ny settlement is better than none’, it does not necessarily follow that any settlement is 
acceptable.113 For Fabre, it is of vital importance that the settlement is also ‘one which can be said to 
constitute a just position.’114 In fact, as was seen earlier while setting out the justifications given to 
support an instrumentalist approach, the key goal of these approaches is to reach the morally 
correct outcomes to issues of rights, rather than simply to reach an outcome. This was seen to be 
due partly to the importance of the issues at stake, and partly due to the fact that these decisions 
are taken to have a “moral content”, meaning that they can be judged (objectively) “better” or 
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“worse”, “right” or “wrong”, independently of the procedure used to reach them (section 3.4.1). In 
light of these justifications, Waldron is open to the argument that he attaches too much importance 
to the problem of controversy, and not enough to the need to make “correct” and “just” decisions. 
Furthermore, it could be suggested that this prioritising of morally correct and just outcomes is the 
logical result of the importance Waldron himself seems to attach to the substantive quality of 
decisions on rights. Waldron seems to accept this importance when he writes that, for example, 
‘[b]ecause rights are important, it is likewise important that we get them right’,115 and when he 
praises as ‘honourable’ the approach which takes the possibility reaching the ‘wrong answers’ on 
these matters, and hence violating rights, ‘very seriously’.116 
Due to the controversial and morally-charged nature of the issues involved in questions of rights and 
principle, it is likely to be the case, as Waldron points out, that a particular view and outcome is 
regarded as “correct” or “just” by some, yet “incorrect” or “unjust” by others.117 It is thus also likely 
to be the case that taking up a view in the process of choosing and justifying an institution to make 
the decision about what view is to be enforced in society – effectively presupposing that decision 
from the start - will be seen as question-begging to those who disagree and think another view 
should be taken and enforced.  But, given the importance of the issues at stake and their potential to 
affect the quality of our lives and of society in general, and assuming the existence of “moral truths”, 
it could be argued (as Fabre does) that in such circumstances ‘one has to bite the bullet, and stand, 
in the face of others’ disagreeing with us, for what is just.’118 In line with the goal of instrumental 
approaches – “morally correct” and “just” outcomes – an instrumentalist accepting the existence of 
“moral truths” regarding issues of rights is open to reply to Waldron that, as Alexander puts it, 
‘respect cannot be demanded for erroneous moral judgments in the form of acceding to them.’119 
Some, maybe many, will disagree on controversial matters but, to those who accept the existence of 
“moral truths”, ‘[t]hose judgments may be wrong, in which case respecting them may entail allowing 
those whose judgments they are to impose immoral constraints...on other people.’120 Effectively, the 
reply here is that “truth” and “justice” should not be held to ransom by those who disagree, or 
dropped as the primary goal of decision-making just because there will be those who disagree. Yet 
this is what Waldron’s argument regarding the question-begging nature of instrumentalism, to the 
realist instrumentalist at least, seems to amount to. 
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It might also be added that standing for what is “just” or “morally correct” regarding issues of rights 
in the face of those who disagree, and enforcing these controversial standards in society on those 
who disagree, is an unavoidable side-effect of the task of co-ordinating behaviour in a society full of 
disagreement. As Waldron himself points out in introducing Law and Disagreement, given that law 
operates to order our ‘actions and interactions in circumstances in which we disagree...about how 
[they] should be ordered’, it should be of no surprise to find that it sometimes does so in a way 
which is ‘at odds with the sense of justice of some or many of those who are under its authority.’121 
It is ‘more or less bound to happen’ that the law being enforced will, at times, ‘conflict with the firm 
and conscientious moral convictions of the individual citizen.’122 As well as being in line with what is 
an unavoidable side-effect of law operating as an authority in a society full of disagreement on 
controversial issues, it could be suggested that enforcing controversial (but “right”) standards on 
those who disagree is a necessary and beneficial task, not just because the substantive issues 
involved are of great importance, but for more general reasons given by Waldron to justify the 
authority of law in society. As Waldron himself argues, ‘[t]he authority of law rests on the fact that 
there is a recognizable need for us...to co-ordinate our behaviour in various areas with reference to 
a common framework’, a need which Waldron stresses is ‘not obviated by the fact that we disagree’ 
about what standards and framework we should be held to.123 Thus, acting in the face of 
disagreement according to “correct” (again, assuming realism for the time-being), but undoubtedly 
controversial, standards and principles in the course of choosing decision-making institutions to 
make decisions to be enforced even against those who disagree could be argued to fall within what 
Waldron himself appears to see as an unavoidable side-effect of the necessary and beneficial 
situation of living under an authority such as law.124 
In short, what the above arguments amount to is the claim that, if one is to take the dangers of 
getting decisions regarding rights “wrong”, to use Waldron’s words, “very seriously”, then one must 
treat avoiding this outcome as of fundamental importance when choosing and justifying a decision-
making institution that is to settle the issue of what outcomes are to be enforced in society. Begging 
the question from the perspective of those who disagree about what rights involve, or should 
involve (but could be wrong to so disagree), should not be an issue if one is taking the moral quality 
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of the decisions to be enforced in society sufficiently seriously. Furthermore, begging the question 
against those who disagree (but could be wrong to so disagree) on issues of rights and morality  
should not be an issue if one is also taking the need to co-ordinate conduct in society according to 
some standard – a need unaffected by the fact of disagreement – sufficiently seriously. Troublingly 
for Waldron, these considerations are ones which he himself has raised as important. Thus, there 
seems to be an arguable reply to Waldron’s criticisms of instrumentalism, relying on logic and ideas 
Waldron himself accepts.  
However, the above reply to Waldron, to be convincing, also relies on a realist and foundationalist 
underpinning; on the idea that there exists independent, objective, standards of “moral truth”, 
“wrongness”, “rightness” or “justice”. The general idea of the reply is that disagreement should not 
distract us from what should be the goal of decision-making where rights are involved – the “moral 
truth” or “morally correct” outcomes. If one is taking this goal of getting matters “right” and the 
dangers of getting them “wrong” sufficiently seriously, the argument goes, begging the question 
against those who may disagree should not be an issue. This clearly relies on there actually being 
identifiable “morally correct” outcomes or “moral truths” which decision-making institutions can be 
seen as aiming for, which they can be assessed according to, and which can be prioritised over not 
begging the question against those who disagree. That this response relies on such realist 
assumptions becomes even clearer by reconsidering some of the specific arguments used in putting 
forward the reply to Waldron. For example, as noted above, Fabre’s criticism was that , ‘if one allows 
for the possibility that someone may be wrong’ and others right on these issues, then ‘why not argue 
that in so far as he [or she] is wrong’, their views on these issues ‘should not prevail?’125 If one 
accepts the possibility that someone may be wrong, Fabre argues, ‘one has to bite the bullet, and 
stand, in the face of others’ disagreeing with us, for what is just.’126 Similarly Alexander’s point was 
that ‘respect cannot be demanded for erroneous moral judgments in the form of acceding to them’ 
as respecting erroneous judgements ‘may entail allowing those whose judgments they are to impose 
immoral constraints...on other people.’127 If one takes an anti-realist perspective such as that 
defended in Chapter 2, dropping concepts of “moral truth”, and the idea that something “is (rather 
than that someone thinks it is) just” or “morally right”, then either no sense can be made of the 
ideas emphasised in the quotes directly above, and in their argument that “moral correctness” 
should be taken as the fundamental goal of decision-making institutions, or what sense can be made 
leaves the problem of begging the question Waldron raised untouched and unanswered. 
                                                          
125
 Fabre, ‘Dignity of Rights’ (fn112) 273 [emphasis added]. 
126
 ibid, 282 [emphasis added]. 
127
 Alexander, ‘Is Judicial Review Democratic?’ (fn78) 281 [emphases added]. 
67 
 
No sense can be made of the response relying on the importance of getting decisions “morally 
correct” and treating these standards as the goal of decision-making if this is taken to mean “morally 
correct independently of what a particular individual or group sees as justified”. The very idea of 
such independent standards of moral correctness was discarded on pragmatic anti-realist grounds in 
Chapter 2. That leaves the reply to Waldron’s criticism of begging the question by presupposing a 
particular standard of moral truth in designing an institution whose point it is to choose the 
standards to be taken and enforced in society as only making sense if it is taken to mean that 
disagreement should not get in the way of reaching outcomes which are “morally correct” according 
to what a particular individual or group regards as such. However, another consequence of the 
perspective defended in Chapter 2 is that there are no means of showing any particular moral 
standard to be “correct” in a way which does not rely on the question-begging assertions and 
reassertions of particular individuals or groups; there are only particular standards of moral 
correctness or moral truth, and the fact that particular individuals or groups consider them justified. 
The result is that competing standards of moral correctness, each ultimately grounded in nothing 
more than mere assertion and reassertion, and each unable to answer the sceptical “sez who?” 
critique (see Chapter 2, especially section 2.2) are equally eligible to be taken in society. Thus, 
relying on the idea that disagreement over what these standards of moral truth are (or should be) 
should not get in the way of enforcing these contested standards simply reproduces the problem 
raised by Waldron. Relying on such standards in practice begs the question against those who see 
their own standards as justified. Relying on such standards in choosing an institution to make 
decisions and co-ordinate action in society begs the question of why these particular standards 
should be treated as the goal of decision-making in this area in preference to the standards of others 
which, after all, turn out to be equally (in)eligible for this purpose. Thus, once the realist and 
foundationalist assumptions underlying the responses to Waldron’s criticism of direct 
instrumentalism are rejected, those responses can be seen to simply reproduce the problem of 
begging the question which formed the basis of that criticism in the first place. As a result, it is 
argued that the consequence of anti-realism and challenging the objectivity of moral judgements in 
this context is that Waldron’s criticism that direct instrumentalism is inherently question-begging 
remains unanswered, and is more convincing for it. Thus, the relevance of anti-realism here is that it 
makes Waldron’s first anti-instrumentalist case more convincing against the realism-grounded 
replies of criticised instrumentalists. 
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3.4.2.2. Indirect Instrumentalism as Controversial 
Waldron's second argument against the instrumentalist approach in practice is directed against what 
he calls ‘a more modest rights-instrumentalism’.128 This approach holds that a decision-making 
institution should be chosen according to which is ‘most likely to get at the truth about rights, 
whatever that truth turns out to be.’129 Unlike the approach criticised in the previous section, this 
approach does not rely on a controversial standard of what the “moral truth” is or requires 
regarding issues of rights and morality to assess the capabilities of competing decision-making 
institutions to reach the “morally correct decisions”. This indirect approach could therefore serve as 
another response to Waldron’s first criticism that the instrumentalist approach presupposes our 
possession of the truth in a question-begging way.  In fact, this is how the indirect approach has 
been presented in the constitutionalist debate. For example, responding to Waldron’s first criticism, 
Kavanagh claims that ‘we do not need a precise account of what rights we have and how they should 
be interpreted in order to make some instrumentalist claims.’130 Some instrumentalist claims, she 
argues, can be based on ‘general institutional considerations about the way in which legislatures 
make decisions in comparison to judges’, including ‘factors which influence their decision’.131 
Similarly, Raz responds to Waldron by arguing that conclusions on how likely it is that a decision-
making institution will adequately respect rights can be justified by ‘a whole variety of reasons...even 
absent knowledge of the content of the right.’132 
An example of such a reason often relied on is the influence of public opinion on the decision-maker. 
Elected politicians, such as those in a legislature, are said to be subject to ‘direct political pressure’ in 
that their office is ‘dependent on popular support’ – they can be removed if the public does not 
support the way they have acted on key issues and lose confidence.133 Kavanagh’s concern is that 
this ‘popular accountability...generates a risk that a popular decision will be chosen, even if is not 
the right decision.’134 Judges, in contrast, ‘are not elected by the people’ and thus neither need 
‘popular support’ to take office nor to remain in office.135 It is therefore ‘easier for judges to 
withstand popular pressure...and to make the right decision in the face of widespread public 
opposition’ than it is for elected politicians,136 because, unlike such politicians, their careers do not 
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‘lie in the balance if they thwart the will of their constituents.’137 The same point is made by Raz 
when he points out, as one of the considerations possibly in favour of judicial-decision making on 
rights-issues, that ‘there are ample reasons to suspect that members of the legislature are moved by 
sectarian interests to such a degree that they are not likely  even to attempt to establish what rights 
(some) people have.’138 Raz suggests that this makes it less likely that ‘the correct content of rights’ 
will be ‘revealed’ or ‘discover[ed]’.139 Other examples of institutional factors which are argued to 
make it less likely that the “correct” results will be reached include bias and self-interest on the part 
of those directly affected by their decision. For example, according to Waluchow, ‘we can 
know...that decisions made by individuals whose interests are not directly at stake...are likely to be 
better than if such decisions were left in the hands of individuals whose interests are directly at 
stake.’140 
Waldron’s response to such indirect instrumentalist approaches is that ‘it is almost as difficult to 
defend an impartial account’ of what this approach requires ‘as it is to find a non-question-begging 
version of direct instrumentalism.’141 The reason for this difficulty, according to Waldron, is that ‘we 
are not in possession of any uncontroversial moral epistemology’ in a society full of moral 
disagreement.142 Disagreement is so widespread that even ‘professional epistemologists’ do not 
have ‘the sort of consensus about paths to moral truth that would be required for a non-question-
begging instrumental defence’ of procedures to be used ‘among those who disagree’.143 Again, as it 
was in criticising the more direct instrumentalist approaches discussed above (section 3.4.2.1) 
Waldron’s point is that what factors make reaching “moral truth” more or less likely is a 
controversial matter subject to widespread disagreement – and that relying on a particular view in 
designing and justifying decision-making institutions is therefore question-begging. The immediate 
response, and again as it was in relation to Waldron’s criticism of direct instrumentalism, is that 
controversy does not affect the “truth of the matter”, nor the importance of getting issues over 
rights and morality “right” even in the face of disagreement because of the dangers of getting them 
“wrong”. This argument is used by Raz to dismiss Waldron’s point that epistemology is controversial 
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as ‘irrelevant.’144 Raz argues that the fact that ‘sound moral epistemology is controversial does not 
mean that we cannot know what it requires.’145 For Raz, this fact only leads to the conclusion ‘that 
avoiding controversy is not a goal to be pursued.’146 Thus, Waldron is again open to the accusation of 
letting controversy and disagreement get in the way of what, given the importance of decisions 
where rights are at stake, should be the primary goal – moral truth – and what should, in order to 
approach this goal, be taken as an indispensable tool in this task – sound epistemology, the 
requirements of which is something that, according to those making this response, it is possible to 
“know”, even in the face of disagreement.   
However, as with the reply to Waldron’s criticism of direct instrumentalism discussed above, this 
response relies on the assumption that there is actually a “moral truth” to be pursued via an 
epistemology. Again, the consequence of the anti-realist perspective defended in Chapter 2 is that 
the very idea of an independent identifiable “moral truth” is discarded. Thus if what Raz calls 
“sound” epistemology is supposed to be a tool to facilitate knowledge of what this independent, 
objective, “moral truth” requires, then it is flawed from the start. The anti-realist and anti-
foundationalist perspective defended in Chapter 2 also concluded that there is no moral assertion 
which can be defended against competing assertions supported by others in a non-question-begging 
and convincing way.  Thus, if “sound” epistemology is supposed to be a tool to convincingly decide 
between competing subjective (as in dependent on the values and preferences of an individual) 
standards of “moral correctness”, then it would be presented as a tool to reach what the anti-realist 
and anti-foundationalist denies can be reached; a non-question-begging defense of a moral 
assertion which can successfully withstand the sceptical “sez who?” critique. As a result, Waldron’s 
rejection of indirect instrumentalist approaches is supported here. But while Waldron’s point is that 
what makes “moral truth” more likely – what “sound epistemology” requires - is a controversial 
matter subject to widespread disagreement, the argument here is that the very idea of a “sound 
epistemology” is misguided. 
 
3.4.3. An Anti-Realist Rejection of Instrumentalist Approaches in Theory 
The argument presented in this section so far has defended Waldron’s conclusion regarding 
instrumentalist approaches in practice – that they can be dismissed as question-begging – against 
the replies of the criticised instrumentalists explicitly via the anti-realist and anti-foundationalist 
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perspective taken in this thesis. However, while, as noted above (section 3.4.2), Waldron appears to 
accept the idea of, and much of the justification for, the instrumentalist approach in theory and 
seems to merely object to its use in practice, the consequence of the philosophical perspective 
defended here is that the very idea and justification of the instrumentalist approach is misguided. 
The idea of the instrumentalist approach is that authority and decision-making is justified only to the 
extent that it is likely to reach the “morally correct” outcomes regarding rights, or make decisions 
according to “right reason” (see above, section 3.4.1). The justification for the relevance of this 
instrumentalist condition was seen to be that, as Kavanagh puts it, ‘[s]ome political decisions involve 
a choice between states of affairs or actions which are morally right or wrong, better or worse, 
independently of what people prefer.’147 
However, once this idea that there exist standards of “moral truth”, “moral rightness” or “moral 
superiority” independent of what particular individuals or groups prefer or declare them to be is set 
aside (as argued for in Chapter 2), then this justification, relying on those ideas, is fundamentally 
flawed. Contrary to Kavanagh, political decisions cannot be said to involve a choice between what is 
independently “right or wrong”, “better or worse” in a moral sense. This renders the instrumentalist 
approach advocating the decision-making institution most likely to make the morally “right” or 
“better” choice, and avoid the morally “wrong” or “worse” choice, irrelevant to decision-making 
over rights. Moreover, as well as rejecting the purported relevance of the instrumentalist condition 
to decision-making over rights and the moral issues involved, challenging the idea of independent 
standards of “moral truth”, and objectively defendable assertions of what it requires, has the 
consequence of rendering the instrumentalist condition meaningless.  If the idea of a “morally” 
correct decision is dropped, then the instrumentalist approach loses its goal, and the instrumentalist 
condition - based on the primacy of this goal in decision-making - cannot even be stated.  In fact, 
Kavanagh acknowledges this very point in the course of her defence of instrumentalism.  Kavanagh 
notes that a potential objection to the instrumentalist idea that ‘[t]he [institutional] design most 
likely to yield morally right decisions, or is likely to yield the most morally right decisions, is most 
justified’148 would be to hold that ‘there is no such thing as a “morally right” and “morally wrong” 
decision’, and accepts that such an objection (if made out) would render her statement of the 
instrumentalist condition ‘meaningless.’149 Kavanagh does not defend herself against such an 
objection, but simply ‘assume[s] that there is such a thing as a morally right and wrong decision’, 
because this issue ‘is not’, as she sees it, ‘in contention with Waldron’ (whose arguments she was 
                                                          
147
 Kavanagh, ‘Participation and Judicial Review’ (fn18) 460 [emphasis added]. 
148
 ibid. 
149
 ibid, 460, n30. 
72 
 
considering in that article).150 However, whether in contention with Waldron or not, this issue is in 
contention in this thesis, and thus the objection Kavanagh notes would render the instrumentalist 
approach “meaningless” is made here, based on the arguments of Chapter 2.  Thus, as well as 
making Waldron’s criticisms of instrumentalist approaches to the constitutionalist debate in practice 
more convincing, even in the face of the replies made by instrumentalists, the consequence of the 
anti-realist perspective taken and defended here is that Waldron’s critique of instrumentalism does 
not go far enough in failing to reject the very idea and justification of the instrumentalist approach 
even in theory. The relevance of the rejection of realist theories and ideas via an anti-realist 
perspective such as that defended in Chapter 2 is that instrumentalist approaches to the issue of 
decision-making authority in a constitution are misguided in both practice and theory. 
 
3.5. Waldron’s “Right of Rights” and the Relevance of (Anti) Realism and (Non) Objectivity 
Having considered, at some length, Waldron’s negative arguments against the relevance of 
realism/anti-realism and objectivity to the arbitrariness of judicial-decision making on moral issues 
such as rights, and against instrumentalist approaches to authority and constitutionalism, this 
chapter will now consider his more positive contribution to the constitutionalist debate. This is the 
argument that decision-making over issues of rights should properly be left to majoritarian elected 
institutions such as Parliament, deciding on a basis of equality, because this more adequately 
respects the rights of citizens to participate in decision-making on an equal basis – what Waldron 
calls “the right of rights”151 – than limiting these decisions to a narrow judicial elite through the 
institution of judicial review.152 This forms the basis of Waldron’s more direct argument against the 
institution of judicial review, and in favour of the institution of elected majoritarian decision-making 
in society where issues of rights and morality are involved. Given the implications of this argument 
for the constitutionalist debate, and given the attention paid to some of Waldron’s other 
contributions here, it is one which it would be peculiar not to discuss in this thesis on the 
constitutionalist debate, and in the present discussion of Waldron. The discussion of Waldron’s 
“right of rights” argument will, however, be relatively brief. This is because, it is argued, from the 
anti-realist and anti-foundationalist perspective taken here, that Waldron’s “right of rights” 
argument can be quickly dismissed as fundamentally flawed; it relies on moral premises which, from 
this perspective, are incapable of a convincing, non-question-begging defence.  
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3.5.1. Establishing Participation as the “Right of Rights” – The Argument From Dignity and 
Autonomy 
Waldron’s argument for participation as the “right of rights” draws on the attitude which Waldron 
claims is expressed towards right-bearers in the very justification of their having rights. Waldron 
argues that ‘the idea of rights is based on a view of the human individual as essentially a thinking 
agent’, with an ‘ability to deliberate morally’ and ‘transcend a preoccupation with his [or her] own 
particular or sectional interests.’153 On this view, ‘any right’ is attributed in an ‘act of faith in the 
agency and capacity for moral thinking’ of the individual.154 In short, each person is seen as a 
‘potential moral agent, endowed with dignity and autonomy’.155 The relevance of this in the 
decision-making context is that excluding individuals from decisions over rights and shifting such 
decisions from ‘representative institutions’ - such as legislatures - to the ‘courtroom’ and to a 
‘handful of men and women...who, it is thought, can alone be trusted to take seriously the great 
issues that they raise’, is incompatible with this view of the right-bearer as a dignified and 
autonomous individual with the capacity to reason morally.156 There is, Waldron argues, ‘something 
unpleasantly inappropriate and disrespectful about the view that questions about rights are too hard 
or too important to be left to the right-bearers themselves to determine, on a basis of equality.’157 
Even more strongly Waldron writes that viewing the individual as an autonomous and dignified 
moral agent is incompatible with the ‘insult, dishonour or denigration that is involved when one 
person’s views are treated as of less account than the views of others’ on matters that affect them 
too.158 Yet such exclusion, Waldron’s argument goes, is the effect of denying individuals the right to 
equally participate, and, in the institutional context, is the effect of the institution of judicial rights-
review of legislation of the elected institutions. In contrast, there is a ‘certain dignity in participation’ 
so that attributing a right to participate in decisions over rights, on equal terms, reflects the ‘respect’ 
owed to the individual as an ‘active, thinking being’ with moral capacity.159 Thus, as Harel puts it, 
Waldron’s argument for the right to participate, from which his direct argument against judicial 
review as a breach of this right is made, amounts to the claim that ‘[p]olitical participation...is 
                                                          
153
 ibid, 250. 
154
 ibid. 
155
 ibid, 223. 
156
 ibid, 213. 
157
 ibid, 252. 
158
 ibid, 238. 
159
 ibid, 251. 
74 
 
grounded in the dignity and respect we owe equally to all people’ which also grounds the attribution 
of rights generally.160 
 
3.5.2. Criticising Waldron’s Right of Participation Argument 
Waldron’s “right of rights” argument against judicial review, and in favour of elected legislatures 
making decisions over rights and the moral issues involved, has been criticised on a number of 
grounds. Kavanagh’s response questions the supposed consequences of establishing a right to 
participate by arguing that, while participation is something that should be respected and regarded 
as important, it is not clear that it overrides the importance of the quality of decision-making over 
rights. For Kavanagh, it is not the case that ‘“giving people a say”...is more important than the 
outcomes of [the] decision-making process.’161 Waldron’s dismissal of instrumentalist arguments 
such as these has already been discussed above where it was argued that, without attacking the 
underlying realist and objectivist assumptions of instrumentalist approaches, that dismissal is highly 
questionable (section 3.4.2). However it was also argued, via an attack on those realist assumptions, 
that instrumentalist responses such as Kavanagh’s are of little use (section 3.4.3). The criticism 
regarding the balance between participation and the instrumentalist condition is therefore not 
supported here, relying as it does on the misguided instrumentalist approach. Others have 
questioned the details of Waldron’s characterisation of the basis on which rights are attributed and 
the image of the individual involved. For example, it has been suggested that, while rights may be 
based on an image of the person as a dignified and autonomous individual with the capacity for 
responsible moral reasoning, this is better stated as an attitude as to what individuals are capable of 
being, rather than what they in fact are.  For Enoch, ‘respect’ is merited because of ‘what, at our 
best, we can become’, something which is ‘perfectly consistent’ with an attitude which pays 
attention to the dangers of individuals being, in fact, ‘stupid, morally corrupt, almost bound to act 
wrongly’ and ‘dangerous’.162 There is no contradiction in treating individuals as worthy of respect, 
and worthy of rights, because of ‘what at our best we can be’ while also holding that they should be 
‘distrusted because of what – the evidence shows – we are very likely to do’, and on this basis taking 
measures to reduce these dangers.163 However, while this criticism merely questions the details of 
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the dignity and respect for individuals on which Waldron grounds both his right of participation and 
rights generally, it is argued here that there is a more fundamental problem with Waldron’s 
argument; his reliance on this (moral) premise that all individuals are dignified, autonomous and 
responsible moral agents and should be treated as such. 
In the argument from respect for dignity and autonomy which Waldron uses to establish the right to 
participation he is effectively appealing to the dignity and autonomy of individuals as a foundation. 
Waldron also sees these ideas as grounding rights generally. In relying on such a foundation for his 
participation-right, from which this part of his attack on judicial review is developed, it must be one 
which can be convincingly defended. If the premise is weak, then so is the argument relying on the 
purported consequences of this premise. As a result, this aspect of Waldron’s attack on judicial 
review and his positive argument in favour of entrusting decision-making over rights and the moral 
issues involved to the elected representative branches is only as strong as the defence of the 
premise that all individuals have such dignity and autonomy that ought to be respected. 
The claim that individuals have an inherent dignity and moral capacity that ought to be respected is 
indeed, as Perry notes, often taken as fundamental to the very ‘idea of human rights’.164 For 
example, repeated references to these ideas can be found in many human rights instruments and 
declarations such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which in its preamble refers to the 
‘recognition of the inherent dignity...of all members of the human family’),165 or the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (which states in its preamble that the rights found there ‘derive 
from the inherent dignity of the human person’).166 However, it is nonetheless a claim that needs 
defending, for as Perry also notes, ‘not everyone...does agree that the well-being of all human 
beings...is of fundamental importance’ and ‘not everyone agrees that he or she owes every human 
being respect or concern.’167 What can be said to such individuals who do simply disagree and 
question the very idea that all individuals have an inherent dignity and moral capacity that ought to 
be respected? What can be said to those who restrict this idea to a narrower class of individuals on 
the basis of particular characteristics they take to be relevant, instead of accepting the claim that 
one should ‘extend the respect you feel for people like yourself to all featherless bipeds’?168 To put it 
bluntly, what can be said to those who respond to Waldron’s foundational premise regarding the 
                                                          
164
 MJ Perry, The Idea of Human Rights (OUP 1998) 13. 
165
 (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III). 
166
 (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
167
 Perry, Idea of Human Rights (fn164) 36. 
168
 R Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality’ in S Shute and S Hurley (eds), On Human Rights: 
The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993 (Basic Books 1993) 125. 
76 
 
dignity and respect owed to human individuals regardless of outcome, with the sceptical rejoinder 
“sez who”? (see Chapter 2, section 2.2) 
Perry suggests that most defenders of the idea of human rights (himself included) – and the respect 
for dignity on which it is commonly based - turn out to believe that ‘the fundamental wrong’ when 
their idea of rights is violated is that ‘the very order of the world – the normative order of the world 
– is transgressed.’169 However, claiming that the idea that all individuals have dignity and moral 
capacities that ought to be respected has such objective authority would fall squarely within 
Waldron’s own definition of realism; that there are ‘real properties’170 or ‘moral facts which 
determine the truth or falsity of the judgments people make’ so that there can be said to be 
anything more than ‘moral judgements and the people who make them.’171 As such, Waldron cannot 
appeal to such a defence – claiming to ground his claim in “the way things are”, “objective truth”, 
“intrinsic natures” or an independent ‘Ultimate Reality’172 – if he is to remain neutral on the 
realist/anti-realist issue, in line with his earlier irrelevance case. Such a defence would also be 
incompatible with the tenor of that irrelevance case which, it was argued (in section 3.3), actually 
amounted to an implicit attack on realism itself. For example, an appeal to independent objective 
authority for his claim concerning the dignity of individuals would seem to go against his earlier 
claim that ‘realists...are quite unable to demonstrate the truth of their judgements or show how 
they correspond to moral reality’ and that they should therefore qualify their claims with the 
admission that it is ‘”only [their] opinion”’.173 If one takes this earlier argument seriously, then 
Waldron must be "quite unable to demonstrate the truth” of the judgement he relies on concerning 
the dignity and respect owed to individuals. If, however, Waldron were to claim such objective 
authority for his premise regarding the dignity and respect owed to individuals then his argument 
would be subject to the criticisms made of realist approaches in the previous chapter, arguing 
against the very ideas of “objective reality” or “the way things are”. Thus, from the anti-realist 
perspective taken and defended in this thesis, Waldron’s argument from participation as the right of 
rights, would, as well as being inconsistent with his earlier arguments concerning realist claims made 
when setting out his irrelevance case, be reliant on the misguided realist approach, and therefore 
dismissible as itself misguided.  
The alternative is that Waldron is relying on a view as to the dignity and respect owed to individuals 
which cannot be said to amount to anything more than his own subjective view, in which case the 
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“sez who?” critique - challenging his authority in making such claims – remains unanswered. In fact, 
it was the argument of the previous chapter, after considering attempts to overcome this critique – 
particularly Gewirth’s influential argument from dialectical necessity – that moral claims cannot be 
shown to amount to anything more than the questionable assertion and reassertion of those claims. 
It is suggested that Waldron’s premise regarding the dignity and respect owed to individuals – as a 
moral and normative claim – is no different. Waldron’s appeal to dignity and respect is indefensible 
through anything more convincing than the assertion and reassertion of that claim and Waldron’s 
agreement with it. This begs the question, “why this claim” – why should this moral claim, and its 
consequences for the constitutionalist debate be taken in preference to the competing claims of 
those who disagree, which turn out to be equally (in)eligible in that they too can be defended 
through mere assertion and reassertion? From the anti-realist and anti-foundationalist perspective 
defended earlier, therefore, Waldron’s premise seems to be, to use a Waldronian term, arbitrary. 
Given that his “right of rights” argument relies on this indefensible and arbitrary premise – that 
individuals have rights because of the respect for dignity and autonomy they are owed, and 
therefore they have the “right of rights” on this same basis – that argument for participation as the 
fundamental right is itself indefensible and unconvincing. Thus, it is argued here that the 
consequence of the anti-realist and anti-foundationalist perspective is that Waldron’s positive 
argument in favour of his participatory “right of rights” – which forms this part of his case against 
judicial review and in favour of elected-majoritarian decision-making – is an unconvincing and 
questionable solution to the constitutionalist debate.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to begin to apply the anti-realist and anti-foundationalist 
perspective defended in the previous chapter to the constitutionalist debate, and some of the key 
issues within it. Firstly, Waldron’s claim that the realist/anti-realist issue, and the issue of moral 
objectivity, are irrelevant to the issues involved in the constitutionalist debate was considered. 
Waldron’s irrelevance claim was, however, rejected on the grounds that the arguments used to 
support it in effect amount to an implicit attack on realism itself. As well as having the consequence 
of not proving the point that the realist/anti-realist issue is irrelevant to the constitutionalist issue, 
this implicit attack was argued to render Waldron’s irrelevance case incoherent and self-
contradictory, and thus inherently incapable of proving its point. Following this, some more general 
comments were made regarding the inconsistency of Waldron’s stance on the realist/anti-realist 
issue; a problem highlighted by and forming an interesting background to, Waldron’s problematic 
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irrelevance case. It was seen that Waldron’s irrelevance arguments implicitly take a stance hostile to 
the claims of realists. In line with that stance, some of Waldron’s other writings contain statements 
openly aligning himself with anti-realist theories and rejecting realist concepts. However, in other 
writings still, Waldron seems to make some realist assumptions and claims, use the very realist 
concepts and ideas he at other times rejects. Thus Waldron seems to move between a problematic 
implicit anti-realist irrelevance position, an open anti-realist position, and a realist position.  
Having rejected Waldron’s argument that the realist/anti-realist debate has no significant 
consequences for key issues involved in the constitutionalist debate, the consequences of the 
realist/anti-realist issue were then considered in relation to the issue of authority – another issue of 
concern for Waldron. It was seen that the responses to Waldron’s criticisms of instrumentalist 
approaches to authority and constitutionalism relied on an assumption of core realist ideas such as 
independent “moral truth” or “rightness”. It was therefore argued that a consequence of rejecting 
these realist assumptions was that Waldron’s criticisms of putting the instrumentalist approach into 
practice – that it is question-begging in the context of disagreement over rights and appropriate 
epistemology – become more convincing. With that, it was suggested that the relevance of the anti-
realist perspective taken here is that instrumentalist approaches to authority and constitutionalism 
should be rejected in practice. However, it was further argued that, from this perspective, Waldron’s 
criticisms of the instrumentalist approach do not go far enough. The very idea of, and justification 
for, the instrumentalist approach to authority and constitutionalism, was seen to, like the 
instrumentalist responses to Waldron’s criticisms, rely on the realist concepts of “moral truth” and 
“moral correctness”. A consequence of rejecting these concepts is that the relevance of the 
instrumentalist condition is not established, relying as it does on the idea that decisions over rights 
have a “moral content” in that they involve choices between actions and states of affairs which are 
morally “right” or “wrong”, “better” or “worse” independently of what people prefer. Furthermore, 
rejecting the idea of “moral truth” and “morally correct” decisions renders the core instrumentalist 
condition – that these standards are to be treated as the goal of decision-making and the standards 
that a decision-making institution must be conducive to in order to be justified – meaningless. 
Finally, Waldron’s more direct argument against judicial review and in favour of elected majoritarian 
decision-making over issues of rights and morality, based on his claim that participation is the “right 
of rights” was considered. It was however argued that when taken back to its underlying premise – 
that humans are owed respect for their dignity as autonomous individuals with moral capacity – it 
relies on nothing more convincing than the assertion and question-begging reassertion of this moral 
claim. It is one of those claims which, according to the perspective taken here, cannot be defended 
against the sceptical critic or against competing claims which turn out to be equally eligible. 
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Ultimately, therefore, it is concluded here that the both the instrumentalist approach, and 
Waldron’s “right of rights” approach to the constitutionalist debate are misguided, explicitly as a 
consequence of the philosophical perspective defended in the previous chapter, and which Waldron 
has failed to show is irrelevant to the issues involved. 
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Chapter 4 
Constitutionalist Arguments From Democracy  
 
4.1. Introduction 
Both sides of the legal-political constitutionalist debate commonly put forward democratic 
arguments in an attempt to establish their stance as superior to the opposing constitutionalist 
school’s. The tendency to use such arguments is perhaps unsurprising given the ‘normative valence’ 
associated with the concept of “democracy”,1 which in modern times has become something of an 
‘achievement word’.2 The appraisive value of “democracy” has led one commentator to describe it 
as ‘the world’s new universal religion’.3 While such a label perhaps goes too far, it is clear that 
“democracy” is a ‘powerful term’ in society.4 For example, its perceived value is strong and 
widespread enough to have led the General Assembly of the United Nations to establish the 
‘International Day of Democracy’,5 dedicated to its promotion and highlighting its status as a 
‘universal core value’.6 Such widespread support for the concept makes “democracy” a powerful ally 
to have on side, and the ‘accusation of being antidemocratic’ a particularly ‘damning’ one.7 
However the problem with arguing from “democracy”, it is argued, is that it is an example of what 
Gallie described as an ‘essentially contested concept’;8 a concept whose very definition is the subject 
of great dispute, with ‘no clearly definable general use’ that can be ‘set up as the correct or 
standard’ one.9 The resulting ‘myriad usage’10 of the term creates the possibility that it can be used 
to support many, often opposing, arguments. In this chapter, it will be argued that this is the case in 
the constitutionalist debate; “democracy” is understood and defined differently by members of both 
sides, and, depending on which conception one starts from, can logically support both political and 
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legal constitutionalism. For this reason it will be concluded that arguing from “democracy” advances 
neither constitutionalist case, nor the constitutionalist debate generally, as it results in opposing 
sides arguing past one another via their differing conceptions of a term subject to irresolvable 
contestation. It will therefore be rejected as an unuseful way to tackle the constitutionalist debate. 
To set out this argument, core examples of democratic arguments from both political and legal 
constitutionalists will first be discussed and the different conceptions of “democracy” relied on will 
be drawn out, the aim being to demonstrate the differing constructions relied on by both sides 
(sections 4.2 and 4.3). Secondly, in arguing that neither side can convincingly claim to be using the 
concept in a more accurate or superior way, Gallie’s claim of its essential contestability will be 
supported (section 4.4). To do so, it will be suggested that in the absence of a standard generally 
agreed definition (section 4.4.1) arguments over democracy ultimately amount to assertions of one 
set of values against others, with no means of deciding between them (section 4.4.2). This inability 
to set up particular value and normative assertions as superior to their sceptical denial or competing 
assertions is a consequence of the pragmatic anti-realism and anti-foundationalism defended in 
Chapter 2. Finally, possible counter arguments from those claiming to advance a superior conception 
of democracy insulated from the values of a particular individual or group (section 4.5), or based on 
values we all accept (section 4.6), will be examined.  
 
4.2. Political Constitutionalist Arguments From Democracy 
A popular argument among critics of legal constitutionalism is simply that ‘it is undemocratic’, and 
therefore ‘undesirable’.11 This argument is a recurring theme in the closely-related judicial review 
debate, ‘dominated by...a conviction that judicial review is a deviant institution in a democratic 
society’,12 and much of which has been dedicated to attacking judicially-enforced legal limits on the 
elected branches with, or defending such limits against, this claim.13 Those accusing advocates of 
such legal restraints of ‘hiding a dirty little secret’ of a ‘discomfort with democracy’14 clearly see this 
“democratic” argument as a critical blow to legal constitutionalism. Such a thought follows from the 
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appraisive value of “democracy” noted above (section 4.1); the air of legitimacy that the description  
“democratic”, and therefore the air of illegitimacy that the label “undemocratic”, brings leads to 
these political constitutionalists invoking their “democratic” argument as some sort of ‘trump card’15 
in the constitutionalist debate. For example, Tomkins expressly considers his “democratic” criticism 
to support his case that ‘legal constitutionalism is...dangerously misguided’.16 However, when one 
looks to the arguments used to support this attack, it becomes clear that it is a very specific 
conception of “democracy” and “democratic legitimacy” that legal constitutionalists are accused of 
contravening. 
As put by Tomkins, the “democratic” political constitutionalist argument is that, ‘in a democracy, 
those who are empowered...to resolve political disputes are required to be politically accountable’.17 
Those who are given this power in a legal constitution – judges via the process of constitutional 
review – are not politically accountable as they are not themselves elected, nor ‘responsible to 
any...body’ that is.18 Therefore, the argument goes, legal constitutionalism is democratically 
objectionable.19 The second part of Tomkins’ “democratic” criticism is that, in a “democracy”, each 
decision-maker ‘should act as a representative (in the sense of “delegate”) of the people’.20 Again, 
the argument is that the judiciary fail to meet this requirement because to be representative in this 
sense requires that ‘the people should nominate or elect the decision-maker’.21 The judiciary are 
unelected, and so are not representative in the sense Tomkins claims is needed in a “democracy”. 
This focus on the unelected nature of the judiciary is shared by Waldron’s “democratic” argument. 
Waldron claims that legislators are ‘evidently superior as a matter of democracy and democratic 
values’ to the judiciary, again, because they ‘are regularly accountable to their constituents’ through 
elections, and treat their ‘electoral credentials’ as important to their decision-making role.22 
In sum, these political constitutionalist arguments from “democracy” ultimately amount to the claim 
that legal constitutionalism is “undemocratic” because it gives decision-making power in questions 
over which we disagree to those who are not electorally accountable to, and electorally 
representative of, the public. Such a focus on the unelected nature of the judiciary reveals the 
particular, thin, conception of “democracy” relied on by the political constitutionalists putting these 
arguments forward. The argument rests on the idea that “democracy” means something 
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approaching what Perry describes as ‘electorally accountable policymaking’,23 and, in line with 
Schumpeter’s classic minimalist account of “democracy”, that democratic legitimacy requires ‘the 
election of the men [and women] who are to do the deciding’.24 It does indeed follow from this 
specific conception of “democracy” and its requirements that when the unelected, and therefore 
electorally unaccountable, courts overturn the decisions of the elected, and therefore electorally 
accountable, political institutions, substituting the policy choices and judgements of a committee of 
judges for those of ‘the people’s representatives’, they are acting contrary to “democracy”.25 It also 
arguably follows from this that those who advocate a constitutional model giving the courts this 
power to act undemocratically are themselves acting in a way harmful to “democracy”; they are 
opposing “democracy”. 
However, the specific conception that this argument depends on is ‘not the only possible way...to 
define democracy’ and it is far from as uncontroversial or self-evident as these arguments imply.26 
For example, the focus on accountability and representation through voting and elections as the 
paramount aspect of “democracy” and “democratic legitimacy” has been rejected as ‘simply false’27 
and ‘depend[ing] on an exaggerated sense of the importance of voting to legitimation of power in a 
democratic society’.28  On this argument, elections are merely one means of selecting people to hold 
positions of power and responsibility in a “democratic” society.29 As Manin notes, some, including 
the likes of Aristotle, Montesquieu and Rousseau, have even gone as far as rejecting voting as 
‘intrinsically aristocratic’, rather than democratic.30 Such a view was taken by those commonly cited 
as having ‘invented democracy’,31 or at least as providing the classic example of it – the Athenians.32 
In the Athenian regime, many powers were entrusted to citizens via a lottery.33 Lotteries were seen 
as inherently democratic for they ‘gave all eligible citizens an equal chance of holding office’.34 In 
contrast, election by voting involves choosing a candidate based on whatever characteristic or 
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quality a voter regards as valuable and which ‘the other candidates do not possess....to the same 
extent’ (or at least risks such practices by basing the allocation of office on the votes of citizens 
regardless of how they choose to make their decision).35 The issue, the argument goes, is that ‘a 
quality that is favourably judged...and is not possessed by others constitutes a superiority’,36  and a 
system based on allocating power according to superiority, some of which will be affected by 
conditions and characteristics outside the control of the judged individual via the natural and social 
lotteries, is describable as aristocratic.37 This argument is not merely one of the past, generally 
agreed in modern times to be misguided; there is an increasing school of modern theorists who 
advocate the introduction of selection by lot, at least partly, to restore ‘the democratic nature of 
public service’ and ‘exercise a beneficent democratic influence’.38 With this in mind, Manin asks 
‘”Why do we not practice lot, and nonetheless call ourselves democrats?”’.39  The answer, it is 
suggested here, is that “we” take a different conception of “democracy”.  
The underlying strong egalitarian premise of the conception of “democracy” or “democratic” relied 
on by this lottery argument will be discussed below (section 4.4.2, pp92-94), but for now it is merely 
highlighted to demonstrate that “democracy” is not as clear-cut as the above political 
constitutionalist arguments imply. It is not self-evident, nor uncontested, that elections are the most 
“democratic” process for allocating power, nor even that they provide “democratic” legitimacy at all 
to the decision-makers chosen via this process. Failing to acknowledge this disagreement over 
“democracy” by arguing from (rather than for) a particular interpretation, makes the argument 
unproblematic for those likewise arguing from their own conception.  For example, for those taking 
the above lottery argument, the political constitutionalist criticism that decision-makers who are 
unelected are “undemocratic”, or at least less “democratic”, than those who are elected becomes 
irrelevant, for it is based on a conception of “democratic legitimacy” that they reject.  Such an 
argument from “democracy” therefore fails to advance the political constitutionalist case in that it 
can only be a blow to opponents (or support political constitutionalism on its own terms) for those 
starting from the same conception on which it relies. This is also evident from the legal 
constitutionalist response that reliance on the courts is actually in accordance with “democracy”. 
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4.3. Legal Constitutionalist Arguments From Democracy 
A legal constitutionalist response to the above political constitutionalists’ accusations of advocating 
an undemocratic system is simply to claim the exact opposite; that judicially-enforced legal limits 
upon the elected branches are actually conducive, even essential, to “democracy”. One method is to 
take a thick definition of “democracy”, referring to the ‘rule of democratic values’, not merely the 
rule of elected majorities.40  These values, which together form what Barak describes (in Dworkinian 
fashion) as ‘the internal morality’ of “democracy”,41 include respect for ‘human rights...ethical 
values...and appropriate ways of behavior’.42 More specifically, this “internal morality” is founded 
upon ‘the dignity and equality of all human beings’,43 respect for which requires more than equal 
participation in the political process through voting in elections to a supreme legislature.44 Such 
respect requires that the ‘political decisions’ reached themselves ‘treat everyone with equal concern 
and respect’.45 
For Dworkin, the requirement of treating all with equal concern and respect means that each and 
every individual ‘must be guaranteed fundamental...rights [that] no combination of other citizens 
can take away’, notwithstanding that they may form a majority.46 As a result, allowing the courts to 
have the final word on the compatibility of legislation enacted by the elected branches with these 
fundamental rights and values is not “undemocratic”. On the contrary, Dworkin argues that denying 
such a role, with the effect of leaving individual rights at the mercy of temporary political majorities, 
is contrary to ‘true democracy’,47 a view echoed by Barak when he states that ‘democracy cannot 
exist’ without insulating individual rights and values from ‘the power of the majority’.48 It is not 
enough to rely on the ‘grace of the self-restraint’ of legislative majorities; formal legal restraints on 
the exercise of legislative supremacy is needed.49 
 
As is clear from the reference to “true” democracy, Dworkin directly accuses those putting forward 
the “democratic” political constitutionalist arguments above (section 4.2), based on elected-majority 
rule through the supremacy of political institutions, of ‘misunderstand[ing] what democracy is’.50 
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Similarly strongly, Abella claims that there is a tendency in the controversy over the constitutional 
role of the courts for ‘important concepts’ to be ‘conveniently disregarded’.51 This is followed by the 
statement that participants need to be reminded that ‘democracy is not – and never was – just 
about the wishes of the majority’, but rather includes ‘the protection of rights, through courts, 
notwithstanding the wishes of the majority’.52 The claim here thus seems to be that those who reject 
a judicially-enforced legal constitution restraining elected majorities as “undemocratic” are guilty of 
“disregarding” the actual concept of “democracy”, which, to the contrary, requires substantive legal 
restraints on majoritarian politics to uphold rights. In short, to Abella and Dworkin, those such as 
Tomkins, arguing from a concept of elected majority policy-making, are not really arguing from 
“democracy” at all. 
 
Yet those supporting the political constitutionalist arguments above, and the conception of 
“democracy” they rely on, could just as easily accuse those following the “democratic” legal 
constitutionalist arguments of themselves “misunderstanding” the concept, and offer a reminder of 
what “democracy” truly means. In fact, Lord Sumption seems to do precisely that.  In discussing the 
use of “democracy” as a term of ‘approval’ for ‘values which may or may not correspond to those 
which a democracy would in fact choose for itself’, Sumption responds that giving force to these 
values is ‘democratic only in the sense that the Old German Democratic Republic was democratic’.53 
Putting the specifics of the German Republic to one side, Sumption is simply arguing that giving force 
to particular values is not to act “democratically” because “democracy” ‘[p]roperly speaking...is a 
constitutional mechanism for arriving at decisions for which there is a popular mandate’.54 Thus, the 
response to the claim that “democracy” requires particular values to be upheld even in the face of 
majority opposition is a denial that “democracy” means anything of the sort, followed by a reminder 
of what “democracy” properly is; a process for reflecting popular mandate. This response is simply a 
reassertion of the original claim which the likes of Dworkin were responding to; that legal constraints 
are “undemocratic” because particular substantive values are placed beyond the reach of elected 
majorities and under the control of the unelected judiciary. 
 
A stalemate appears to have been reached. Political constitutionalists favouring the supremacy of 
the elected branches start from a formal, thin, conception of “democracy”, focussing on the 
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electoral accountability of the decision-makers, and accuse legal constitutionalists of being 
undemocratic or else misunderstanding the concept. At the same time, legal constitutionalists 
favouring the supremacy of the judicial branches and limiting the elected political ones start from a 
thicker, substantive, conception of “democracy”, based on protecting particular rights and values, 
and accuse political constitutionalists of being undemocratic and misunderstanding the concept. As 
a result, it is suggested that arguing from “democracy” takes the constitutionalist debate no further 
forward as both sides come off both better and worse. 
 
4.4. Democracy as an Essentially Contested Concept 
In response to the argument above, that both sides of the constitutionalist debate can, and do, use 
“democracy” to support their case, each taking a different conception, it may be suggested that this 
is not an issue once we establish what the standard or correct usage is. If the actual definition of 
“democracy” were found, the arguments of those who misunderstand the term could simply be 
dismissed, as Dworkin, Abella and Sumption each attempt to do to their opponents. However, it is 
argued here that no such definition exists.  “Democracy” is an example of what Gallie described as 
‘essentially contested concepts’;55 concepts with appraisive value, but ‘no clearly definable 
use...which can be set up as the correct or standard use’,56 giving rise to ‘endless disputes’ over their 
proper use.57 In establishing democracy’s essentially contested character, a sample of the ‘legion’ of 
different interpretations of the concept58 will first be highlighted to demonstrate the lack of a 
standard, generally agreed, definition to appeal to (section 4.4.1). Secondly (section 4.4.2), it will be 
argued that this contestation is irresolvable as the version one supports depends on their particular, 
value-laden, political theory. Particular conceptions of “democracy” are only “true” or “superior” to 
those who share the values that justify it. As a result, arguments over “democracy” ultimately 
descend into an exercise of ‘pure assertion and counter-assertion’59 of the values that form the 
premises of each side’s argument. With no non-question-begging means of deciding between such 
value-assertions (according to the pragmatic anti-realist and anti-foundationalist argument set out in 
Chapter 2), it is argued, the contest over “democracy” is irresolvable. 
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4.4.1. Democracy – A Norm of Contestation 
One method of establishing particular uses of a term as “incorrect” or “inferior” is to show that they 
are out of line with the way it is ordinarily used, or that other competing conceptions are more in 
line with ‘standard usage’.60 This approach depends on there actually being ‘a single, easily 
recognized type of political community’61 that can be set up as the benchmark-norm of “democracy” 
from which a particular use of the term can be said to deviate. However, as Hailsham points out, ‘[a] 
moment’s reflection’ is enough to show that such a norm does not exist.62 When one looks at the 
various ways “democracy” has been used over time, and is still used today, what one finds is not a 
norm of “democracy”, but a norm of contestation. The history of “democracy” as a concept is one of 
fundamental disagreement, which more than 2000 years of discussion has not been able to resolve, 
leaving it with what Dahl describes as a ‘hopeless variety of definitions’.63 
Turning to the democratic theory literature, a vast amount of different meanings given to 
“democracy” can be found. These include (to name but a few): procedural democracy (‘the election 
of the men [and women] who are to do the deciding’),64 participatory democracy (seeking to counter 
elitist elected-representation by involving citizens more directly in government, via selection 
processes such as lotteries),65 communal democracy (requiring that those governed each have an 
‘equal place in [the] concern and respect’ of the government via a system of legally guaranteed and 
enforced rights),66 cosmopolitan democracy (treating “democracy” as a global system),67  radical 
democracy (a left-wing model seeking to move away from hierarchical state-based political 
mechanisms),68 and, more recently, Islamist democracy.69 The different models each have 
‘significantly diverging views’ on how society is, or should be, structured, and put forward differing 
normative and moral justifications for “democracy”.70 While only a few of the wide variety of ideas 
on what “democracy” is or should be have been mentioned, they serve to illustrate the fatal 
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difficulty that arguments appealing to a standard or agreed definition of the concept face; no such 
standard definition exists.71 
An attempt may be made to identify the “correct” definition of “democracy” by stripping back the 
normative and political theory to ‘go back to the word’s etymological meaning’.72 If successful, this 
would cut through the disagreement demonstrated through the lack of a standard use of the 
concept, and allow arguments relying on a conception straying from this more accurate definition to 
be dismissed. As translated from the original Greek (δημοκρατία), “democracy” is generally agreed 
to mean something along the lines of ‘rule by the people’73 or ’power of the people’.74 However, as 
Sartori points out, this literal translation is merely a ‘word-word definition’;75 it ‘correlates’ the word 
“democracy” to another set of words as ‘having the same meaning’,76 but does not tell one what the 
practical implications of these words are for “democracy” as a ‘thing’.77 As a result, the etymological 
meaning fails to provide a precise and useful standard to work from when trying to clarify what 
“democracy” is. 
For example, how the “the people” is to be defined in practice is itself a matter of disagreement and 
variation. Does “people”, for the purposes of “democracy”, refer to ‘the whole adult population, or 
only those who possess enough property’, as was common in the 19th century “democracies”?78 Is 
the exclusion of particular groups, such as women, enough to render the system “undemocratic” 
(bearing in mind such exclusion until relatively recent times in ‘countries that were universally 
recognised as democratic, including France and Switzerland’,79 and, one may add, the UK)?  On a 
more topical note, should convicted prisoners currently serving their sentence be included in “the 
people”, as has been declared by various courts applying the European Convention on Human 
Rights?80 Or is this another privilege that is ‘lost’ by those who have ‘broken their contract with 
society’?81 
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The implications of “rule” or “power” are also unclear from the words themselves.  For example, is 
“power” or “rule” achieved by voting for elected representatives, as those favouring the thin 
conception of “democracy” relied on by Tomkins may argue (see section 4.2), does it require more 
direct involvement of citizens, as those advocating participatory democracy may argue, or is it 
sufficient for the decision-makers to be appointed provided they ‘striv[e] to personify what is best in 
their society’?82 Is it necessary for the decisions reached by those in power ‘to reflect or embody the 
popular will’, and if so, how is “popular will” to be ‘defined and…identified in practice?’83 Does “rule 
by the people” require each person to be treated with equal concern and respect in only the 
procedural element (the selection of those who exercise governmental power), or does it require the 
actions of those in power to treat all with equal concern and respect through a system of rights and 
guarantees, ensuring the ‘basic interests and needs’ of all are met?84 As these questions, and the 
various answers given by different people and at different times, demonstrate, appealing to the 
literal (as generally agreed) meaning of the word “democracy” does not allow ‘definite or useful 
conclusions’ about what “democracy” is to be drawn.85 The etymological meaning therefore cannot 
provide a standard or correct definition of “democracy” sufficient to resolve the debate over the 
concept. It simply raises more contested questions. 
 
4.4.2. Defining “Democracy” – Irresolvable Contestation 
Having failed to find a single standard usage of the term “democracy” to set up as a benchmark-
norm to assess “democratic” arguments against, and rejected the etymological route as of little help, 
the next question is ‘whether it is possible to find arguments and criteria’ pointing to the ‘best 
interpretation’ of the concept.86  It is argued here in relation to democracy that, as Gallie put it 
regarding essentially contested concepts generally, ‘it is quite impossible to find a general principle 
for deciding which of two contestant uses....really "uses it best"’.87 It will be suggested that the 
disagreement over “democracy” is irresolvable as the process of choosing one conception over 
another is an inherently value-laden one, dependent on the preferred political theory of the 
individual doing the choosing. 
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As Waldron notes in relation to differing conceptions of private property, ‘the conception...we adopt 
is...the upshot of the arguments we are convinced by’.88 The arguments we are convinced by are 
those which have a ‘connection with the considerations that ultimately matter to us’.89 Gaus builds 
on this idea and extends it to contested concepts generally; these considerations, the ‘things that 
really matter to us’, which together form our ‘political theory’, lead us to interpret or describe 
elements of a concept in a particular way.90 But, as different individuals have different values and 
ideas of what is important that the conception must connect with, this justificatory process 
establishing a particular conception as superior to others is an inherently subjective, relative, one. 
However convincing the justification for a particular conception is to a particular individual, it ‘will 
not move those’ starting from a different political theory.91 From their perspective, the same 
conception will be unjustified, for it will fail to connect with their values and ideas of what is 
important. Returning to “democracy” specifically, it is argued here that this value-laden justificatory 
process underlying the conception one holds or agrees with becomes clear from a closer 
examination of some of the conceptions and interpretations mentioned in the discussion so far.  
Dworkin’s idea of a “true democracy”, in which the decisions of elected majorities must respect 
particular rights, values and ethical standards (see above, sections 4.3 and 4.4.1), is a good example. 
This idea seems to be the result of Dworkin’s particularly strong egalitarianism as made explicit in 
Taking Rights Seriously.92 There, Dworkin starts from what he describes as ‘the liberal conception of 
equality’,93 which he simply ‘presume[s] we all accept’.94 This conception holds that everyone must 
be treated with ‘equal concern and respect’,95 a requirement which Dworkin goes on to interpret in 
a particularly strong way. Dworkin rejects the idea that ‘equal treatment’ alone (by which he means 
the equal distribution of goods or opportunities, such as voting power) suffices.96 Instead, ‘more 
fundamental’97 to his liberal conception of equality is the requirement of ‘treatment as an equal’, 
which, rather than stopping at the level of opportunity to participate in decision-making, applies to 
those decisions themselves.98 This particular form of egalitarianism is one of the considerations held 
by Dworkin which, it is suggested, his conception of “democracy” is moulded to realise in the way 
described by Gaus above. This becomes clearer if one considers the consequences of stopping at the 
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“equal opportunity” interpretation of Dworkin’s egalitarian premise. On such an interpretation, a 
system which, unlike Dworkin’s, requires nothing in particular of the outcomes made via an equal 
process, in effect allowing elected temporary majorities to get their way, would not be regarded as a 
‘brutal and alien’ or ‘fake’ form of “democracy” as Dworkin describes it.99 Such a system would 
instead be seen as a prime example of a “democracy”. 
For example, such a commitment to equality of opportunity appears to underlie Waldron’s claim 
that a supreme legislature is ‘superior as a matter of democracy and democratic values’ to the 
judiciary.100 In setting up his core case against judicial review, Waldron refers to a ‘culture of 
democracy’, which he goes on to explain means a culture which values ‘political equality’.101 In 
describing this “democratic” value of equality as a strictly ‘process-related’ one, achieved through 
the ‘right to vote’ and have ‘one’s voice counted’,102 Waldron stops where Dworkin starts; at the 
level of process and opportunity. So while Waldron agrees with Dworkin that equality is a value 
essential to “democracy”, it is read as adequately achieved through ensuring that all have a formally 
equal opportunity to have a say in the decision-making process, through the system of elections to a 
representative and ultimately supreme majoritarian institution. Thus it is Waldron’s commitment to 
equality of participation (which, as noted in Chapter 3, section 3.5, is in turn based on his view of the 
individual as an autonomous agent with moral capacity and dignity deserving of respect) which leads 
him to see electoral accountability as the key to “democracy”, and the electorally accountable 
legislature as more “democratic” than the unelected judiciary. The differing political theories of 
Waldron and Dworkin, informed by a commitment to differing conceptions of equality, therefore 
explain their different ideas on what “democracy” is. In other words, their political theories and 
values fuel their disagreement. 
An even stronger egalitarian commitment can be seen to underlie the arguments of those who go 
further than Dworkin in viewing the system of elections, not merely as insufficient for a “true 
democracy”, but as inherently undemocratic. As highlighted above (section 4.2), the argument for 
the undemocratic nature of elections is that allowing those in power to be chosen by voters, based 
on whatever characteristics or qualities they value, is to allow them to be advantaged and treated as 
superior based on factors which may be at least partly outside their control. As Manin puts part of 
the case, ‘there is nothing to prevent voters from deciding...purely on the basis of the candidates’ 
natural endowments, to the neglect of their actions and choices’, who to vote for, and who to give 
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power to.103 For example, Manin argues, even if some members of the electorate carefully compare 
the different policies proposed by each candidate, ‘the personalities of the contenders inevitably 
play a part’;104 not everyone proposing even the most overwhelmingly popular policy is ‘equally 
likely to be elected’.105 
The above argument ultimately amounts to the claim that it is an injustice to allow some people to 
be disadvantaged, while others are advantaged, by factors which do not result from their actions; 
those which are at least partly outside of their control. This, it will be noticed, is a typical luck 
egalitarian argument. While there are a variety of different forms of the luck egalitarian political 
theory,106 its ‘core idea’ is that unequal advantages and disadvantages between individuals ‘are 
acceptable if they derive from the choices [they]...have voluntarily made’, and conversely that 
‘inequalities deriving from unchosen features of [their]...circumstances are unjust’, and 
unacceptable.107 The unchosen circumstances of concern to luck egalitarians are taken to include 
social characteristics, such as the class or wealth of the family one is born into, natural endowments, 
such as intelligence, talent,108 and even the ‘willingness to make an effort’ to earn advantages, which 
some consider as at least partly influenced by the unchosen factors of ‘happy family and social 
circumstances’.109 The focus on the unequal allocation of political power as an advantage or 
disadvantage,110 and the particular concern over the influence of factors other than ‘the efforts, 
actions, and choices’ of those subject to this allocation,111 reveals the commitment of those 
advancing the argument that elections are undemocratic to these luck egalitarian values, also 
premised on the ideal of allocating advantages and disadvantages as much according to voluntary 
actions and choices as possible. The rationale behind the proposed “democratic” method of power 
allocation put forward in place of election by choice also reveals a commitment to the above luck 
egalitarian values.  The use of the “democratic” method of sortition, or selection by lot, is preferred 
for giving all an ‘equal chance of holding office’.112 On this argument, the resulting reduction of the 
influence of unchosen characteristics - the goal of luck egalitarianism - makes the lottery a fairer way 
of distributing the benefit (or burden, depending on how it is seen) of public office.113 Thus, it is the 
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luck egalitarian political theory which underpins the arguments of those putting forward a definition 
of “democracy” criticising the use of elections; arguments which hold that ‘true democracies choose 
public officials through lotteries that give everybody an equal chance’ to serve.114 Luck egalitarianism 
and its component values form the considerations which their idea of “democracy” is moulded to 
achieve. 
A final example of the influence of one’s political theory on the conception of “democracy” one 
agrees with comes from the arguments of those advocating qualifications on voting. As highlighted 
above (section 4.4.1, p89) a common feature of 19th century “democracies” was a property 
qualification for opportunities to formally participate in the political process through voting. The 
rationale for this “democracy” offered by contemporary liberals reveals the influence of yet another 
political theory. Those in support of such a system regarded ‘admission to the franchise’ as 
dependent on having sufficient ‘political knowledge and ability’ to ‘allow the voter to make an 
intelligent use of his vote’.115  Property qualifications were rationalised as a ‘rough-and-ready test’ of 
such ‘political “merit”’.116 For example, after claiming that political power should be allocated in a 
way which prefers those ‘who would more fitly exercise such power’, Bagehot went on to argue that 
while property qualifications were an ‘imperfect test of intelligence’, they were a test 
nonetheless.117 Similarly, Macauley supported a property qualification on the basis that the poorly 
educated ‘poor class of Englishmen’ were at risk of having their judgement blinded, particularly in 
the conditions of hardship and ‘distress’ in which they lived.118 
While the logic of using property as an indicator of intelligence is open to question, in the sense that 
more effective methods could perhaps be proposed, it is the broader goal distributing political 
power according to competence or intelligence, and the political theory behind this, which is of 
interest here.  As Miller notes, supporting the unequal distribution of voting rights ‘as a privilege’ to 
be earned by ‘displaying proof of one’s competence to take part in government’119 reflected the 
classical liberal theory prominent at the time. The ‘basic principle’ of this classical version of 
liberalism is that benefits must be deserved or earned rather than distributed on an equal basis.120 
Thus, in contrast to the conceptions of “democracy” discussed directly above, which were seen to 
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rely on egalitarian values, support for a “democracy” in which “the people” is restricted to those of 
particular characteristics, such as intelligence or ability, relies on inegalitarian values (or at least anti-
luck-egalitarian values). This example shows yet again the consequences of one’s political theory and 
values on the conception of “democracy” or ideas of what is or is not “democratic” that one holds.  
The point of drawing out the values relied on by the various conceptions of “democracy” discussed 
here is to demonstrate that defining “democracy” is a ‘deeply political, normative and ideological 
matter’121  and that, as a result, disagreement over what “democracy” is is largely due to the 
different political theories and values of those defining it. Each conception will be seen as justified or 
“true” by those who share the values that underpin it, and unjustified or “false” by those who do 
not. Thus, arguments over “democracy” are, at a deeper level, arguments over the normative and 
moral beliefs we hold as individuals.  Once the debate reaches this level it reveals itself as ultimately 
an assertion of one set of values against another. In other words, argued back to the premises of 
each side, the contestation over “democracy” is seen to be what Macintyre describes as a ‘matter of 
pure assertion and counter-assertion’.122  With no non-question begging means of deciding between 
competing value assertions (see Chapter 2 where the philosophical perspective behind this claim 
was defended) and each side unwilling to back down, ‘for that would be to give up too much of what 
we hold important’,123 it is argued that the disagreement over the concept of “democracy” is 
irresolvable. No side of the constitutionalist debate can claim to have an independently superior 
conception of “democracy” on their side, meaning there is no means of convincingly dismissing the 
“democratic” arguments of either side. The concept of “democracy” supports both political and legal 
constitutionalism.   
It will be noticed that this essential contestability argument does, as Gray points out, depend on the 
philosophical perspective he calls ‘ethical nonnaturalism’.124 This is because the above argument 
depends on there being no objective, or non-question-begging, means of establishing particular 
value-assertions as superior, or correct, over competing assertions of the same nature. This idea was 
set out and defended in Chapter 2 via a pragmatic anti-realist and anti-foundationalist perspective. 
For now, however, this chapter will finish with an examination of the claim that an objectively 
superior (as in subjective-value-free, or alternatively, based only on values which are generally 
agreeable) conception of “democracy” can be found. If successful, this claim would rebut the 
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argument of this chapter that “democracy” is an essentially contestable concept due to its inherently 
value-laden nature. 
 
4.5. Rawls’ “Objective” Theory of Justice Argument 
The irresolvable contestability of “democracy”, and the resulting stalemate of opposing 
constitutionalist arguments each claiming to have the concept on their side, described so far in this 
chapter, may be avoidable if an objective argument establishing a particular conception as superior 
can be made. Rawls’ argument from the original position, a hypothetical choice situation in which 
rational participants determine the principles of justice for the ‘basic structure of society’,125 as 
presented in A Theory of Justice, attempts to do this. The outcome of Rawls’ argument is that 
particular rights, liberties and values, demanded by justice, must be de-politicised. In Rawls’ words, 
‘the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining’.126 A “democracy” which ‘did not 
embody these liberties’ would ‘not be a just procedure’, 127and, as justice is ‘the first virtue of social 
institutions’, must therefore be rejected.128 
Of particular interest here is the method used by Rawls to reach his “just” conception of 
“democracy”. Following a similar line to traditional contract theorists, Rawls defers to a hypothetical 
original position.  In this extra-societal position, rational participants meet to ‘determine once and 
for all what is to count...as just and unjust in society’.129 The decision takes place behind a ‘veil of 
ignorance’, meaning that the participants are ignorant of characteristics such as their ‘place in 
society’, their ‘class position or social status’, natural endowments such as ‘intelligence, strength, 
and the like’ and also their ‘conceptions of the good’.130 The purpose of these restrictions is to 
ensure that the decision-making process is ‘fair’ in that ‘no one is advantaged or disadvantaged...by 
the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances’,131 and that a person’s 
‘particular inclinations and aspirations, and...conceptions of their good do not affect the principles 
adopted’.132 Thus, the legitimacy of the principles of justice Rawls proposes comes from their being 
the result of a “fair” process which, via the veil of ignorance, leaves aside influences which are 
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‘arbitrary from a moral point of view’, and ensures they are those which ‘would be chosen by 
rational persons’.133 
For Rawls, then, the original position setup gives the principles of justice he proposes the force of 
what he calls an ‘Archimedean point’; a point from which the structures of society can be judged, 
free from irrelevant or arbitrary influences.134 However, it is argued that such an Archimedean point 
in fact ‘eludes’ Rawls; his objectively rational principles of justice actually turn out to reflect his 
particular ‘political and moral perspective’ and the values within it.135 This, it is argued, is the result 
of two problems with the original position method; the influence of one’s values and biases in 
determining what it would be “rational” for the original participants to decide in that position – a 
problem with simulating the original position, as is required to put it into use and draw conclusions 
from it (section 4.5.1), and the value-laden nature of the very construction of the original position 
(section 4.5.2). 
 
4.5.1. Simulating the Original Position  
As noted above, the authority of Rawls’ principles of justice (as presented in A Theory of Justice) 
comes from his claim that they are what would be rationally chosen by members of the original 
position, free from the arbitrary biases and influences of the world which the veil of ignorance seeks 
to exclude. However, the problem with this claim is that, while the hypothetical original participants 
may be free of these influences, the person taking Rawls’ thought experiment is not. The person 
simulating the original position is very much a part of the real world, without the luxury of a veil of 
ignorance, and therefore subject to all the morally arbitrary (as Rawls sees them) characteristics and 
conceptions of the good which the original position is designed to avoid. Furthermore, as the person 
simulating the original position is the ‘only actual participant’ in Rawls’ method,136 the discovery of 
what the hypothetical participants would rationally decide is more likely to be a reflection of what 
that particular thinker regards as “rational”.  As Walzer puts it, the principles which emerge turn out 
to be the ‘products of his [or her] own thinking’.137The claimed objectivity of the original position 
therefore becomes something of an exercise in hypothetical subjectivity – an exercise in attributing 
to the original participants decisions and conclusions which the present thinker would themselves 
prefer. 
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In fact, this is a problem Rawls does appear to recognise. ‘Of course’, he writes, ‘when we try to 
simulate the original position...we will presumably find that our deliberations and judgments are 
affected by our special inclinations and attitudes.’138 Yet after briefly mentioning this difficulty, Rawls 
quickly goes on to dismiss it with the claim that ‘none of this affects the contention that in the 
original position rational persons...would make a certain decision’.139 The only hint of a justification 
for this dismissal offered by Rawls is that the proposition that the rational participants would make a 
certain decision ‘belongs to the theory of justice’; he regards it as a separate, apparently ineffectual 
question, ‘how well human beings can assume this role in regulating their practical reasoning’.140  
However, it is argued that these issues (what the participant would decide, and the ability of the 
theorist to escape the biases and inclinations that it is the very purpose of the original position to 
avoid) cannot be separated in the way Rawls attempts. Given that the original participants and their 
discussions are entirely hypothetical, and given that the world itself does not offer an independent 
description of what is “just” or “rational” (see Chapter 2, especially section 2.3.2) the only means of 
establishing what their decision would “rationally” be is for an actual person to simulate the 
situation. The only available source of the outcomes is the decisions of whoever takes Rawls’ 
thought experiment. As a result, the issue of who makes those speculations and what influences 
them is necessarily connected to the issue of what decisions the participants of the original position 
would make. The two are one and the same. It is therefore argued that Rawls is too quick in his 
(rather brief) dismissal of the problem of the possible influence of one’s own attitudes and 
inclinations on the outcomes of the original position thought experiment.  
 
The effect in practice of the attitudes and inclinations of a particular thinker on what they see as 
“rational” for the original participants to require of justice, it is argued, becomes clear through a 
comparison of the differences in the conclusions of Rawls and Nozick, particularly concerning Rawls’ 
difference principle. One of the principles of justice according to which the institutions of society can 
be criticised, which Rawls claims ‘persons in the initial situation would choose’, holds that 
‘inequalities of wealth and authority’ are only just if they ‘result in compensating benefits for 
everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society’.141 What is of particular 
concern here is the argument Rawls uses to show that this ‘difference principle’142 is one which 
would be rationally adopted by those in the original position. Rawls argues that the principles he 
proposes ‘seem to be a fair basis on which the better endowed’ or socially more fortunate, ‘could 
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expect the willing cooperation of others’.143 Rawls’ logic supporting this argument is that, since it is 
necessary to ‘everyone’s well-being’ that a there is a ‘scheme of cooperation’ in society, advantages 
should be divided in whatever way is necessary to secure ‘the willing cooperation of 
everyone...including those least well situated’.144 This cooperation can only be expected if the terms 
of cooperation are reasonable. The less well off therefore have a ‘veto’, allowing them to demand 
that the advantages of those better off only be accepted if they are benefited by them, and which it 
would be rational for those who are better off to accept in order to achieve the cooperation they 
need.145 
 
However, the conclusion of this argument (Rawls’ difference principle) does not, by itself, follow 
from the premise (that the cooperation of all is beneficial).  As the willing cooperation of everyone is 
to everyone’s advantage (the ‘better endowed gain by cooperating with the worse endowed’ and 
vice versa),146 those who are better endowed or more advantaged could just as easily demand the 
exact opposite of Rawls’ “reasonable” principle. Nozick mirrors Rawls’ argument and points out that 
it is just as logical for the better off to demand that they get as much as they possibly can in return 
for their cooperation.147 If the willing cooperation of all is to the advantage of everyone, it would also 
be rational for the least well off to accept these terms; that is, it would be to their advantage. Thus, 
the logic Rawls uses to establish his difference principle as “rational” is, it turns out, neutral between 
his proposed principle and its opposite.  As a result, Rawls’ conclusion that the difference principle is 
what would be rationally chosen by those in the original position cannot be due to simple logic, 
unaffected by influences other than those allowed in the original position itself. Something else from 
outside that position is having an effect, for if the conclusion followed merely from the logic or setup 
of the original position itself the outcome would be dictated, but, as has been argued here, the logic 
could lead to at least two incompatible outcomes.  Again, as Rawls is the only actual person in his 
simulation of the original position, it is something specific to Rawls which is having the decisive 
effect leading to one conclusion over the other.  
 
It is suggested that it is Rawls’ own values, attitudes and moral preferences which lead him to leap 
from logic neutral between requiring either the position of the least or most well off to be 
maximised to the conclusion that it should “rationally” be the least well off.  As Nagel suggests, the 
assumption that ‘the worst off need further benefits to co-operate willingly while the best off do 
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not’ is simply a repetition of egalitarian principles.148 The only difference between the arguments 
that the best off should be expected to sacrifice their benefits unless they work to the advantage of 
the least well off and the argument that they should not, ‘is the relative position of the parties’.149 
While Nagel happens to agree that this is ‘a vital difference’, he points out that it is not one that is 
self-evident, but one which ‘depends on a moral judgment’; that it is only “fair” that the better off in 
society should be expected make sacrifices which lessen inequality.150 
 
That this is a subjective judgement is again exemplified by comparing the differing judgement 
resulting from a different person’s simulation of the original position. For Nozick, not only is Rawls’ 
difference principle not dictated by the rationality of the original participants, it is also ‘unfair’.151 
While accepting that cooperation with others in society is beneficial, Nozick considers the possibility 
of intra-group cooperation where the better endowed cooperate with each other and the lesser 
endowed do the same, ‘with no cross-cooperation’.152 Nozick then considers which group would gain 
the most from the general cooperation between both groups Rawls envisages. As the better off 
group includes those with greater abilities, talents, natural resources and accomplishments than the 
worse off group, ‘it is difficult to avoid concluding that the less well endowed gain more than the 
better-endowed do’ from general cooperation.153 The less endowed have access to the greater 
benefits created by the more endowed, which they would not otherwise have access to themselves, 
while the more endowed only gain access to the lesser benefits created by the lesser endowed, 
while having to give up some of their greater benefits. For Nozick, as the least advantaged are 
‘already benefiting most’ from general cooperation, Rawls’ argument allowing them to demand even 
further benefits to the detriment of the most advantaged who would be required to limit their gains 
is, contrary to how Rawls sees it, unfair.154 In short, the sacrifice demanded of the more endowed is 
unacceptable, notwithstanding that it may lessen inequality. Nozick, in approaching the original 
position from a different perspective, one which rejects Rawls’ particular egalitarian moral 
judgements and inclinations, comes out with a radically different conclusion to Rawls of what would 
be “rationally” or “fairly” decided in the original position.   
 
The above examples demonstrate that, while claiming that the issues of how well one can avoid 
being influenced by their own attitudes and inclinations while simulating the original position and 
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the claim that certain conclusions would rationally be reached in that position are separate, Rawls’ 
own arguments actually show the opposite. Rawls’ particular conclusion that the difference principle 
would be “rationally” adopted in the original position depends on those attitudes and inclinations, as 
is exemplified by comparing the reasoning and conclusions of Nozick who rejects those inclinations. 
Rawls’ own values influence his idea of what would be “rationally” or “fairly” agreed in the original 
position. Rawls therefore fails to show that it is possible to objectively simulate his thought 
experiment. 
 
4.5.2. The Value-Laden Construction of the Original Position  
 
The argument in the previous section was that it is not possible to escape the influence of one’s own 
attitudes, inclinations and conceptions of the good while simulating the original position. However, 
even putting this objection to one side and assuming that Rawls’ thought experiment, with its 
conditions and restrictions via the veil of ignorance, will produce a certain, indisputable, set of 
justice principles according to which a “democracy” can be criticised, it is further argued that the 
setup of the original position itself reflects Rawls’ own values. The construction of Rawls’ original 
position is the result of the very influences, values and biases it seeks to avoid, and the very 
disagreements it seeks to resolve once and for all. As a result, even if a certain set of principles are 
the result of this hypothetical situation, they will be the result of a value-laden situation 
contaminated by the subjective influences it claims to avoid, and will themselves be so 
contaminated. If so, they would fail to provide an objective means of preferring one conception of 
“democracy” over another as more just. 
 
Rawls justifies his construction of the original position and veil of ignorance as necessary to ‘rule out’ 
the possibility of outcomes ‘that it would be rational to propose...only if one knew certain things 
that are irrelevant from the standpoint of justice’.155 This is in line with Rawls’ concern to ensure that 
neither a person’s ‘particular inclinations and aspirations’ nor their conceptions of the good ‘affect 
the principles adopted’, according to which the basic structure of society and its institutions can be 
appraised.156 It is with this aim in mind that Rawls goes on to impose restrictions on the knowledge 
and character of the original participants via the veil of ignorance. Rawls spends little time justifying 
each of these restrictions, merely asserting that they are ‘reasonable’, ‘natural’, ‘innocuous or even 
trivial’.157 It is argued here, however, that the restrictions Rawls imposes are far from self-evident 
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and far from uncontroversial as he assumes. They may be “natural” or “reasonable” to Rawls, but, it 
is suggested, he overlooks their controversial nature to others. 
 
For example, one of the restrictions that Rawls imposes on the original participants is knowledge of 
one’s conception of the good.158 However, even accepting Rawls’ premise that no one should be able 
to use “morally arbitrary” or contingent characteristics to their advantage in the original position 
(this premise will be criticised below at pp103-106),159 this restriction on knowing one’s conception 
of the good is nonetheless highly questionable. As Nagel points out, to allow participants to be 
influenced by their conceptions of the good in putting forward or accepting particular principles of 
justice would not be to allow them to seek ‘special advantages’ for themselves.160 As long as the 
participants remain ignorant of their identity and place in society (restrictions which are indeed part 
of Rawls’ veil of ignorance),161 to opt for principles on the basis of one’s conception of the good 
would be to opt for principles ‘that advance the good for everyone, as defined by that 
conception’.162 It is therefore argued that, even on Rawls’ logic, his restriction on knowing one’s 
conception of the good in the original position is puzzling. It is further argued that excluding 
knowledge of one’s own conception of the good reveals Rawls’ ‘strong individualistic bias’; it 
replaces knowledge of specific conceptions of the good with Rawls’ preferred ‘liberal, individualistic 
conception’.163 
 
This bias is evident from Rawls’ assumption that, despite not knowing what their specific 
conceptions of the good are, the original participants can nonetheless be confident that these 
conceptions will be protected by his first principle of justice.164 This principle guarantees the equal 
division of ‘primary goods’, by which Rawls means ‘equal basic liberties for all, as well as fair equality 
of opportunity and equal division of income and wealth’.165  The problem, as Nagel points out, is that 
the primary goods Rawls’ first principle protects ‘are not equally valuable in pursuit of all 
conceptions of the good’.166 It may be the case that they serve ‘many different individual life plans’, 
but they are less conducive to conceptions of the good which desire ‘certain well-defined types of 
social structure,’ or require society to work ‘concertedly for the realization of certain higher human 
                                                          
158
 ibid, 11. 
159
 ibid. 
160
 Nagel, ‘Rawls on Justice’ (fn148) 226. 
161
 Rawls, Theory of Justice (fn109) 11. 
162
 Nagel, ‘Rawls on Justice’ (fn148) 226. 
163
 ibid, 228. 
164
 Rawls, Theory of Justice (fn109) 131. 
165
 ibid, 130. 
166
 Nagel, ‘Rawls on Justice’ (fn148) 228. 
103 
 
capacities’.167 This individualistic bias is reinforced by the characterisation of the original participants 
as ‘mutually disinterested’,168 effectively ruling out possible conceptions of the good which 
‘depend...on the relation between one’s own position and that of others’.169 Put together, these 
biases mean that the original position exercise, from the very start, presupposes a conception of the 
good ‘according to which the best which can be wished for someone is the unimpeded pursuit of his 
own path, provided it does not interfere with the rights of others’, and rules out more cooperative 
conceptions.170 For Rawls, this is clearly not an issue. As he rather forcefully put it elsewhere, if a 
conception of the good ‘is unable to endure and gain adherents under institutions of equal freedom 
and mutual toleration’ one must ‘question...whether its passing is to be regretted’.171 Yet to those 
who hold such conceptions of the good, which form a part of their ‘moral identity’ (just as much as 
Rawls’ rejection of those same conceptions forms part of his), the liberal bias against them is a 
matter to be regretted.172  As a result, it is argued that this aspect of the original position reflects 
ideas which are certainly not “innocuous” as Rawls suggests; it is the result of a disputable, 
questionable, conception of the good. 
 
Another example revealing the value-laden nature of the original position’s construction comes from 
Rawls’ premise that no one be advantaged by natural characteristics or qualities.  Rawls makes clear 
that the aim behind his theory of justice is to nullify ‘the accidents of natural endowment and the 
contingencies of social circumstance’.173 As Nozick notes, this ‘quest’ shapes Rawls’ theory and 
‘underlies his delineation of the original position’.174 For example, this is the key reason Rawls offers 
for imposing his veil of ignorance rendering the original participants ignorant of their natural 
endowments, abilities, place in society and conceptions of the good.175 The justification behind 
Rawls’ aim to find a conception of justice nullifying the effects of accidents of nature and fortune 
appears to be simply that ‘inequalities of birth and natural endowment are undeserved’.176 As these 
contingencies are ‘arbitrary from a moral point of view’, any effects they have are also undeserved 
and it is an ‘obvious injustice’ that they should be used to one’s advantage.177 For Rawls, such 
arbitrariness must be corrected; allowing outcomes to be affected by ‘arbitrary contingencies’ would 
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not be ‘fair’.178 But again, while such logic may ‘seem[] reasonable’179to Rawls, from his perspective,  
he simply ignores its controversial nature to others, from their perspective . 
 
For example, Nozick, rather than regarding Rawls’ idea as “innocuous”, rejects it as unsupported by 
any ‘cogent argument’.180  As he points out, Rawls’ claim that natural endowments, abilities and so 
on, are morally arbitrary or undeserved and must therefore be nullified, involves an assumption that 
assets and holdings should be equal ‘unless there is a (weighty) moral reason why they ought to be 
unequal’.181 Rawls’ logic is, in effect, a presumption of equality. Only if this presumption can be 
rebutted via a moral argument he finds convincing (specifically that one deserves a particular 
distribution of natural assets), will Rawls accept differences in the distribution of those assets, and 
the resulting advantages gained from putting them to use. But why this presumption; ‘why is 
equality the rest...position of the system, deviation from which may be caused only by moral 
forces?’182 For Nozick, attempts to justify such an equality presumption often amount to an assertion 
‘that differences between persons are arbitrary and must be justified’.183 It is suggested here that 
Rawls is no different. When one looks for an attempt to justify his premise, what one finds are 
repeated assertions that ‘there is no…reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to be 
settled by the distribution of natural assets’,184 or that there is something ‘intuitively’ defective 
about a system allowing advantages to be influenced by ‘the outcome of the natural lottery’.185 
 
Reliance on such assertions leaves Rawls open to mere counter-assertion. Why not, as Nozick does, 
start from an assumption that ‘people are entitled to their natural assets’, by virtue of the same fact 
that they were born with them?186 If one does this, then, using the same logic as Rawls, it can be said 
that as people are entitled to what they are naturally given they are also entitled to any advantages 
resulting from this, and that, turning Rawls’ claim around, there is no reason not to permit the 
distribution of advantages to be influenced by the distribution of natural assets. This shows the weak 
foundation of one of Rawls’ most fundamental ideas; Rawls’ premise can be rejected merely by 
shifting the focus from desert to entitlement.  Thus, the effect of holding intuitions contrary to Rawls 
again becomes clear; the aspects of the original position which reflect these inclinations are 
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rejected, and the resulting outcomes unsupported.  Rawls’ appeals to what “seems reasonable”, or 
“intuitive”, it is argued, provide little support; they merely repeat the fact that he supports his own 
premises and inclinations (which, of course, he would). Moreover, they will simply be rejected by 
those who see Nozick’s entitlement alternative as “reasonable” or “intuitive”. As a result, it is argued 
that, taken back to its underlying premises, Rawls’ construction of the original position to nullify the 
effects of the natural lottery relies on nothing but assertion, supported by little more than his 
repetition of the fact that he prefers those assertions. Ultimately, it relies on his own egalitarian 
preferences and inclinations. 
 
Putting the above arguments together, that simulating the original position to reach “rational” 
principles of justice is an exercise influenced by, even dependent on, the subjective values of the 
present thinker, and that the very construction of the situation which is claimed to produce those 
principles is similarly value-laden, it is submitted that Rawls’ thought experiment fails to provide the 
“Archimedean point” he desires. Instead, as Lukes puts it, Rawls’ theory of justice turns out to 
express a ‘particular political and moral perspective’ – that of an individualistic liberal egalitarian.187 
The principles of justice turn out to be yet another value-laden basis on which to assess the basic 
structures and institutions of society.  As a result, Rawls’ theory of justice (as presented in A Theory 
of Justice) fails to escape the argument put forward above (section 4.4.2) that assessing different 
conceptions of “democracy” is an inherently value-laden and subjective exercise, which, it was 
argued, contributes to the concept’s essentially  contestable nature. 
 
4.6. Rawls’ “Inter-Subjective”Political Liberalism Argument 
 
While Rawls’ original position and the resulting principles of justice have been criticised for failing to 
provide a non-subjective standard by which to assess the structures of society, including 
“democracy”, his later work offers an alternative source of authority for his standards. While, as 
Rawls admits, A Theory of Justice ‘regards justice as fairness...as [a] comprehensive, or partially 
comprehensive, doctrine[]’,188 one which appeals to ‘metaphysical or epistemological doctrine[s]’,189 
or as Zuckert puts it ‘what we might be tempted to call ultimate truths of philosophy or religion’,190 
the theory as presented in Political Liberalism attempts to avoid this. According to Rawls, his theory 
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of justice no longer seeks to establish itself as having a ‘true foundation’.191 Justifying a doctrine with 
such claims is ‘not the business of political liberalism’.192 Instead, Rawls now seeks to justify his 
conception of justice via an explicitly value-laden perspective; that which forms the ‘public political 
and social attitudes of society’.193 In other words, the aim of Rawls’ theory of justice is no longer to 
provide some kind of value-free Archimedean point from which to assess the institutions of society, 
the results of which are authoritative because they are derived from an ‘extrasocietal source of 
moral truth’.194  The authority for a conception of justice is now seen as deriving from its congruence 
with the shared ‘settled convictions’ of society.195  This source of authority is in line with the 
pragmatic purpose Rawls, at this time, sees for political philosophy; ‘to provide a shared public basis 
for the justification of political and social institutions’ to help ensure stability in society despite 
trenchant disagreement over the truth of competing comprehensive doctrines.196 To achieve this, 
Rawls seeks to construct a standard of justice which is agreeable to a society generally by basing it 
on ‘deeper bases of agreement embedded in [its] public culture’.197 
 
The key question here is whether Rawls succeeds in justifying his theory of justice by appealing to 
publicly accepted convictions. If Rawls has indeed found a generally agreeable standard of justice 
which can be used to assess the institutions of society, then he will have found a means of cutting 
through the disagreement over “democracy” using premises on which, it turns out, we 
fundamentally agree after all. It would follow that, contrary to what has been argued in this chapter 
so far, disagreement over “democracy” can be resolved in a way that avoids relying on controversial 
and contested values.  An inter-subjectively more just, and therefore superior, conception of 
“democracy” could be found. 
 
4.6.1. Justifying the Original Position  
 
Rawls’ methodology remains similar to that in A Theory of Justice; the principles are worked out via 
the original position, unchanged from Rawls’ earlier work. The veil of ignorance is still there to 
‘abstract from...the contingencies of the social world’ and to counteract ‘contingent advantages and 
accidental influences’.198 The purpose of the original position, however, is now explicitly to act as ‘a 
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means of public reflection and self-clarification’; a means of modelling and working out the 
implications of the ‘considered convictions’ of society for justice and what it requires of public 
institutions.199 In short, Rawls seeks to use the original position as a link between the settled and 
agreed convictions of society – our fundamental attitudes – and his principles of justice. To show 
that it can serve as such a link, Rawls justifies his construction of the original position as itself in line 
with ‘our considered convictions’.200 The idea is that, as it models the convictions and values on 
which society fundamentally agrees, identifying what principles would result from the original 
position would be to identify ‘the conception of justice that we regard – here and now – as fair’.201 
 
The specific conviction which Rawls invokes to justify the restrictions of the veil of ignorance is that 
society is ‘a fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons’, which he claims is ‘implicit 
in the public culture’ of our society.202 As Rawls explains elsewhere, ‘the constraints imposed...and 
the manner in which the parties are described, are to represent the freedom and equality as 
understood in such a society’.203 For example, the restrictions on the participants’ knowledge of their 
natural abilities and endowments to nullify any advantages or disadvantages flowing from these (as 
Rawls describes them) “morally arbitrary” factors are now justified as necessary to ‘model’ the 
‘fundamental idea of equality as found in the public political culture’ of society.204 So while this 
restriction was criticised above as unconvincingly argued for as based on Rawls’ own questionable 
assertion that it is an ‘obvious injustice’ to allow advantages and disadvantages to result from the 
contingencies of the natural lottery,205 reflecting his own egalitarian preference for desert over 
entitlement (section 4.5.2), the claim is that it is not based merely on Rawls’ preferences, but 
society’s too. It is one of those considered convictions over which, it turns out, we fundamentally 
agree. 
 
However, even accepting the premise that there is widespread agreement in society that citizens are 
“free and equal” (or should be), the conclusion that advantages resulting from natural talents and 
abilities should be nullified (and therefore excluded via the veil of ignorance), does not necessarily 
follow. Such a conclusion merely ‘models one possible conception of the concept of equality’;206 one 
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which holds that to allow one person advantages others do not receive, or to treat them differently, 
on the basis of natural abilities is to violate the principle of “equality”.  As Zuckert points out, Rawls 
has ‘perceived an agreement at the level of concept’, in this example, the general concept of 
equality, and then attempted to interpret it as ‘an agreement at the level of conception’, with 
specific requirements.207 Yet “equality” is a controversial concept. There is a wide range of 
competing ideas over what makes people equal, and precisely ‘what the claim of equality entitles 
them to’.208This disagreement stems from the ambiguity of the concept. The basic idea of “equality” 
and its requirements which has ‘dominated Western thought’ is something like ‘“likes should be 
treated alike”’.209  However this alone cannot form the basis of any conclusions about what is or is 
not acceptable or fair. The statement is meaningless unless one determines what it means to be 
“alike”, which similarities are relevant, and what it means to “treat alike”. Yet such determinations 
‘do not exist in nature’; they are established only when made by people210 (the argument that 
determinations such as these do not exist, or have content, independent of what particular 
individuals or groups assert them or that content to be, was defended in more detail via the 
pragmatic anti-realist and anti-foundationalist perspective in Chapter 2). The problem is that these 
are determinations over which people disagree, resulting in many different conceptions of 
“equality”.211  If Rawls is to successfully show that his construction of the original position to nullify 
the effects of natural endowments and any advantages gained is one of our fundamental convictions 
evident from the public culture of society, he must show, not merely that the (vague) concept of 
“equality” is a fundamental idea on which there is agreement, but that his particular conception is 
subject to such agreement. If not, then the claim that the original position models the considered 
convictions of society would fail. The most that could be claimed is that this aspect of the original 
position models Rawls’ individual interpretation of a generally agreeable concept, rather than the 
concept itself.  With that claim would return the problem of defending this particular interpretation, 
which in turn, would raise the problem of defending the particular moral and normative assertions 
and preferences underlying it, a problem which the pragmatic anti-realist and anti-foundationalist 
perspective defended in this thesis sees as irresolvable. 
 
With the vague and contested nature of “equality” as a concept in mind, one would expect to find 
some kind of detailed analysis of the public culture of society demonstrating that the conception 
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evidently preferred is that which treats natural abilities as unacceptable grounds on which to treat 
people differently, and on which to allow advantages to be gained. One would expect to find some 
detailed analysis of the public culture of society Rawls claims to rely on to demonstrate that this 
public culture specifically supports his particular characterisation of “equality”. However, when one 
looks for such analysis, it is in vain. Instead, one merely finds assertions such as ‘citizens are equal in 
virtue of possessing the two moral powers [capacity for a sense of justice and conception of the 
good]’, or that ‘features relating to...native endowment’ are ‘irrelevant’,212 followed by a reference 
to a previous chapter discussing the veil of ignorance in which Rawls ‘assume[s]’ that it is ‘one of our 
considered convictions’ that having native endowments such as ‘intelligence’ is no reason to 
propose or accept a conception of justice which allows those with such characteristics to be 
advantaged.213Putting that line of argument together, Rawls’ assertion that features relating to 
native endowment or historical circumstances are irrelevant is backed up with a reference to a 
previous statement where Rawls himself admits he is simply making an assumption that such an idea 
is in fact one of society’s considered convictions. It is submitted that, without specific analysis of 
examples taken from the public culture which Rawls claims his original position models, his 
assumptions that his interpretations match the considered convictions of society remain 
unsupported. 
 
Moreover, it has been suggested that if Rawls were to engage in a more detailed examination of the 
public culture of society, he would find evidence for a conception of equality that contradicts the 
one he relies on. For example, Galston points to the institution of employment to support his claim 
that a prominent feature of our (Western) public culture is that ‘individuals are permitted to achieve 
unequal rewards by developing their natural talents and persuading others to....remunerate 
them’.214  Advantages and benefits are founded, at least partly, on natural endowments supervised 
only by attempts to ensure equal opportunities to develop these talents and abilities.215 This can be 
contrasted with Rawls’ interpretation, evident in both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, 
which treats advantages gained from natural endowment as problems to be corrected. Thus, as well 
as relying on interpretations of concepts not adequately shown to be supported by the culture of 
society, Rawls may in fact be relying on interpretations which could be seen as rejected by that 
culture.  
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Either way, it is argued that Rawls’ attempt to ground the original position in the settled convictions 
of society to give authority to his principles of justice as a generally agreeable standard by which to 
assess institutions fails. Rawls has not successfully shown that he is merely ‘making our intuitions 
explicit’ or ‘providing a foundation for what we already believe’.216 As a result, the conclusion 
reached in relation to A Theory of Justice, that the original position and the principles which result 
reflect the questionable attitudes, inclinations and values of Rawls himself, remains. Rawls’ standard 
of justice cannot serve as an objective or inter-subjectively justified means of choosing between 
competing conceptions of “democracy”.  
 
4.7. Conclusion 
 
While “democratic” arguments are common in the political-legal constitutionalist debate, with both 
sides seeking to justify their desired constitutionalism as more “democratic” than the others’, the 
main argument of this chapter has been that this is a problematic way to proceed in the debate. 
What “democracy” actually is or requires is a subject over which there is widespread disagreement. 
This was demonstrated through highlighting the many different ways the concept is defined and 
used, resulting in a lack of an agreed standard to appeal to. It was further argued that this 
disagreement is irresolvable, fuelled as it is by the competing political theories and values of its 
participants. A particular conception of “democracy” is superior only to those who share the 
particular values which justify it. This was demonstrated by drawing out the political theories and 
value-laden premises underlying various conceptions of “democracy”.  Rawls’ early attempts to find 
an objective standard by which to assess the structures of society, “democracy” included, and justify 
his preferred model, were rejected as premised on the kind of value judgements he claims could be 
avoided, particularly in judging what is “rational” in the original position, and constructing this 
position itself. Rawls’ later attempts to ground his original position, and the principles he claims 
would result from it, on ideas which are fundamentally accepted in society, in effect claiming that his 
standard of justice reflects some kind of inter-subjective agreement, was rejected as unconvincingly 
argued. The possibility that Rawls’ standards of justice could be used to cut through disagreement 
over “democracy” and set up a particular conception as superior (as a matter of justice), was 
therefore rejected. The result is that, with both sides of the constitutionalist debate relying on a 
specific idea of what “democracy” is to support their arguments, and with no objective and no non-
question-begging means of deciding which side really uses the concept correctly or best - a 
judgement which, again, was seen to be a value-laden one, relying on the political and moral values 
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of the individual making the judgement, judgements and values and so which, according to the 
perspective set out in Chapter 2, cannot be grounded in anything more than the questionable 
assertion and question-begging reassertions of particular individuals or groups - “democracy” 
supports both political and legal constitutionalism. Arguing from this disputed concept is therefore, 
it is submitted, an unuseful way to proceed in the constitutionalist debate for it cannot convincingly 
support any side over the other. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to critically examine the constitutionalist debate over where and how 
decision-making power in a constitution should be distributed, particularly regarding rights-issues. 
This examination was taken from a pragmatic anti-realist, anti-foundationalist, and ultimately 
sceptical, philosophical perspective. This perspective, holding that there exists no convincingly 
defensible moral position or premises, was set out and justified in detail in Chapter 2. It was 
concluded there that moral and normative claims, when questioned, can rely on nothing more 
convincing and nothing more stable than the question-begging reassertion of those premises by 
particular individuals or groups, and the fact of one’s preference for those premises. The argument 
for this conclusion began by identifying the problem of defending moral and normative claims. The 
problem was seen to be that of how one can respond to the sceptical questioning of particular 
claims, either denying the claim outright and questioning the standing of the individual putting it 
forward to make authoritative moral assessments – bluntly put by Leff as the “sez who?” critique - 
putting forward an alternative but incompatible claim, or both. Two possible responses were 
considered, but rejected as incapable of adequately dealing with this problem.  
 
Firstly, a realist foundationalist approach, offering the possibility of grounding particular claims as 
more accurate representations of an independent “reality”, “way things are”, or “intrinsic nature” of 
particular concepts and notions was rejected via a pragmatic anti-realist argument. This argument, 
inspired by the work of Rorty, did not claim, as might be expected, that there “is” no such thing as an 
independent reality or an objective content of particular notions to be represented or approximated, 
but that the ubiquity and unavoidability of description makes confidently distinguishing between the 
“way things are”, or objective qualities sought after by realists and the meaning one prefers to give 
to these notions, problematic.  The pragmatic idea is that if one cannot confidently distinguish the 
thing in itself – “reality”, or an “intrinsic nature”- from the meaning we each give to these, then 
holding onto the ideas of such independent realities or “things in themselves” is pointless. One 
cannot be sure whether these independent qualities are acting as a constraint and whether they are 
being more or less accurately approximated by particular claims and descriptions. The approach 
whose goal is the more accurate representation of independent ground, a standard which can be 
used to choose between competing claims in a way which avoids relying on the mere assertion of 
particular individuals or groups - thereby rendering the “sez who?” response irrelevant – runs into 
the problem that what is being represented cannot be shown to be anything more than ourselves; 
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that what is doing the work in this exercise is anything more than our own preferred descriptions 
and the meaning we prefer to give to those “objects” the realist seeks. The idea that the world can 
have a preferred description of itself was quickly dismissed by pointing out that description requires 
language and that language requires a speaker. With this in mind, it should perhaps be unsurprising 
that the “sez who?” critique could not be avoided in the way the rejected realist approaches 
attempt; someone always has to “say”. This pragmatic argument was seen to differ from that 
attacked as self-refuting and contradictory by critics. It is not an argument that there really is no 
such thing as “the way things really are”, that the reality is that there is no “reality”, or that it is a 
matter of independent fact that there are no “independent facts”. Rather, it is an argument against 
these very concepts and ideas, and as such, not only is not made here, but actually cannot be made, 
for they use concepts the pragmatist discards.  
 
Having rejected the realist approach, based on the idea of escaping our own belief and description 
to reach independent ground with which they can be compared and on the basis of which 
competing normative claims can be independently adjudicated, the seminal argument of Gewirth 
was considered. Gewirth’s influential approach was considered in detail due to the nature of the 
method relied on and the promises it offers for the task of defending moral claims. Gewirth’s 
argument from dialectical necessity was explicitly presented by him as a means of establishing a 
supreme moral principle – one which all actions and judgements must conform with – without 
resorting to the kinds of realist claims rejected earlier. His approach was not to claim objective 
authority, or correspondence to qualities independent of the perspective of individuals, but rather 
to ground a supreme principle of morality in logic purportedly unavoidable and obligatory from 
within the perspective of all agents as demonstrated through the dialectically necessary method. 
Relying on a chain of claims unavoidable from within the perspective of any purposive agent would 
allow the “sez who?” critique to be rebutted with the response “you say, or else you contradict 
yourself and ultimately end up saying nothing of meaning”. Unfortunately, however, it was seen that 
Gewirth’s argument for his supreme principle does not live up to this promised standard in that at 
least one of the judgements – the crucial rights claiming judgement – is not the unavoidable and 
logically necessary consequence of the previous judgement in the dialectical chain. As a result, the 
purportedly unavoidable progression towards Gewirth’s principle stops, leaving that principle as 
optional and in need of defense. Gewirth’s attempt to offer an obligatory principle on the basis of 
which moral disputes could be adjudicated, in a way which avoids appealing to questionable realist 
concepts and ideas, was therefore rejected as unsuccessful on his own terms. The problem of 
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defending moral and normative assertions thus remained unresolved. On this basis, Leff’s sceptical 
conclusion of the lack of ‘any defensible moral position on, under, or about anything’1 was adopted. 
 
Having set out and defended this sceptical perspective and conclusion, its consequences for the 
constitutionalist debate were considered. Chapter 3 considered Waldron’s argument that the anti-
realist/realist issue considered in the first part of this thesis, and on which an anti-realist stance was 
taken, is irrelevant to the constitutionalist debate. Given that an aim of this thesis was to explore the 
constitutionalist debate from an anti-realist and sceptical perspective, Waldron’s claim that it is 
effectively devoid of consequences had to be considered carefully. Careful consideration showed, 
however, that his irrelevance argument amounted to what was in effect an anti-realist, or at least 
realist-hostile, argument. As well as not proving his point, it was argued that this had the effect of 
rendering Waldron’s irrelevance argument incoherent, paradoxical and therefore incapable of 
proving his point. After rejecting Waldron’s argument as to the irrelevance of realism/anti-realism 
and (non)objectivity to the issues at the heart of the constitutionalist debate, its relevance to some 
of those issues was considered. The popular instrumentalist approach – according to which decision-
making power should be distributed and justified according to the quality of the substantive 
outcomes a particular setup is likely to reach – was rejected. As well as defending Waldron’s critique 
of such approaches in practice against responses which were seen to rely on realist assumptions and 
ideas, it was argued that a consequence of the acceptance of the sceptical perspective taken here 
was that such approaches are misguided in theory. Its justification, based on the prizing of “morally 
correct” outcomes, was seen to lose force once the very idea of a “morally correct” outcome was set 
aside. In fact, it was argued that the perspective taken here has the effect of rendering the very idea 
of the instrumentalist approach – treating such “morally correct” outcomes as the goal of decision-
making and of constitutional design – meaningless. It was therefore rejected as a misguided 
approach to the debate. 
 
Chapter 4 considered another form of argument in the constitutionalist debate – arguments from 
“democracy”. These arguments, seeking to establish a particular constitutionalist case as 
“democratic”, and opponents’ as “anti-democratic” (or at least less “democratic”), were seen to be 
common among various sides of the constitutionalist debate. The discussion of a selection of these 
arguments from both legal and political constitutionalists in support of their opposing constitutional 
models drew out the particular and differing conceptions of “democracy” and “democratic 
legitimacy” relied on. This revealed that, depending on how one defines “democracy” and its 
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requirements, it could be used to support opposing constitutionalist cases. Because of this it was 
suggested that, unless it can be established which argument relies on a more accurate or superior 
conception of “democracy”, such arguments are of little use in the constitutionalist debate. It was 
argued, adopting Gallie’s “essential contestability” analysis, that no particular conception of 
“democracy” could be established as superior to another. This analysis was supported on the basis 
that “democracy” is a value-laden concept. The conception one agrees with, or takes to be the 
“true” conception, was seen to be dependent on the particular political and moral perspective of the 
individual. This was demonstrated via a deconstruction of particular constitutionalist arguments and 
the versions of “democracy” relied on. As the argument of Chapter 2 was that such moral claims 
cannot be convincingly defended against opposing claims and values, it was concluded that the 
argument over “democracy”, which was seen to amount to an argument over the values we hold as 
individuals, is one over which there is no “correct”, or convincingly defendable, outcome. No 
conception of “democracy” can be established as anything more than question-begging and 
arbitrary, so that the constitutionalist arguments relying on it cannot be shown to be anything more 
than questionable; there is no convincing means of dismissing opposing arguments, also relying on 
the questionable preferences of those putting them forward, as misguided. On this basis, 
constitutionalist arguments from “democracy” were rejected as of little use in the constitutionalist 
debate as capable of supporting many opposing constitutionalist cases. 
 
It will have been noticed, no doubt, that the argument here has been overwhelmingly negative; 
starting with the sceptical philosophical perspective against the defensibility of moral positions, and 
then, from this perspective, against the use of instrumentalist approaches, and against democratic 
arguments. This raises the question of where this leaves the constitutionalist debate and the issues 
within it. If current approaches are unsatisfactory, then what is the way forward? After all, the issues 
with which the rejected approaches were attempting to deal remain, in particular the questions of 
where decision-making power in a constitution should lie, and how it should be distributed and 
exercised. What positive contribution (if any) can the perspective taken and used to criticise current 
approaches make to these issues and to this debate?  As a preliminary note, once the use of 
arguments relying on questionable normative and moral premises is rejected as inherently unable to 
provide convincing solutions to the constitutionalist debate, it is suggested that the pragmatic way 
to proceed is to take the underlying problem of defending moral and normative positions as the 
starting point and attempt to establish a constitutionalist case on this basis. That way a 
constitutionalist case could be made out in a way which avoids the problems of convincingly 
defending normative and moral claims and values set out in this thesis. This task, undoubtedly a 
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difficult (perhaps even impossible) one, is not one which could be dealt with in this (relatively) short 
thesis. However, having cleared much of the ground through this critical examination of the 
constitutionalist debate as it currently stands, and having raised the question of what a 
constitutionalist case acceptable to the philosophical perspective taken would look like, the author 
intends to make a more positive contribution to this task in future research. This research - taking 
the form of a scholarship-funded PhD at Durham Law School, for which study has already began - 
will mark a move away from the constitutionalist debate as it currently exists, and, taking the 
negative conclusions put forward here as a starting point, will focus on the construction and 
justification of a constitutional model compatible with the philosophical perspective used to criticise 
that current debate. That is, this research will consider the question: What would, and what could, a 
sceptic’s constitution look like? 
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